

BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER  
CITY OF SEATTLE

In the Matter of the Appeal of: )  
 ) Hearing Examiner File  
**THE BALLARD COALITION** )  
 ) W-17-004  
of the adequacy of the Final Environmental Impact )  
Statement, prepared by the Seattle Department of ) SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF  
Transportation for the Burke-Gilman Trail Missing ) TRANSPORTATION'S POST-  
Link Project ) HEARING BRIEF

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Environmental Impact Statement that is the subject of this appeal documents the Seattle Department of Transportation's ("SDOT") environmental review of the Burke-Gilman Trail Missing Link Project ("Project"). The Project would complete the last 1.4 miles of the existing regional multi-use, otherwise continuous, Burke-Gilman Trail ("BGT").

SDOT has completed a thorough and comprehensive environmental analysis of the Missing Link Project, which is fully documented in the Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS"), the Draft Environmental Impact Statement ("DEIS") and their appendices. The FEIS relies on experts who used methodologies that are commonly employed in their respective professions to identify and disclose impacts. The Project location presents design challenges and demands policy judgments because of its proximity to arterial routes, Major Truck Streets, industrial and water-dependent businesses and a growing commercial neighborhood. The EIS fully informs decision-makers charged with siting and designing the Project about the Project's impacts. It discloses impacts associated with construction of five different alternatives, enabling decision-makers to resolve the Project challenges and make appropriate policy judgments.

The sole issue for resolution at this hearing is the adequacy of the FEIS. The Coalition has not met its heavy burden to sustain its challenge to the FEIS's adequacy and cannot overcome the substantial weight that the Examiner must accord to SDOT's determination of adequacy. Over the course of the hearing, the Coalition argued that SDOT should have completed its FEIS analysis differently, used different methodologies, and performed additional analysis. But the evidence at hearing established otherwise—SDOT's approach was thorough and comprehensive. A challenger can almost always argue that an EIS should have contained more or different analysis, but an EIS is not supposed to be "a compendium of every conceivable

1 effect or alternative to a proposed project, but is simply an aid to the decision-making process.”<sup>1</sup>  
2 The purpose of the Examiner’s review is not to “fly speck” the FEIS.<sup>2</sup> At best, the Coalition’s  
3 evidence amounts to a difference of opinion, which is insufficient to establish that the FEIS is  
4 inadequate. The Coalition cannot meet its heavy burden to sustain its challenge to the FEIS on  
5 these grounds.

6 Also, the Coalition’s contested evidence supporting its underlying subjective opinion of  
7 the Project (or, more typically, of the preferred alternative) is not relevant to this appeal.  
8 Although SDOT disagrees with the Coalitions opinion, it is beyond the province of the Examiner  
9 to rule on the wisdom of the proposed project. Instead, the Examiner is tasked with deciding  
10 whether the EIS provides the decision-maker with sufficient information to make a reasoned  
11 decision.<sup>3</sup> The FEIS’s analysis meets the rule of reason, and the Coalition’s appeal has no merit.  
12 The adequacy of the FEIS should be affirmed.

## 13 II. ARGUMENT

### 14 A. The Coalition misstates both the purpose of an EIS and EIS adequacy standards.

15 Washington courts apply the deferential “rule of reason” standard when considering EIS  
16 adequacy. The rule of reason is a broad, flexible cost-effectiveness standard, and does not require  
17 a discussion of every conceivable impact or an exhaustive discussion of alternatives.<sup>4</sup> Rather,  
18 because an EIS is simply an aid to the decision-making process, an EIS need only present  
19 decision-makers with a “reasonably thorough discussion” of the project’s probable significant  
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21 <sup>1</sup> *Concerned Taxpayers Opposed to Modified Mid-S. Sequim Bypass v. State, Dep’t of Transp.*, 90 Wn. App. 225,  
22 230, 951 P.2d 812, 815 (1998).

<sup>2</sup> *Mentor v. Kitsap Cty.*, 22 Wn. App. 285, 290, 588 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1978)

<sup>3</sup> *Citizens Alliance To Protect Our Wetlands v. City of Auburn*, 126 Wn.2d 356, 362, 894 P.2d 1300 (1995)  
23 (“CAPOW”).

<sup>4</sup> *Klickitat County Citizens Against Imported Waste v. Klickitat County*, 122 Wn. 2d 619, 641, 860 P.2d 390 (1993).

1 impacts to the environment.<sup>5</sup> As explained further below, the FEIS meets or exceeds this  
2 standard. It utilizes commonly accepted methodologies and approaches to quantify and assess  
3 the Project's potential impacts. SDOT even included additional analysis that is not required or  
4 typically contained in an EIS precisely so it could better assess issues of importance to various  
5 stakeholders.

6 To prevail in its appeal, the Coalition must establish that the FEIS is unreasonable. It has  
7 not, and cannot, do so. Instead, and as explained in detail below, the Coalition presented  
8 testimony that, at best, reveals a difference of opinion regarding the way the analysis could have  
9 been completed or conveyed. The Coalition's argument that the additional studies or analyses it  
10 advocates are typical or otherwise required to assess the Project's impacts are without merit. The  
11 mere existence of a difference of opinion is insufficient to support the Coalition's adequacy  
12 challenge. As Hearing Examiner Sue Tanner previously observed, "[i]t is not unusual for experts  
13 to disagree on the appropriate analytical approach to a given assignment."<sup>6</sup> Thus, "when an  
14 agency is presented with conflicting expert opinion on an issue, it is the agency's job, and not the  
15 job of the reviewing appellate body, to resolve those differences."<sup>7</sup> The reviewing body must  
16 defer to the agency's expertise and affirm its analysis of environmental impacts absent definitive  
17 contrary expert testimony showing that SDOT's experts failed to meet industry standards or the  
18 rule of reason.<sup>8</sup>

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20 <sup>5</sup> *Klickitat County*, 122 Wn.2d at 644 (upholding EIS and holding that a general discussion in a document  
incorporated by reference was sufficient to satisfy the rule of reason).

21 <sup>6</sup> Findings and Decision of the Hearing Examiner for the City of Seattle, MUP-14-016(DR,W)/S-14-001, at p. 15.

22 <sup>7</sup> *City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound Regional Council*, 98 Wn.App 37 (1999) (according deference to SEPA  
agencies' choice of methodologies and affirming hearing examiner's decision to uphold the agencies' conclusions,  
despite contrary expert opinion).

23 <sup>8</sup> *Org. to Pres. Agr. Lands v. Adams Cty.*, 128 Wn.2d 869, 881, 913 P.2d 793, 801 (1996) (affirming adequacy of  
EIS where appellant's expert witness "did not testify definitively that the studies are inadequate"); Findings and  
Decision of the Hearing Examiner, *supra* n. 16, at p. 15 (rejecting an appellant's challenge to an FSEIS noting, "The

1 More generally, the Coalition advanced several theories during the hearing that reflect a  
2 distorted view of SEPA's standards.

- 3 1. *The purpose of an EIS is to disclose significant impacts, not to design or select the*  
4 *safest project.*

5 Contrary to the Coalition's arguments and supporting witness testimony, the purpose of  
6 an EIS is to disclose probable significant impacts; not to choose the alternative with the least  
7 impact or to design the safest project. Even the Coalition's expert, Claudia Hirschey, confirmed  
8 this principle, albeit reluctantly.<sup>9</sup> The Coalition's criticisms of the FEIS for allegedly failing to  
9 present the safest design—for example, Ms. Hirschey's claim that the Preferred Alternative is  
10 not the safest alignment, or Mr. Bishop's claim that it is unsafe for trucks to cross the centerline<sup>10</sup>  
11 (even though local and national guidelines allow this maneuver)—are simply not relevant to the  
12 question of whether or not the FEIS properly identified probable significant adverse impacts.

13 An EIS's purpose is to inform decision-makers who are responsible for weighing the  
14 trade-offs of each decision. As the Coalition's witnesses admitted, any decision-making requires  
15 weighing trade-offs.<sup>11</sup> The decision-maker, not the EIS, must resolve these trade-offs. SEPA  
16 only requires the EIS to inform the decision-maker about the impacts so that the trade-offs can be  
17 resolved as part of the ultimate Project decision.<sup>12</sup>

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19 Appellants have shown that the transportation analysis could have been done differently. They have not shown that  
20 [the applicant's expert's] analysis failed to meet industry standards, or that it failed to present . . . a reasonably  
21 thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the proposal's probable transportation impacts.”).

22 <sup>9</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1908:21 – 1909:10 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

23 <sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 1878:22 – 1879:6 (testimony of C. Hirschey); 11/27/17 Tr., at 63:16-25 (testimony of V. Bishop).

<sup>11</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 595:6-11 (testimony of S. Kuznicki). For example, as Brad Phillips testified, to preserve lanes,  
sidewalk space may need to be eliminated. 11/30/17 Tr., at 1069:12-17; 1227:15-25. Similarly, Bill Schultheiss  
testified that the choice of bicycle facility type requires evaluating trade-offs, as described in the national AASHTO  
guidelines. *Id.* at 1227:15-25.

<sup>12</sup> *Save Our Rural Env't v. Snohomish Cty.*, 99 Wn.2d 363, 371, 662 P.2d 816, 820 (1983) (stating, “SEPA is  
essentially a procedural statute” and “was not designed to usurp local decisionmaking or to dictate a particular  
substantive result”).

1           2. *The purpose of an EIS is to disclose impacts to the environment as a whole, not to*  
2           *individuals.*

3           Contrary to the suggestion of several Coalition witnesses and counsel, the purpose of an  
4           EIS is to disclose and discuss probable impacts to the environment as a whole, and should not  
5           over-emphasize impacts specific individuals or their preferences.<sup>13</sup> Yet, much of the Coalition’s  
6           testimony decried the sufficiency of discussion of impacts to specific individuals and businesses.  
7           For example, the Coalition’s counsel repeatedly asked SDOT’s economics expert, Morgan  
8           Shook, whether he had examined the Project’s impacts to an individual business,<sup>14</sup> and the  
9           Coalition’s witnesses highlighted impacts to specific driveways.<sup>15</sup> The Coalition failed to  
10          establish that any potential impact to individual businesses amounted to an undisclosed  
11          significant impact to the environment as a whole. Although SDOT *did* include some information  
12          related to specific businesses to aid in its analysis of the broader impact, EISs are not required to  
13          account for the types of limited individual impacts described by Coalition witnesses because  
14          such an approach is not consistent with the purpose of an EIS.<sup>16</sup>

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18           <sup>13</sup> See WAC 197-11-444 (listing the elements of the environment) and RCW 43-21C-020 (“Legislative recognitions  
19          – Declarations – Responsibility,” indicating that the legislature viewed SEPA as based on importance of the “overall  
20          welfare and development of human beings” and that SEPA should be applied, in part, to “foster and promote the  
21          general welfare.” Moreover, RCW 43-21C-020(2) requires the state and agencies to work, in part, to “assure for all  
22          people of Washington safe, healthful productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings”).

23          <sup>14</sup> 12/1/17 Tr., at 1410:15-17 (“[W]hat does that tell me as a business along Shilshole about the economic impact on  
my business?”), 1427:18-22 (same).

<sup>15</sup> E.g., testimony of Scott Kuznicki, 11/28/17 Tr., at 494:5 – 503:25 (regarding videos of truck movements at  
Salmon Bay Sand and Gravel driveway); testimony of Tim Olstad (employee of Salmon Bay Sand and Gravel)

<sup>16</sup> In *SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards*, the court held that a proposal’s adverse impact on surrounding property  
values was not an environmental impact, but was akin to “profits and personal income” expressly exempted from  
EIS coverage. Impacts to individual businesses adjacent to the proposed trail are likewise not required to be  
analyzed in an EIS. 49 Wn. App. 609, 616, 744 P.2d 1101, 1105 (1987). See also discussion *supra*, Section H.

1           3. *The FEIS disclosed all probable impacts and potential mitigation of said impacts;*  
2           *whether those impacts were labeled as “significant” or not is not grounds for*  
3           *invalidating the FEIS.*

4           Contrary to the Coalition’s assertions at hearing, the lack of “significant impacts”  
5 identified in the FEIS is irrelevant. The question of whether an impact is significant is only  
6 germane to the question of whether or not an EIS is required. It does not bear on the question of  
7 EIS adequacy. Here, SDOT has prepared an EIS that discloses all probable impacts and  
8 discusses potential mitigation of those impacts. Whether the EIS labels those impacts as  
9 significant or not is beside the point.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty  
10 in defining significance, observing, “[A] precise and workable definition [of significance] is  
11 elusive because judgments in this area are particularly subjective—what to one person may  
12 constitute a significant or adverse effect on the quality of the environment may be of little or no  
13 consequence to another.”<sup>18</sup> Because the FEIS discloses all probable impacts, the Coalition’s  
14 subjective judgments about the significance of those impacts are not grounds for finding the  
15 FEIS inadequate.

16           4. *The Coalition cannot rely on evidence that was not reasonably available at the*  
17           *time SDOT prepared the FEIS.*

18           EIS adequacy must be decided on the basis of evidence predating EIS issuance. “Under  
19 the rule of reason, it would be preposterous to expect an EIS to disclose and analyze facts that  
20 were not known and not reasonably knowable at the time the EIS was issued.”<sup>19</sup> To the extent the  
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22 <sup>17</sup> No published Washington case has found an FEIS inadequate on the grounds that the FEIS should have labeled an  
23 impact as “significant” or “not significant.”

<sup>18</sup> *Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass’n v. King Cty. Council*, 87 Wn.2d 267, 277, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976).

<sup>19</sup> *Settle, supra*, at 14-27.



1 Coalition raised facts that were not known and not reasonably known at the time the EIS was  
2 issued, those facts cannot be a basis for finding the EIS inadequate.<sup>20</sup>

3 B. The Examiner must give substantial weight to SDOT's EIS adequacy determination.

4 As explained in SDOT's Pre-Hearing Brief, SEPA requires the Examiner to give  
5 substantial weight to SDOT's determination of EIS adequacy. In relevant part, RCW  
6 43.21C.090 provides:

7 In any action involving an attack on a determination by a governmental agency  
8 relative to . . . the adequacy of a "detailed statement", the decision of the  
9 governmental agency **shall** be accorded **substantial weight**.

9 (Emphases added).<sup>21</sup>

10 Washington courts routinely recognize this statutory mandate. *City of Des Moines v.*  
11 *Puget Sound Reg'l Council*, 98 Wn. App. 23, 849–50, 988 P.2d 27, 35 (1999) (citing "SEPA's  
12 statutory requirement that agency determinations of EIS adequacy are entitled to substantial  
13 weight"); *Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane*, 114 Wn.2d 20, 34, 785 P.2d 447, 455 (1990)  
14 (stating "this court will give the agency's decision 'substantial weight'"); *see also* R. Settle, *The*  
15 *Washington State Environmental Policy Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis*, at 14-23 (2016)  
16 (stating that EIS adequacy decisions are "subject to the statutory directive that the agency's  
17 determination 'shall be accorded substantial weight'").<sup>22</sup> There is no merit to the Coalition's  
18 argument that SDOT is not entitled to this statutorily-mandated deference.

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>20</sup> *E.g., infra*, at Section F(d)(8).

21 <sup>21</sup> *See also* RCW 43.21C.075(3)(d) (confirming that when an agency provides for administrative appeal of EIS  
22 adequacy, the responsible official's procedural determinations must receive "substantial weight"); WAC 197-11-  
23 680(3)(viii) (stating the same).

22 <sup>22</sup> SEPA, as originally enacted in 1971, contained no standards of judicial review. Settle, *supra*, at 4-4. However, in  
23 1973 the legislature amended SEPA by enacting RCW 43.21C.090 directing courts to accord "substantial weight" to  
EIS adequacy determinations. 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 179, § 3. This type of statutory amendment to add a standard of  
review is an "unusual additional step" that requires giving effect to "the legislature's explicitly stated intent." *See*  
*Quadrant Corp. v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.*, 154 Wn.2d 224, 237-38, 110 P.3d 1132, 1139 (2005) (holding

1 Even under general principles of agency deference, where there is no specific statutory  
2 mandate to grant deference or substantial weight, courts refrain from extending deference to an  
3 agency action only when the agency acts in manner that is “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to  
4 law,” meaning the action was “willing and unreasoning, and taken without regard to the  
5 attending facts or circumstances.”<sup>23</sup> The Coalition has not cited any authority to support applying  
6 these general principles when the applicable statute mandates deference. Moreover, even if these  
7 principles applied, there is no evidence that SDOT’s actions were arbitrary, capricious or  
8 contrary to law. Rather, the Coalition attempts to erode the deference owed to SDOT by  
9 focusing on decisions that are not relevant to SDOT’s determination of the FEIS’s adequacy,  
10 such as work on advancing design initiated shortly before the FEIS’s publication. As the  
11 Examiner already concluded, these allegations of purported impropriety are outside the scope of  
12 the Coalition’s appeal,<sup>24</sup> and are not relevant to the adequacy of the FEIS. In short, the Coalition  
13 has not provided any legal authority supporting its argument that statutorily required deference  
14 can be overcome by allegations of impropriety related to issues that are beyond the scope of the  
15 appeal, and which are entirely unrelated to the adequacy of the EIS. The Coalition’s argument  
16 that the Examiner should refrain from extending the deference owed to SDOT in this case is no  
17 more than a thinly veiled attempt to expand the scope of the Coalition’s appeal and undermine  
18 SDOT’s credibility.

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21 that the legislative intent to grant deference under the Growth Management Act supersedes deference granted by the  
Administrative Procedure Act).

<sup>23</sup> *Schneider v. Snyder's Foods, Inc.*, 116 Wn. App. 706, 716, 66 P.3d 640, 645 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).

<sup>24</sup> The Examiner has already ruled that issues relating to SDOT’s actions after the FEIS’s completion were not raised  
22 in the Coalition’s appeal and constitute a different SEPA challenge; thus, any post-FEIS evidence will not be  
23 considered as part of this appeal except in the context of the deference issue. 12/1/17 Tr., at 1501:13 – 1502:2. To  
the extent the Coalition relies on SDOT’s actions before the EIS process (e.g., prior appeals or designs), such  
evidence is also irrelevant to this appeal.

1 In any event, the Coalition’s argument fails because SDOT’s actions were consistent with  
2 both SEPA and the Seattle Municipal Code (“SMC”). The Coalition tried to show that an agency  
3 is prohibited from taking *any* action prior to the issuance of an FEIS,<sup>25</sup> but the provision they  
4 cited includes an exception that expressly allowed SDOT to proceed with project design.  
5 Specifically, the exception allows “developing plans or designs, issuing requests for proposals  
6 (RFPs), securing options, or performing other work necessary to develop an application for a  
7 proposal, as long as such activities are consistent with subsection 25.05.070.A,”<sup>26</sup> which limits  
8 the taking of an action that will limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. As established by the  
9 only testimony presented about this topic at hearing, SDOT’s actions fit squarely within this  
10 exception. SDOT’s Environmental Manager, Mark Mazzola, testified that SDOT’s only action  
11 before FEIS issuance (in May 2017) was the commencement of discussions with a consultant  
12 (around late March 2017) to develop the Preferred Alternative’s design.<sup>27</sup> As Mr. Mazzola  
13 testified, this action was consistent with the exception set forth in SMC 25.05.070(D) to the  
14 prohibition on further action because it was limited to development of project design and did not  
15 in any way limit SDOT’s choice of alternatives.<sup>28</sup> The Coalition’s interpretation of SMC  
16 25.05.070 would render the express exception set forth in SMC 25.05.070(D) meaningless  
17 because an agency would be barred from performing even the limited work allowed under SMC

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20 <sup>25</sup> SMC 25.05.070(A) states in full, “Until the responsible official issues a final determination of nonsignificance or  
21 final environmental impact statement, no action concerning the proposal shall be taken by a governmental agency  
22 that would: 1. Have an adverse environmental impact; or 2. Limit the choice of reasonable alternatives.”

23 <sup>26</sup> SMC 25.05.070(D).

<sup>27</sup> 12/1/17 Tr., at 1494:4 – 1495:7 (testimony of M. Mazzola).

<sup>28</sup> Notably, Mr. Mazzola did not testify that the consultant even advanced the Preferred Alternative’s design before  
the FEIS’s issuance. The Coalition’s counsel also mischaracterized Brad Phillips’ testimony about the costs of  
advancing design. The Coalition’s counsel claimed Mr. Phillips said that it cost \$250,000 to \$350,000 to advance  
designs from ten percent to 30 percent. 12/1/17 Tr., at 1515:11-13. In fact, Mr. Phillips stated that that was the cost  
to advance designs for construction (i.e., 100% final design). 11/30/17 Tr., at 1031:1-8.

1 25.05.070(D), such as the work that SDOT did in this case. Such a result is contrary to basic  
2 rules of statutory construction.<sup>29</sup>

3 The Coalition’s reliance on SMC 25.05.070(E) is also unavailing. SMC 25.05.070(E)  
4 provides that “[n]o final authorization of any permit shall be granted until expiration of the time  
5 period for filing an appeal in accordance with Section 25.05.680, or if an appeal is filed, until the  
6 fifth day following termination of the appeal.” (Emphasis added.). It is uncontested that the City  
7 has not authorized any permits for this Project.<sup>30</sup>

8 C. SDOT’s role as lead agency was proper.

9 As the Examiner has already ruled, SDOT’s role as both project proponent and lead  
10 agency “as a matter of law does not serve as a basis upon which the Coalition may challenge the  
11 FEIS.”<sup>31</sup> Regardless, the Coalition continues to advance a theory that SDOT improperly  
12 influenced its consultants. Contrary to the Coalition’s claims, SDOT’s work with its consultants  
13 is entirely consistent with its role as lead agency under SEPA.

14 WAC 197-11-420 contemplates an active, controlling role for lead agencies. “Preparation  
15 of the EIS is the responsibility of the lead agency,” and “[n]o matter who participates in the  
16 preparation of the EIS, it is the EIS of the lead agency.”<sup>32</sup> The lead agency bears the  
17 responsibility of “assur[ing] that the EIS is prepared in a professional manner and with  
18 appropriate interdisciplinary methodology, and the responsible official bears the responsibility of  
19 “direct[ing] the areas of research and examination to be undertaken.”<sup>33</sup> Without exception, all of

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21 <sup>29</sup> *State v. Lilyblad*, 163 Wn.2d 1, 11, 177 P.3d 686, 690 (2008) (“This court may not interpret any part of a statute  
as meaningless or superfluous.”).

22 <sup>30</sup> As Mr. Mazzola testified, since the FEIS’s publication, SDOT has not made a formal decision or taken any action  
as defined under SEPA. 12/1/17 Tr., at 1514:1-6.

23 <sup>31</sup> Order on Motion to Dismiss entered September 28, 2017.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*

<sup>33</sup> *Id.*

1 SDOT's witnesses who testified on this subject, each of whom has extensive EIS experience,  
2 testified that it is common for the lead agency or project applicant to provide comments and  
3 feedback to the consultants involved in EIS preparation, and that SDOT did not interfere with  
4 their independent professional judgment.<sup>34</sup> SDOT's role in this FEIS was no different than any  
5 other lead agency these witnesses had worked with.

6 It is apparent from the evidence at the hearing that SDOT staff's comments on its  
7 consultants' work product were simply suggestions, feedback, or questions to which the  
8 consultants ultimately agreed.<sup>35</sup> For example, as Ms. Ellig testified, she adopted SDOT's  
9 comment to revise language from "traffic hazards" to "incident response data," because the latter  
10 term was more appropriate and was, in fact, supported by data.<sup>36</sup> Morgan Shook testified that he  
11 removed the monetization of traffic delay that was in his draft report because he agreed with  
12 SDOT's comment that the calculation was not precise and could be misinterpreted as showing  
13 the actual cost to businesses.<sup>37</sup>

14 The Examiner should reject the suggestion that SDOT's working relationship with its  
15 consultants was improper.

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20 <sup>34</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 977:3 – 978:24 (testimony of E. Ellig); 11/30/17 Tr., at 1204:22 - 1205:25 (testimony of M.  
21 Johnson); 12/1/17 Tr., 1386: 1-8; 1384:2-12 (testimony of M. Shook); 12/1/17 Tr., 1456:25; 1457:1-23; 1466:8-16  
(testimony of M. Mazzola).

22 <sup>35</sup> See 12/1/17 Tr., at 1540:18 – 1548:14 (testimony of M. Mazzola regarding SDOT's comments).

23 <sup>36</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 921:4-17 (testimony of E. Ellig).

<sup>37</sup> Compare 12/1/17 Tr., at 1378:4 – 1384:1 (testimony of M. Shook regarding changes to draft report) *with id.* at  
1547:4-20 (testimony of M. Mazzola regarding his comments to the draft report noting "I don't think it's appropriate  
to monetize the delay . . . . Having said that, I'd like to understand the methodology and the calculation that went  
into this analysis").

1 D. SDOT's analysis of alternatives satisfies the rule of reason.

2 1. *SEPA allows agencies to use its proposal to define its alternatives and to limit its*  
3 *alternatives analysis to a single type of facility or design.*

4 SEPA requires agencies to ensure that project proposals are “properly defined.”<sup>38</sup> The  
5 agency may then use a properly defined proposal as the benchmark for identifying and  
6 comparing alternatives.<sup>39</sup> Under the rule of reason, a project proponent need only look at  
7 reasonable alternatives—”actions that could feasibly attain or approximate a proposal’s  
8 objectives, but at a lower environmental cost or decreased level of environmental degradation.”<sup>40</sup>

9 An agency’s decision as to what is or is not a reasonable alternative is afforded “great  
10 weight.”<sup>41</sup> Courts defer to agency definitions of proposals and the use of such proposals as a  
11 starting point in identifying reasonable alternatives.<sup>42</sup> For example, in *Concerned Taxpayers*  
12 *Opposed to Modified Mid-S. Sequim Bypass v. State, Dep’t of Transp.*, the agency defined its  
13 proposal as a four-lane bypass highway around Sequim, and the court held that the EIS was not  
14 deficient for considering only four-lane alternatives and excluding two-lane alternatives.<sup>43</sup>  
15 Notably, that project was funded for only a two-lane highway, and the Washington State  
16 Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) stated in the FEIS that the remainder of the project  
17 (expanding the bypass to four lanes) would be constructed “as warranted and as money is  
18 available.”<sup>44</sup> Despite the lack of funding, the court cited WSDOT’s commitment to eventually  
19 building the four-lane highway and upheld the consideration of only four-lane alternatives.

20 \_\_\_\_\_  
21 <sup>38</sup> WAC 197-11-060(3).

22 <sup>39</sup> *Id.*; WAC 197-11-440.

23 <sup>40</sup> WAC 197-11-440(5)(b)

<sup>41</sup> *Solid Waste Alternative Proponents v. Okanogan Cty.*, 66 Wn. App. 439, 445, 832 P.2d 503, 507 (1992)

<sup>42</sup> *Settle, supra*, at 14-65 (stating, “the proponents’ purpose is necessarily the starting point in identifying reasonable alternatives”).

<sup>43</sup> *Concerned Taxpayers*, 90 Wn. App. at 230, 951 P.2d 812.

<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at 228.

1 In *Solid Waste Alternative Proponents v. Okanogan Cty.*, the agency defined its proposal  
2 as an in-county solid waste landfill, and the court upheld EIS exclusion of an out-of-county  
3 alternative.<sup>45</sup> The court stated that the decision to look only at in-county sites was a policy  
4 decision, not an environmental decision, and upheld Okanogan County’s policy decision because  
5 the environment is not the only consideration in situating a landfill.<sup>46</sup> The court also upheld the  
6 EIS’s analysis of only two in-county sites, even though a County study had rated four sites as  
7 equally suitable.<sup>47</sup> As the court stated, no matter which alternative the County selected,  
8 “someone would have been unhappy,” but “community displeasure cannot be the basis” for  
9 selecting alternatives.<sup>48</sup>

10 For the same reasons, the alternatives analysis here is adequate. SDOT, like WSDOT and  
11 Okanogan County, is committed to completing the BGT, an existing regional multi-use trail.  
12 This commitment is expressed not only by SDOT, but also as a matter of policy in several City  
13 plans. The BGT’s completion has been in the City’s comprehensive plan since the 1990s.<sup>49</sup> The  
14 Bicycle Master Plan identifies the Project as a “catalyst project” that “reduce[s] critical barriers  
15 to bicycling by closing network gaps and increase[s] safety by building all ages and abilities  
16 friendly bicycle facilities to the maximum feasible extent.”<sup>50</sup> The Pedestrian Master Plan  
17 identifies the Preferred Alternative corridor as part of the “Priority Investment Network” for  
18 pedestrian travel.<sup>51</sup> The FEIS presented five build alternatives that could reasonably fulfill the  
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21 <sup>45</sup> 66 Wn. App. at 444, 832 P.2d 503, 506.

22 <sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 444.

23 <sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 445.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.* at 446.

<sup>49</sup> Exhibit R-1 at 1-1.

<sup>50</sup> Exhibit R-8 at p. 40.

<sup>51</sup> Exhibit R-36 at p. 56; 12/1/17 Tr., at 1462:1-12 (testimony of M. Mazzola).

1 Project’s objectives and the City’s plans. The Coalition’s displeasure with these alternatives  
2 cannot be the basis for finding the alternatives analysis inadequate.

3 In addition to identifying reasonable alternatives, the FEIS comprehensively analyzed  
4 each of the alternatives in detail. The FEIS need only devote sufficiently detailed analysis to each  
5 alternative to permit a comparative evaluation, and may vary the amount of consideration given  
6 to each alternative.<sup>52</sup> As illustrated by the FEIS’s table of contents, it provided an in-depth  
7 assessment of each alternative. For every section devoted to the Preferred Alternative, a separate  
8 section is provided for the four other build alternatives and the no build alternative. The number  
9 of alternatives considered and the level of scrutiny provided in the FEIS clearly surpasses the  
10 requirements necessary to demonstrate sufficient alternatives analysis.<sup>53</sup>

11 2. *The FEIS analyzed and reasonably rejected the Coalition’s preferred alternative*  
12 *facility types.*

13 “An EIS is not required to include all reasonable alternatives but a reasonable number  
14 and range.”<sup>54</sup> The FEIS analyzed a reasonable number and range of alternatives consistent with  
15 the properly defined project. Conversely, the alternatives proffered by the Coalition—an  
16 elevated bridge and bicycle-only facility (either a one-way or two-way cycle tracks) do not meet  
17 the Project’s objective to provide a multi-use trail. They are different types of transportation  
18 facilities. As the court held in the Sequim bypass case, different facility types or types of design  
19 are not necessary for a reasonable alternatives analysis. In that case, the FEIS considered only  
20 one type of design for one type of facility—a four-lane highway—that the agency lacked funding

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22 <sup>52</sup> WAC 197-11-440(5)(c).

23 <sup>53</sup> *E.g., Solid Waste Alternative Proponents.*, 66 Wn. App. at 445, 832 P.2d 503, 507 (holding that the EIS’s consideration of two alternative sites for an in-county landfill was sufficient); *CAPOW*, 126 Wn.2d at 367 (holding that the EIS sufficiently considered alternative sites where it identified and examined three sites and concluded they all contained flaws that rendered them infeasible);



1 to build.<sup>55</sup> The court concluded that this approach was reasonable. Similarly, SDOT’s policy  
2 decision to focus on building a facility that matches the existing BGT is reasonable.

3 The evidence in the record also demonstrates that the alternative facility types proposed  
4 by the Coalition are unreasonable and supports SDOT’s decision documented in the FEIS to  
5 reject those alternatives.<sup>56</sup> For example, the elevated bridge alternative is unreasonable because,  
6 as the Coalition admitted, this alternative has a “significantly higher cost than an at-grade trail”  
7 and provides “no intermediate access to the trail,”<sup>57</sup> meaning that users would be forced to travel  
8 the entire length, from 22<sup>nd</sup> Avenue to 17<sup>th</sup> Avenue, to exit the bridge. The lack of access is  
9 inconsistent with the project objective of accommodating all users, which would require a bridge  
10 with additional access points, would require a much bigger footprint, and would cost  
11 significantly more than the already significant cost of the Coalition’s proposal.<sup>58</sup>

12 With respect to the bicycle-only facilities, it is important to note that the Examiner  
13 previously dismissed the Coalition’s claims based on that type of facility alternative because the  
14 Coalition failed to provide any supporting argument or evidence to support the alternative when  
15 the City challenged it in a pre-trial motion.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, no further discussion is necessary.  
16 Nevertheless, the evidence in the record supports SDOT’s decision to exclude that alternative  
17 from further analysis and the Coalition has not met its burden to prove otherwise. Although the  
18 Coalition challenged the safety of two-way trails because of the contraflow movement, the  
19 Coalition presented no evidence about the feasibility of one-way trails or any other design

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21 <sup>54</sup> Settle, *supra*, at 14-66.

22 <sup>55</sup> *Concerned Taxpayers*, 90 Wn. App. at 230.

23 <sup>56</sup> In fact, the FEIS specifically considered both but rejected them because these facilities. Exhibit R-1, at 1-33.

<sup>57</sup> Exhibit A-1, at p. 046.

<sup>58</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1091:15 – 1092:1 (testimony of B. Phillips); *see Solid Waste*, 66 Wn.App. at 446 (recognizing cost-effectiveness basis for the rule of reason).

<sup>59</sup> Order on Motion to Dismiss, W-17-004, filed September 28, 2017, at 3.

1 alternative. The Coalition’s displeasure with the Project’s design is insufficient to establish that  
2 the alternatives analysis is insufficient.

3 In addition to one-way facilities not meeting the project objective, SDOT’s witnesses  
4 established other reasons why one-way trail alternatives would not be reasonable here. As Bill  
5 Schultheiss explained, placing one-way trails on both sides of Shilshole would introduce several  
6 risk factors from the north side of Shilshole, such as additional street intersections, driveway  
7 crossings, and higher volumes of traffic turning across the trail’s path.<sup>60</sup> Blake Trask explained  
8 that the Project is bookended on both ends by the BGT’s existing facility type—one-way multi-  
9 use trail—making it inappropriate to switch facility types in the middle.<sup>61</sup> SDOT’s policy  
10 decision to focus on building a facility that matches the existing BGT is reasonable and should  
11 be sustained.

12 E. The Project was sufficiently designed to evaluate impacts.

13 As has been confirmed repeatedly in these proceedings and in related superior court  
14 proceedings,<sup>62</sup> SEPA does not require a project proponent to design a proposal to a uniform,  
15 specific percentage of completion before environmental review can be conducted. Instead, SEPA  
16 requires design sufficient to reasonably identify the principal features of the proposal and its  
17 environmental impacts.<sup>63</sup> The Coalition has failed to present evidence to support its claim that  
18 the underlying design is insufficient.

19 First, all of SDOT’s experts who testified on the matter agreed that the design was  
20 sufficient to evaluate and disclose impacts. The experts also testified that the Project’s level of  
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22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>60</sup> 12/1/17 Tr., at 1288:1 – 1289:4 (testimony of B. Schultheiss).

<sup>61</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1732:16 – 1733:8 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

1 design is typical for an EIS.<sup>64</sup> To provide an accurate comparison across alternatives, all of the  
2 alternatives would need to be designed to the same level. The design fulfills SEPA's mandate  
3 that an EIS be prepared "at the earliest possible point in the planning and decision-making  
4 process."<sup>65</sup>

5 Even the Coalition's witnesses support this conclusion. Ms. Hirschey ultimately  
6 admitted that she previously worked on an EIS (for the Lynnwood Link Extension) that  
7 evaluated impacts based on a "conceptual design," which did not include "design elements [that]  
8 would be further detailed in later stages of project design."<sup>66</sup> Brad Phillips, the lead civil designer  
9 for the Lynnwood Link Extension and the person who determined that the Project's design was  
10 sufficient for the EIS,<sup>67</sup> confirmed that the Lynnwood project's level of design was "very  
11 similar" to the level of design here.<sup>68</sup>

12 Further, the Coalition failed to identify any aspect of the design that was insufficient to  
13 allow evaluation of impacts. According to Ms. Hirschey's report, a sufficient design requires  
14 survey data, documentation of sight distance, and would enable documentation of truck  
15 tracking.<sup>69</sup> The Project's design included survey data and documentation of sight distance,<sup>70</sup>  
16 which Ms. Hirschey's report confirmed was not an impact issue based on the level of design  
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19 <sup>62</sup> Order on Motion to Dismiss filed herein on September 18, 2017; Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Second  
Order of Remand, filed in No. 09-2-26586-1 SEA on October 18, 2017; Order Denying Plaintiffs' LRC 7(b)(70  
Renewed Motion to Enforce Second Order of Remand, filed in No. 09-2-26586-1 SEA on November 29, 2017.

20 <sup>63</sup> WAC 197-11-055.

21 <sup>64</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 918:1-14 (testimony of E. Ellig); 11/30/17 Tr., at 1075:15-19 (testimony of B. Phillips); 11/30/17  
Tr., at 1301:16 -1302:25 (testimony of B. Schultheiss); 12/1/17 Tr., at 1466:13-16 (testimony of M. Mazzola).

22 <sup>65</sup> WAC 197-11-055(2); SMC 25.05.055(b). *See also* WAC 197-11-406 and SMC 25.05.406 (stating, "[t]he lead  
agency shall commence preparation of the environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the  
agency is developing or is presented with a proposal").

23 <sup>66</sup> to 12/5/17 Tr., at 1906:13 – 1907:15 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>67</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1078:11 – 1079:4 (testimony of B. Philips).

<sup>68</sup> *Id.* at 1035:18 – 1036:5.

<sup>69</sup> Exhibit A-3 at p. 5.

1 completed.<sup>71</sup> And as explained below, “truck tracking” is not an analysis typically required or  
2 necessary for an EIS. Nevertheless, SDOT’s design was adequate and sufficient to allow  
3 SDOT’s experts and the Coalition’s expert to perform Autoturn analyses to document truck  
4 tracking issues for purposes of judging design sufficiency.

5 The Coalition’s witnesses’ testimony that the design was based on ranges (for example,  
6 ranges of trail and lane widths), and thus was insufficiently designed to determine whether the  
7 trail met standards, was also inaccurate. The design drawings prepared by Mr. Phillips show that  
8 the Project was designed with specific widths and dimensions.<sup>72</sup> As Mr. Phillips explained, the  
9 FEIS describes the widths as a range because the dimensions could change during further  
10 design.<sup>73</sup> Thus, the use of ranges more accurately captures and discloses the possibility of future  
11 adjustments, but this does not suggest that the Project was not sufficiently designed.

12 F. The FEIS’s transportation and safety analysis meets the rule of reason.

13 1. *SDOT’s analysis was based on reasonable and standard methodologies.*

14 Under the rule of reason, an EIS is adequate if it provides a “reasonably thorough  
15 discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences” of the  
16 decision.<sup>74</sup> The FEIS’s transportation and safety analysis meets the rule of reason. The  
17 transportation analysis is primarily documented in two locations: chapter 7 of the FEIS<sup>75</sup>; and the  
18 Transportation Discipline Report appended to the FEIS.<sup>76</sup> As discussed below and by all of

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20 <sup>70</sup> Exhibit R-10; 11/27/17 Tr., at 164:21 – 165:7 (testimony of V. Bishop regarding survey data); 11/29/17 Tr., at  
892:11 – 893:16 (testimony of E. Ellig).

21 <sup>71</sup> Exhibit A-3 at p. 8 (noting with respect to sight distance under the Preferred Alternative, “Trail moved further  
from edge of street and barriers were eliminated”).

22 <sup>72</sup> Exhibit R-10; 11/30/17 Tr., at 1032:20 – 1033:12 (testimony of B. Phillips).

23 <sup>73</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1033:3-12 (testimony of B. Phillips).

<sup>74</sup> *Klickitat County*, 122 Wn.2d at 644.

<sup>75</sup> Ex. R-1.

<sup>76</sup> Ex. R-3.

1 SDOT's witnesses who testified about this issue, the FEIS was based on standard and reasonable  
2 practices and national and local guidelines;<sup>77</sup> applied conservative assumptions;<sup>78</sup> gathered data  
3 using reasonable and standard methods;<sup>79</sup> and, in many instances, performed more analysis than  
4 is typical in an EIS.<sup>80</sup>

5 The FEIS also adequately compares the Project to existing conditions under the "no  
6 build" alternative, as required by SEPA.<sup>81</sup> The FEIS's transportation analysis begins with a  
7 summary of existing conditions, followed by an analysis of future conditions if the Project were  
8 not built.<sup>82</sup> As Respondents' witnesses testified, a substantial number of cyclists are using the  
9 street under existing conditions; the concerns that the Coalition raised are issues under existing  
10 conditions and are not attributable to the Project. In fact, the Project improves conditions as  
11 compared to the existing conditions in a number of significant ways.<sup>83</sup>

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14 <sup>77</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 822:2 – 840:23 (testimony of E. Ellig describing her methodology for assessing vehicular  
15 operations, freight, non-motorized transportation, public transportation, freight rail, and safety and confirming that  
16 the methodologies are typically used in her profession and was peer-reviewed by her team at Parametrix, the  
17 Environmental Science Associates team, and SDOT); 11/30/17 Tr., at 1026:14 – 1027:24 (testimony of B. Phillips  
18 regarding his use of the NACTO and AASHTO guidelines in designing the Project).

16 <sup>78</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 818:16-25 (testimony of E. Ellig regarding list of additional analyses done for this FEIS that are  
17 typical for EIS); 830:15-22 (testimony of E. Ellig regarding additional collection and analysis of driveway delay not  
18 typical of EIS); 906:12-14 (testimony of E. Ellig regarding use of the PM peak hour to "establish the worst-case  
19 condition"); 11/30/17 Tr., at 1042:2-4; 1097:10-17 (testimony of B. Phillips regarding SDOT's manual's  
20 specification that the standard design vehicle is a single unit truck (SU-30), and Mr. Phillips' use of a larger design  
21 vehicle (WB-50) at certain locations).

19 <sup>79</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., 821:23 – 822:1; 823:20-25; 917:20-24 (testimony of E. Ellig). 11/30/17 Tr., at 1075:10-14  
(testimony of B. Phillips). 12/1/17 Tr., at 1302:17 – 1303:2 (testimony of B. Schultheiss); 1476:22 – 1477:6  
(testimony of M. Mazzola). 12/5/17 Tr., at 1796:24 – 1797:3 (testimony of D. Chang); 12/5/17 Tr., at 1860:19-25  
(testimony of C. Hirschey acknowledging that the tools used in SDOT's analysis are "commonly used").

20 <sup>80</sup> 11/19/17 Tr., at 824:15-17; 855:8-21 (testimony of E. Ellig, explaining that she examined and collected data 44  
21 driveways, and that she has not typically done as extensive an analysis of driveways as SDOT did here); 11/30/17  
22 Tr., at 1039:14 – 1040:10 (testimony of B. Phillips, explaining that AutoTURN analyses are typically used in final  
23 design, and that it is not typical to use AutoTURN on driveways).

22 <sup>81</sup> WAC 197-11-440(5)(b)(ii) (requiring comparison of the "no action" alternative to other alternatives).

22 <sup>82</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at Chapter 4 ("Affected Environment"); Section 5.1 ("Potential Impacts - No Build  
Alternative")

23 <sup>83</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 834:14-25; 902:20-25 (testimony of E. Ellig); 11/30/17 Tr., at 1060:3-21 (testimony of B.  
Phillips); 11/30/17 Tr., at 1258:3 – 1259:22 (testimony of B. Schultheiss).

1           2. *To advance the Coalition's arguments, its witnesses expressed opinions that were*  
2           *not credible.*

3           The Examiner must determine the facts of this case based, in part, on his judgment of  
4           witness credibility and must determine the value or weight to be given to the testimony of each  
5           witness.<sup>84</sup> With regard to expert witnesses, the Examiner is not required to accept an expert's  
6           opinion. To determine the credibility and weight to be given to an expert, the Examiner may  
7           consider the reasons given for an opinion and the sources of his or her information.<sup>85</sup> Here,  
8           Coalition witnesses were forced to support untenable theories that were inconsistent in many  
9           cases with their own past practices. As a result, their credibility suffered, and the strength of  
10          their opinions was undermined, and they failed to refute the testimony of SDOT's experts. For  
11          example:

12           • Mr. Kuznicki admitted that his expert opinion "depends on who my client is,"  
13           suggesting that his conclusions would be different had he been retained by SDOT rather than the  
14           Coalition.<sup>86</sup> He criticized the effectiveness of pavement markings and signage in this proceeding,  
15           despite having approved drawings for those specific design elements in an earlier iteration of the  
16           trail. This demonstrates his willingness to change his positions depending on who pays the bill.  
17           His opinions are unreliable.

18           • Ms. Hirshey proclaimed that she was not aware of any involvement in an EIS  
19           that relied on concept level of design, that "most" EISs on which she had worked were designed

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20  
21          <sup>84</sup> Among other factors, the Examiner may consider the opportunity of the witness to observe and know things  
22          related to the witness's testimony; any personal interest the witness might have in the outcome or the issues; any  
23          bias or prejudice that the witness may have shown; and, the reasonableness of the witnesses' statements. *See, e.g.*,  
Washington Pattern Jury Instruction ("WPI") 1.02. Consistent with this principle, the Examiner should give the  
appropriate weight to lay opinion testimony offered by Coalition witnesses, none of which was sufficient to rebut  
the reasoned testimony of SDOT's expert witnesses that utilized standard methods of their profession to assess  
potential project impacts.

<sup>85</sup> *See, e.g.*, WPI 2.09.

1 to a specific level beyond conceptual design, and that the Project's design failed to meet that  
2 level.<sup>87</sup> On cross-examination during rebuttal, however, when confronted with an example of an  
3 EIS for a transportation project on which she had worked, she was forced to admit that that EIS  
4 was based on a conceptual level of design and which anticipated subsequent design, similar to  
5 SDOT's approach in this FEIS.<sup>88</sup>

6 • Ms. Hirschey initially testified that riding on a contraflow side path is two to three  
7 times more dangerous than riding in the road.<sup>89</sup> On rebuttal she contradicted herself, confirming  
8 that the study that she had earlier referenced was much narrower and admitted that the Project's  
9 design in the locations where there are no driveway or intersection crossings provides a safer  
10 condition than existing conditions, where bicyclists ride in the road, because the Project provides  
11 separation from street traffic.<sup>90</sup>

12 • The Coalition experts repeatedly mischaracterized the FEIS, testifying that it  
13 "lacked" or "omitted" discussion or analysis, when, in fact, the purportedly missing analysis is  
14 included in the document. For example, Ms. Hirschey testified that the FEIS did not "develop the  
15 study methodology . . . to define the data collection and the analyses."<sup>91</sup> Her testimony ignores  
16 an entire chapter in the Transportation Discipline Report on "Methodology."<sup>92</sup> Similarly, her  
17 claim that the FEIS failed to analyze the "safety factors" identified in her report is belied by the  
18 FEIS itself. As Ms. Ellig testified, Table 1-1 of the FEIS summarizes the FEIS's discussion of  
19 the safety factors, which are discussed in detail throughout the FEIS for each of the alternatives  
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21 <sup>86</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 556:14 – 557:9 (testimony of S. Kuznicki).

22 <sup>87</sup> 12/6/17 Tr., at 1904: 10-15 (testimony of C. Hirschey); 11/27/17 Tr., at 180:8- 181:4 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

23 <sup>88</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1906:13 - 1908:4 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>89</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 946:3-7 (Coalition's counsel's questioning); 11/27/17 Tr., at 217:18-23 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>90</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1899:15 – 1901:13 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

1 as well as the “no build” alternative.<sup>93</sup> Ms. Ellig similarly testified as to the location of the  
2 relevant information referenced in Table 1 to Ms. Hirschey’s report,<sup>94</sup> which Ms. Hirschey  
3 maintained was not included in the EIS.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, Mr. Bishop who has been retired for ten  
4 years and who last worked on an EIS around 15 years ago,<sup>96</sup> misstated the relevant standards and  
5 industry practices. For example, he claimed that streets should be designed for trucks (as  
6 opposed to accommodating trucks), that the Project’s lane offset violates standards, or that truck  
7 aprons are a highly unusual and dangerous design feature. As explained below, SDOT’s  
8 evidence established that none of these claims are correct.

9 The Coalition’s experts and their shifting opinions are not credible and their opinions do  
10 not support a finding that the FEIS is inadequate.

11 3. *SEPA requires the consideration of impacts measured from a baseline of existing*  
12 *conditions.*

13 Throughout the presentation of its case, the Coalition’s witnesses demonstrated that they  
14 ignored or failed to consider existing conditions. This failure is most evident from Ms.  
15 Hirschey’s report and testimony. As Ms. Hirschey admitted, her report does not discuss or  
16 consider the “no build” alternative anywhere except in Table 1.<sup>97</sup> Table 1 of Ms. Hirschey’s  
17 report, however, is half-empty with respect to the no build alternative.<sup>98</sup> At the hearing, Ms.  
18 Hirschey confirmed that this is because she did not do any analysis or inventory for the no build  
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20 <sup>91</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 182:10 – 183:5 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

21 <sup>92</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at Chapter 3.

22 <sup>93</sup> Exhibit R-1 at 1-29

23 <sup>94</sup> Exhibit A-3 at p. 7.

<sup>95</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 247:8-13 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>96</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 134:12-17; 185:8-25 (testimony of V. Bishop).

<sup>97</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1911:2012 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>98</sup> Exhibit A-3 at Table 1.



1 alternative, such as an analysis of the lane widths, driveway sight distances, or truck tracking at  
2 driveways.<sup>99</sup>

3 The need to consider existing conditions is especially critical here, because many of the  
4 “impacts” the Coalition attributed to the Project are actually existing issues that are not  
5 attributable to or exacerbated by the Project. For example, the claim that hiring flaggers would  
6 be costly and logistically difficult<sup>100</sup> ignores the fact that flaggers may be needed under existing  
7 conditions.<sup>101</sup> The need to hire flaggers is not an impact of the Project. Another example of the  
8 importance of considering existing conditions is reflected in Ms. Hirschey’s report. She noted  
9 that one of the factors for considering a bicycle contra-flow lane is if there are “a substantial  
10 number of bicyclists already using the street.”<sup>102</sup> Ms. Hirschey nevertheless admitted that she  
11 simply did not consider this factor.<sup>103</sup> Finally, as discussed further below, by ignoring existing  
12 conditions, the Coalition obscures the fact that many of the safety concerns they raised—e.g.,  
13 sight distance concerns, exposure to conflicts, contra-flow travel—are concerns that exist today,  
14 and are mitigated by the construction of a trail that lends definition to a currently chaotic  
15 transportation corridor. The very issues that the Coalition ascribes to the Project are, in fact, a  
16 product of poor existing conditions.

17 *4. The Coalition’s scattered criticism of the transportation analysis revealed no*  
18 *material flaws.*

19 The Coalition’s challenge to the FEIS transportation analysis is fundamentally flawed.  
20 Throughout the hearing, the Coalition and its witnesses attempted to obscure the underlying

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22 <sup>99</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 280:12 – 281:3 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>100</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 374:19 – 375:19 (testimony of T. Olstad).

<sup>101</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1794:14 – 1795:6 (testimony of D. Chang).

<sup>102</sup> Exhibit R-3, at p. 10.

<sup>103</sup> 11/28/30 Tr., 296:20 – 297:24 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

1 soundness of the FEIS by engaging in classic fly-specking<sup>104</sup>—raising a myriad of alleged flaws  
2 that are inaccurate, harmless, or simply distracting. The Coalition’s dissatisfaction with the  
3 FEIS’s methodology is not, however, a lawful basis for finding the FEIS inadequate. A  
4 methodology consistent with industry-accepted standards is legally adequate even if disputed by  
5 opposing experts.<sup>105</sup> In light of SDOT’s expertise in analyzing transportation and safety, it must  
6 be given deference in its choice of methodology.

7 Even without the deference given to SDOT’s witnesses, the scattered theories the  
8 Coalition presented do not establish adequate grounds for an inadequacy determination.  
9 Although the Coalition’s points are addressed in detail below for completeness’ sake, the  
10 Examiner need not fall into the Coalition’s fly-specking exercise. The Coalition has failed to  
11 raise any probable significant impact not disclosed in the FEIS and has failed to show that the  
12 FEIS departed from reasonable or standard industry practices.

13 *i. The FEIS reasonably discussed and analyzed truck activity.*

14 The FEIS disclosed and discussed freight activity in the Project area. For example, the  
15 FEIS identified the street designations for the various alternatives, including which alternatives  
16 have streets that are designated as Major Truck Streets (the Leary Alternative and the Preferred  
17 Alternative) or Minor Truck Streets.<sup>106</sup> For every alternative, the FEIS team identified every  
18 driveway, and gathered and disclosed relevant information related to the driveway type.<sup>107</sup> The  
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21 <sup>104</sup> *Mentor v. Kitsap Cty.*, 22 Wn. App. 285, 290, 588 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1978); *see also* SDOT’s Pre-Hearing Brief,  
filed herein on November 20, 2017, at p. 5-6.

22 <sup>105</sup> *City of Des Moines*, 98 Wn.App at 37 (affirming hearing examiner’s decision to uphold conclusions of SEPA  
agencies with expertise, despite contrary expert opinion); *see discussion supra* Section (B).

23 <sup>106</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B (Final Transportation Discipline Report), at Figure 4-2.

<sup>107</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, Table A1. Special Considerations for Driveways 11/29/17 Tr., at 825:14 - 826:18  
(testimony of E. Ellig).

1 FEIS team also included the driveway widths in the design and assessed sight distance issues.<sup>108</sup>

2 The FEIS team also collected and disclosed additional information and performed additional  
3 analyses of driveways with unique operations including: performing AutoTURN analyses;<sup>109</sup>  
4 collecting five days of video footage to measure truck volumes at driveways;<sup>110</sup> and interviewing  
5 businesses about their driveway operations.<sup>111</sup>

6 The Coalition’s main criticism of the Project as it relates to truck activity is that the  
7 Project is not designed to allow trucks to turn at all locations within the truck’s lane (which the  
8 Coalition described as “within lane” movement), but rather anticipates that trucks may need to  
9 encroach into the opposing lane or shoulder (“within available pavement”). The Coalition’s  
10 criticism lacks for several reasons.

11 First, the Coalition’s position is contrary to the City’s policy of “accommodating” trucks.  
12 The Freight Master Plan discusses the difference between “designing for” and “accommodating”  
13 trucks. Designing for a truck is the same concept as the Coalition’s “within lane” concept,  
14 meaning a truck can turn without encroaching onto other elements. Accommodating trucks is the  
15 same as the “within available pavement” concept, in which a truck may encroach into the  
16 opposing lane or shoulder.<sup>112</sup> The Freight Master Plan defines a Major Truck Street as “an  
17 arterial street that **accommodates** significant freight movement,”<sup>113</sup> meaning that encroachment

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19 <sup>108</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.4 (p. 5-17 – 5-18); Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.7 (p. 5-19 – 5-20);  
20 Exhibit R-1, Chapter 1, Table 1-1. Potential Traffic Hazards by Alternative Segment, p. 1-29 – 1-32; Exhibit R-10;  
Exhibit R-11.

21 <sup>109</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1094:2 – 1095:4 (testimony of B. Phillips); Exhibit R-1, Appendix A AutoTURN Analysis, Page  
A-8 – A-9

22 <sup>110</sup> Ex. R-3, Appendix B, Chapter 4, Table 4-4. Study Area Daily Driveway Traffic Volumes (November 2016,  
December 2016, February 2017), p. 4-14 – 4-16; Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, Appendix C, Table C1. Daily Driveway  
Turning Movements by Vehicle Classification

23 <sup>111</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 846:3-17; 849:23 – 850:6 (testimony of E. Ellig); Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, Appendix B.

<sup>112</sup> Exhibit R-7 at p.79.

<sup>113</sup> *Id.* at p. 24.

1 onto road elements is appropriate even on Major Truck Streets. The Coalition’s witnesses cited  
2 no design standard or plan to support their claim that SDOT must “design for” trucks. As Mr.  
3 Phillips explained, designing for larger vehicles increases roadway turning radii and the width of  
4 driveway accesses, increasing vehicle speeds and conflicts and creating less safe areas for non-  
5 motorized users, and is thus inappropriate here.<sup>114</sup>

6 Second, the Coalition’s position is contrary to City policies and plans. The Freight Master  
7 Plan states that when planning for trucks in urban environments, considerations include whether  
8 the area includes “priority areas or corridors designated in the Pedestrian Master Plan, Bicycle  
9 Master Plan, or Transit Master Plan” and whether “other plans/projects identify modal  
10 improvements (pedestrian/bicycle/transit/auto) for the same roadway.”<sup>115</sup> As discussed above,<sup>116</sup>  
11 the Pedestrian Master Plan and the Bicycle Master Plan both identify the Project as a “priority”  
12 or “catalyst” project and call for placing the trail generally along the route of the Preferred  
13 Alternative.<sup>117</sup> SDOT appropriately considered these master plans in designing the Project.<sup>118</sup>  
14 The Coalition’s belief that the streets should be “designed for” trucks is inconsistent with these  
15 plans, including the Freight Master Plan.

16 The Coalition’s criticisms also illustrate its distorted view that the FEIS should have done  
17 more than what is reasonable, standard, or necessary in an EIS. The Coalition faulted SDOT for  
18 failing to perform an AutoTURN analysis of all driveways. But as Ms. Ellig and Mr. Phillips  
19 testified, it is not typical to include an AutoTURN analysis of driveways in an EIS, much less all

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21 <sup>114</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1046:6-16 (testimony of B. Phillips).

22 <sup>115</sup> Exhibit R-7, Appendix C (Design Guidelines) at p. 8; *see also* Exhibit R-7 at p. 52-53 (directing SDOT staff to  
“consult all other master plans” and “reconcile different needs identified in the respective master plans”).

23 <sup>116</sup> *Supra* at Section D(a).

<sup>117</sup> Exhibit R-36 at p. 56 (Pedestrian Master Plan identifying the Project as a priority project); Exhibit R-8 at p. 40  
(identifying the Project as “catalyst project” that “reduce[s] critical barriers to bicycling by closing network gaps and  
increase[s] safety by building all ages and abilities friendly bicycle facilities to the maximum feasible extent”).

1 driveways, because the purpose of AutoTURN analysis is to determine details in final design.  
2 Moreover, the analysis is a “significant amount of work” that does not add any additional value  
3 to show impacts.<sup>119</sup> Even Mr. Kuznicki, who performed all of the AutoTURN analyses for the  
4 Coalition, testified that he could not recall if he had ever used AutoTURN in an EIS or even in  
5 other stages of environmental review.<sup>120</sup>

6 Finally, while the FEIS analyzes in detail the risk issues presented by truck movements, it  
7 is undisputed that any truck movement-related impacts can be further reduced with further  
8 design. As Mr. Kuznicki admitted, if a designer discovers any movement issues through an  
9 AutoTURN analysis, the designer has a number of options to address the issues via design.<sup>121</sup>  
10 Moreover, the Coalition’s AutoTURN analysis of all driveways showed that all driveways will  
11 remain accessible with the Preferred Alternative.<sup>122</sup> Thus the Coalition failed to raise any  
12 significant impact related to truck activity that was not disclosed in the FEIS.

13 *ii. The FEIS reasonably discussed and analyzed conflicts.*

14 The FEIS sufficiently disclosed the risk of traffic conflicts. The words “conflict” or  
15 “conflict point” is used approximately 70 times in the Transportation Discipline Report,  
16 particularly in discussions of potential conflicts between vehicles and non-motorized users at  
17 driveways and intersections. Ms. Ellig explained that the FEIS considered every driveway or  
18 intersection crossing as an area of potential conflict, thus the FEIS included an inventory of  
19 every driveway or intersection crossing for each of the alternatives at Table 1-1.<sup>123</sup> As described

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21 <sup>118</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 887:17 – 890:20 (testimony of E. Ellig); 12/1/17 Tr., at 1462:1-12 (testimony of M. Mazzola).

22 <sup>119</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1039:18 – 1041:18 (testimony of B. Phillips); 11/29/17 Tr., at 818:12 – 819:2 (testimony of E. Ellig).

23 <sup>120</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 538:1-25 (testimony of S. Kuznicki).

<sup>121</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 532:11 – 536:5 (testimony of S. Kuznicki).

<sup>122</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1051:4-9 (testimony of B. Phillips).

<sup>123</sup> 11/29/30 Tr., at 903:1-13 (testimony of E. Ellig).

1 above, the FEIS also documented necessary information about each of these conflict points in its  
2 driveway inventories.

3 Ms. Hirschey's conflict point diagrams<sup>124</sup> are unavailing and unnecessary to  
4 understanding conflicts—in fact, her diagrams add complexity to an intuitive concept that the  
5 FEIS discussed in laymen's terms, as is encouraged by SEPA. Moreover, the SEPA rules  
6 expressly disavow any requirement for graphics, charts, or matrices.<sup>125</sup> The fact that the  
7 Coalition prefers Ms. Hirschey's diagram (or Mr. Kuznicki's blind spot diagram) does not render  
8 the FEIS's conflicts analysis and accompanying discussion inadequate.

9 Moreover, Ms. Hirschey's analysis of conflict points is flawed. Her definitive claim that  
10 there are no conflict points under existing conditions<sup>126</sup> is simply wrong and misrepresents  
11 existing conditions. As Mr. Schultheiss explained, under existing conditions, cyclists are  
12 “exposed to conflict continuously throughout their entire journey along the street as well as extra  
13 conflicts at some of the intersections[.]”<sup>127</sup> The conflicts are “infinite” because conflicts between  
14 a car and a cyclist could occur anywhere.<sup>128</sup>

15 Ms. Hirschey's “quantitative” analysis of conflict points conceals this fundamental fact  
16 by focusing only on the conflict points associated with the Project alternatives. As Mr.  
17 Schultheiss stated, however, the Project will result in a “substantial reduction of conflicts  
18 [compared] to the existing conditions” because the conflicts would be constrained to  
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22 <sup>124</sup> Exhibit A-3 at p. 210-11.

<sup>125</sup> WAC 197-11-440.

<sup>126</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 278:15-23 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>127</sup> 12/1/17 Tr., at 1290:4-17 (testimony of B. Schultheiss).

<sup>128</sup> *Id.* at 1299:3-11.

1 driveways.<sup>129</sup> Again, the Coalition failed to raise any significant impact associated with conflicts  
2 that was not disclosed in the FEIS.

3 *iii. The FEIS reasonably discussed and analyzed the Project's contraflow*  
4 *side path design.*

5 The FEIS disclosed the contraflow nature of the trail and discusses the safety  
6 implications, such as the fact that drivers crossing the trail would need to look in both  
7 directions.<sup>130</sup> The FEIS also disclosed the nature of the risk under existing conditions, in its  
8 discussion of accident data, including the number of collisions associated with vehicles travelling  
9 in opposite directions to cyclists.<sup>131</sup> Despite Mr. Bishop's and Ms. Hirschey's definitive claims  
10 that "there's no contraflow movement" under existing conditions,<sup>132</sup> the accident data and Mr.  
11 Trask's video and photographs disprove this claim and show that contraflow movement exists  
12 today.

13 Throughout the hearing, the Coalition's counsel and Ms. Hirschey asserted that the  
14 studies Ms. Hirschey cited found that "riding on a contraflow side path is two to three times  
15 more dangerous than riding in the road."<sup>133</sup> But as Mr. Schultheiss testified, the studies do not  
16 support Ms. Hirschey's broad claim. Rather, determining whether a contraflow side path is more  
17 dangerous compared to other alternatives requires assessing numerous factors in context, such as  
18 street intersections and design, traffic volumes, traffic controls, and the relative ability to manage  
19 conflicts.  
20

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21 <sup>129</sup> *Id.* at 1290:14-18.

22 <sup>130</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at 5-20.

23 <sup>131</sup> Exhibit R-1, at p. 7-22.

<sup>132</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 278:15-23 (testimony of C. Hirschey); 11/27/19 Tr., at 149:9-19 (testimony of V. Bishop).

<sup>133</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 946:3-7 (Coalition's counsel's questioning); 11/27/17 Tr., at 217:18-23 (Ms. Hirschey's testimony).

1 Here, Mr. Schultheiss testified that a contraflow side path (i.e., the Project) is safer than  
2 riding in the street (i.e., existing conditions) because under existing conditions non-motorized  
3 users are constantly exposed to vehicles without any separation.<sup>134</sup> In rebuttal, Ms. Hirschey  
4 agreed with Mr. Schultheiss, stating that in the locations where there are no driveway or  
5 intersection crossings, the Project's design provides a safer condition than existing conditions  
6 because of the separation.<sup>135</sup> Although SEPA does not require selecting or designing the "safest"  
7 option, the fact that the project alternatives are safer than the no build alternative does inform the  
8 analysis and contradicts the Coalition's claims.

9 *iv. The FEIS is based on industry-accepted local and national guidelines*  
10 *that address transportation and safety issues; under the rule of reason,*  
11 *the FEIS take into account the unreliable studies the Coalition*  
12 *presented.*

13 The Coalition made much of the fact that the FEIS did not cite the specific studies Ms.  
14 Hirschey cited in her report, but that argument lacks merit for several reasons. First, as discussed  
15 above, the Coalition's counsel and Ms. Hirschey mischaracterized the studies' findings.

16 Further, the FEIS need not take into account unreliable studies. As Mr. Schultheiss  
17 testified, many of the materials Ms. Hirschey relied upon are unreliable, including the  
18 Chicagoland side path rating system, the Commute Orlando website, and the Finnish study.<sup>136</sup> In  
19 rebuttal, Ms. Hirschey all but admitted that these studies are flawed, acknowledging the validity  
20 of Mr. Schultheiss's criticisms and stating, "To me they are what they are."<sup>137</sup> That Ms. Hirschey  
21 nevertheless cited those studies and presented them as reliable calls her reliability and credibility  
22 into question.

23 <sup>134</sup> 12/1/17 Tr., at 1347:22 – 1348:4 (testimony of B. Schultheiss).

<sup>135</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1900:14 – 1901:13 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>136</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1238:13 – 1245:11 (testimony of B. Schultheiss).



1 Finally, as Mr. Schultheiss testified, design standards and guidelines already incorporate  
2 studies on safety.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, it is unreasonable and unnecessary for an FEIS to account for  
3 individual studies.

4 v. *The FEIS did not rest on the assumption that all users follow traffic*  
5 *laws at all times and reasonably used traffic laws as part of its*  
6 *analysis.*

7 The FEIS did not rest on the assumption that all users will follow traffic laws and the  
8 “rules of the road” at all times. As Ms. Ellig testified, and as discussed in the FEIS, the FEIS’s  
9 safety analysis used recent collision data and incident response data in the study area to establish  
10 baseline conditions, which is standard methodology used in EISs.<sup>139</sup> The FEIS’s analysis of the  
11 types of collisions indicated how often and under what circumstances users commit errors and  
12 fail to follow the rules of the road.<sup>140</sup> Ms. Hirschey agreed with the FEIS’s methodology—she  
13 agreed that most accidents are caused by failure to follow the rules of the road, and that accident  
14 data helps show trends in failures to follow the rules. The FEIS also disclosed and considered the  
15 possibility of distracted trail users, cyclists losing control of their bicycles, and drivers  
16 miscalculating turning movements or veering away from their path of travel.<sup>141</sup>

17 The fact that some users may not abide by traffic laws does not support the Coalition’s  
18 conclusion that traffic laws are unreliable and cannot be considered in a safety analysis or in  
19 design. This conclusion would effectively render traffic laws meaningless and is unreasonable.  
20 SDOT is entitled to rely on the reasonable assumption that users generally abide by traffic laws,  
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22 <sup>137</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1865:18-23 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

<sup>138</sup> 12/1/17 Tr., at 1357:18-23 (testimony of B. Schultheiss).

<sup>139</sup> 11/29/30 Tr., at 839:19 – 940:20 (testimony of E. Ellig); Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at 4-33 to 4-45.

<sup>140</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at 4-38.

<sup>141</sup> Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at 5-20.

1 may design the project to be consistent with those traffic laws, and may account for the  
2 infrequent but inevitable failures to abide the laws, as SDOT did here.

3 *vi. The FEIS reasonably incorporated signage and pavement markings.*

4 The FEIS disclosed that the design will incorporate signage and pavement markings as  
5 safety features.<sup>142</sup> Mr. Kuznicki's admission that signage and pavement markings are  
6 "judiciously appl[ied] in the design process" and "show a demonstrated safety benefit"<sup>143</sup> belie  
7 his claim that people ignore these features,<sup>144</sup> and Ms. Hirschey's claim that these features  
8 "cannot mitigate" safety concerns.<sup>145</sup> Moreover, Mr. Kuznicki confirmed that the 100% design  
9 drawings for a prior iteration of the Missing Link showed signage and pavement markings, and  
10 he personally stamped those drawings certifying the design's safety.<sup>146</sup>

11 Mr. Kuznicki's claim that pavement markings are "extremely difficult to maintain" also  
12 has no merit.<sup>147</sup> First, his approval of pavement markings as an adequate safety measure in  
13 previous iterations of this project undermines any claim that markings pose a safety risk. Second,  
14 Mr. Phillips testified that the City does not use paint but instead uses more durable materials with  
15 "vastly reduced" maintenance.<sup>148</sup>

16 *vii. The FEIS reasonably used the PM peak hour to identify transportation  
17 delay.*

18 The FEIS disclosed that the PM peak hour was used to identify potential transportation  
19 delay because although truck volumes typically peak during midday, the PM peak hour  
20 represents the highest volumes for other transportation modes and thus "results in the worst-case

21 <sup>142</sup> Exhibit R-1, at 1-18 to 1-19.

22 <sup>143</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 557:25 – 560:16 (testimony of S. Kuznicki).

23 <sup>144</sup> *Id.* at 515:1-10.

<sup>145</sup> Exhibit A-3 at p. 13.

<sup>146</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 558:4 – 559:21 (testimony of S. Kuznicki)..

<sup>147</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 463:15-18 (testimony of S. Kuznicki).

1 impacts for all modes.”<sup>149</sup> Ms. Ellig confirmed that this methodology is standard in her  
2 profession and resulted in the worst-case impacts to trucks as well as other modes.<sup>150</sup> Ms.  
3 Hirschey’s criticism that the FEIS should have used the truck peak hour would not have  
4 accurately captured impacts, is not standard methodology, and is unsupported, given that Ms.  
5 Hirschey did not do an analysis using the truck peak hour.<sup>151</sup>

6 *viii. The FEIS reasonably discussed potential impacts to railroad*  
7 *operations, based on reasonably gathered information.*

8 The FEIS disclosed the potential relocation of railroad track or removal of siding and  
9 states that the impact would be mitigated by coordinating the relocation with the rail provider  
10 and agencies to reduce disruption.<sup>152</sup> The Project does not call for, and the FEIS did not discuss  
11 removing any main line tracks. Only sidings that are currently largely paved over may be  
12 relocated or removed.<sup>153</sup> The information contained in the FEIS about the railroad was based on  
13 Ms. Ellig’s interview with one of the owners of Ballard Terminal Railroad, who described  
14 Salmon Bay Sand & Gravel’s intermittent use of the railroad as disclosed in the FEIS.<sup>154</sup>  
15 Additionally, Ms. Ellig’s testimony was based on review of five days of video footage showing  
16 railroad operations.<sup>155</sup>

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18 <sup>148</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1058:14-25 (testimony of B. Phillips).

19 <sup>149</sup> Exhibit R-1, at 3-3.

20 <sup>150</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 905:12 – 907:5; 907:22 – 909:1 (testimony of E. Ellig).

21 <sup>151</sup> 11/28/17 Tr., at 313:8-14 (testimony of C. Hirschey).

22 <sup>152</sup> Exhibit R-1, at 7-36 (stating that impacts could include “removing pieces of siding or passing rail . . . that are no  
23 longer used, or relocating track”); Exhibit R-3, Technical Appendix B, at ES-1 (“the Preferred Alternative and the  
Shilshole South Alternative would require track relocation, which would be coordinated with the rail provider to  
reduce disruption to track use”), 5-11 (“New track could be laid prior to removing the old track to reduce the period  
of time when the tracks are unusable. As necessary, any construction activities near the BTR rail line would be  
coordinated with the appropriate agencies.”).

<sup>153</sup> Exhibit R-1 at 7-36; 12/1/17 Tr., at 1473:18 – 1474:5 (testimony of M. Mazzola).

<sup>154</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 838:11 – 839:14, 850:4-6, 942:24 – 943:16 (testimony of E. Ellig); Exhibit R-3, Appendix B, at  
4-33.

<sup>155</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 838:11 – 839:14, 850:4-6, 942:24 – 943:16 (testimony of E. Ellig).

1 The Coalition's letter from CalPortland alleging its use of the railroad is information that  
2 was not reasonably available at the time SDOT issued the FEIS, given that Mr. Cole did not  
3 discuss this use during his interview with Ms. Ellig, no comment was submitted alerting SDOT  
4 to this use, and even Mr. Nerdrum, one of the owners of the railroad, was apparently unaware of  
5 CalPortland's use. Mr. Nerdrum testified that the Ballard Terminal Railroad's only customers in  
6 the last five years were Salmon Bay Sand & Gravel and a flour trans load that occurred three or  
7 four years ago.<sup>156</sup> Mr. Nerdrum made no mention of CalPortland or its use of the railroad, either  
8 in the past or in more recent years. The letter, submitted in rebuttal, is self-serving testimony that  
9 lacks credibility. The discussion of the impacts to the railroad was reasonable, and it would be  
10 "preposterous" to expect the FEIS to disclose facts that the Coalition did not develop until  
11 hearing.<sup>157</sup>

12 *ix. The location of pavement joints is not a safety issue.*

13 As the City traffic engineer Dongho Chang testified, there are no City or state standards  
14 or design guidelines that forbid placing pavement joints in the travel lane. The City has pavement  
15 joints in travel lanes throughout the City, and the City has not observed problems with drivers  
16 failing to follow the travel lanes even in rainy conditions.<sup>158</sup> The Coalition's witnesses provided  
17 no support for their opinions that pavement joints in travel lanes pose a "serious safety  
18 concern."<sup>159</sup>

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22 <sup>156</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 785:9-25 (testimony of E. Ellig).

23 <sup>157</sup> Settle, *supra*, at 14-27 ("Under the rule of reason, it would be preposterous to expect an EIS to disclose and analyze facts that were not known and not reasonably knowable at the time the EIS was issued.").

<sup>158</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1792:7 – 1793:11 (testimony of D. Chang).

<sup>159</sup> Exhibit A-3 at p. 13.

1                   x.     *Curb or truck aprons are not a safety issue.*

2             The FEIS disclosed the use of aprons in the design.<sup>160</sup> As Mr. Phillips testified, aprons are  
3 a design feature used in the City and elsewhere and are included in the Freight Master Plan and  
4 the NACTO guidelines. Aprons improve safety for non-motorized users by slowing turning  
5 vehicles.<sup>161</sup> Mr. Schultheiss confirmed the safety benefits of aprons and testified about a report  
6 by the Federal Highway Administration advocating the use of aprons at intersections.<sup>162</sup> This  
7 evidence outweighs Mr. Bishop’s statement that aprons are only used at roundabouts and that  
8 their use at intersections is a “very, very significant, unique system.”<sup>163</sup>

9                   xi.    *Barriers are not a safety issue.*

10            Mr. Bishop’s testimony that the design “put[s] a barrier in the buffer,” and the Coalition’s  
11 exhibit depicting a barrier in the buffer, are incorrect.<sup>164</sup> Mr. Phillips testified that the design  
12 drawings do not show barriers, and the FEIS confirmed that the Preferred Alternative’s design  
13 does not show a need for barriers.<sup>165</sup> As Mr. Phillips explained, the FEIS disclosed the potential  
14 use of barriers (consistent with AASHTO guidelines) to account for potential changes in final  
15 design, but does not state that barriers will be used.<sup>166</sup> Moreover, even if a barrier was used, that  
16 potential impact was disclosed in compliance with SEPA.<sup>167</sup>

17                   xii. *The lane offset at the intersection of Shilshole and Market is not a safety*  
18                         *issue.*

19            Mr. Bishop’s testimony that the design’s lane offset at one specific location (the  
20 intersection of Shilshole Avenue and Market Street) is dangerous and violate SDOT’s and

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>160</sup> Exhibit R-1 at 1-15.

22 <sup>161</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1067:2-25 (testimony of B. Phillips); Exhibit R-7, Appendix C, at p. 12, 18.

<sup>162</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1262:1 – 1267:19 (testimony of B. Phillips); Exhibit R-28.

23 <sup>163</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 74:1 – 76:25 (testimony of V. Bishop).

<sup>164</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 96:3-5 (testimony of V. Bishop); Exhibit A-1, at Figure 1.

<sup>165</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1034:11-13 (testimony of B. Phillips); Exhibit R-1 at 1-5.

1 WSDOT’s standards is incorrect.<sup>168</sup> As Mr. Chang testified, SDOT’s standards do not prohibit or  
2 limit the use of lane offsets, and the City has used offsets elsewhere because they help  
3 accommodate movement through constrained intersections. WSDOT’s lane offset standards do  
4 not apply in the City, because WSDOT’s standards apply to interstates and state highways and a  
5 different context—higher speeds, more space availability for expansion, and lack of pedestrians,  
6 parking, or buildings.<sup>169</sup> And as Mr. Phillips testified, there are design treatments for lane offsets,  
7 such as guide markers or shifting the road.<sup>170</sup>

8 *xiii. The design of the intersection of Market and 24<sup>th</sup> Ave NW is not a*  
9 *safety issue.*

10 As Mr. Bishop admitted, under existing conditions, “There is no definition [in the  
11 intersection’s design]. It’s totally wide open.”<sup>171</sup> Despite Mr. Bishop’s criticisms of the  
12 intersection’s proposed design, as Mr. Phillips testified, the design adds defining elements such  
13 as curbs and crossings, which increase safety by slowing down vehicles and notifying users of  
14 potential conflict areas.<sup>172</sup>

15 In sum, despite the Coalition’s attempt to fly-speck the FEIS, SDOT established that the  
16 transportation analysis in the FEIS was reasonable and should be affirmed.

17 G. The parking analysis meets the rule of reason.

18 The parking impact analysis is documented in two locations: chapter 8 of the FEIS<sup>173</sup>;  
19 and the Parking Discipline Report appended to the FEIS.<sup>174</sup> The author of the FEIS’s Parking

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20 <sup>166</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1093:1-24; Exhibit R-1 at 1-8 (noting use of “barriers or buffers” (emphasis added)).

21 <sup>167</sup> Exhibit R-1, at p. 1-8.

22 <sup>168</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 79:12 – 81:12 (testimony of V. Bishop).

23 <sup>169</sup> 12/5/17 Tr., at 1789:10 – 1791:8 (testimony of D. Chang).

<sup>170</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1068:22 – 1069:22 (testimony of B. Phillips).

<sup>171</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 70:22-25 (testimony of V. Bishop).

<sup>172</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1070:1 – 1071:4 (testimony of B. Phillips).

<sup>173</sup> Ex. R-1.

1 Discipline Report, Ryan LeProwse, testified that his methodology for the parking analysis is  
2 common in his profession and was similar to the methodology used in other EISs and other  
3 studies that he has performed.<sup>175</sup> He used existing studies regarding parking supply and  
4 utilization, collected data to supplement existing data and to address comments to the DEIS, and  
5 reviewed recent data to confirm the studies' accuracy.<sup>176</sup> Even Mr. Bishop, the Coalition's  
6 witness on this topic, admitted that the study was "extensive."<sup>177</sup> Mr. LeProwse included  
7 unregulated (i.e., unpermitted) parking spaces in the count of parking supply and removed those  
8 spaces from the supply under the build alternatives (even though some of those spaces may  
9 continue to exist), resulting in a conservative analysis.<sup>178</sup> And he defined the study area based on  
10 all of the build alternatives, as is typically done in parking studies for EISs. As Mr. LeProwse  
11 explained, a study area that includes all alternatives allows for an equal comparison to the no  
12 build alternative.<sup>179</sup>

13 The Coalition's sole criticism of the parking analysis was based on their claim that the  
14 study area was too large, and that the FEIS should have defined a separate study area for each  
15 build alternative.<sup>180</sup> The claim has no merit, because the Coalition's methodology is not typically  
16 used or suitable for an EIS because it would not facilitate a comparison of overall parking loss  
17 among various alternatives.<sup>181</sup> Mr. Bishop stated that his experience with parking issues arose in  
18 his work "as a consultant doing mostly private development work,"<sup>182</sup> and he admitted he has

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20 <sup>174</sup> Ex. R-3.

21 <sup>175</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1107:1-9; 1130:6-9 (testimony of R. LeProwse).

22 <sup>176</sup> *Id.* at 1113:2 - 1115:16.

23 <sup>177</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 126:4-9 (testimony of V. Bishop)

<sup>178</sup> 11/30/17., at 1116:20 - 1118:14 (testimony of R. LeProwse).

<sup>179</sup> *Id.* at 1110:3-9.

<sup>180</sup> Exhibit A-1 at p. 053.

<sup>181</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1110:10 - 1112:25; R-16.

<sup>182</sup> 11/27/17 Tr., at 123:4-6 (testimony of V. Bishop).

1 never done a parking analysis for an EIS that required looking at alternatives.<sup>183</sup> A parking  
2 analysis for a private development project, in which there are no alternatives, is different from a  
3 parking analysis of several build alternatives and a no build alternative. Mr. LeProwse's choice  
4 of methodology is entitled to more weight, given his pertinent experience and Mr. Bishop's total  
5 lack of EIS experience on parking impacts.

6 Moreover, Mr. Bishop's claim that his methodology shows "significant impacts" to  
7 parking has no merit. As Mr. LeProwse testified, the loss of parking is not significant because  
8 there is adjacent excess parking supply that is within walking distance and is not being fully  
9 utilized currently.<sup>184</sup> The opponents' witnesses argue that the loss of parking from the preferred  
10 alternative is concentrated, but overstate that impact by asking the Examiner to ignore parking  
11 that is available on immediately adjacent streets. As Mr. LeProwse explained, Figure 5-1 of the  
12 Parking Discipline Report illustrates the availability of parking in the blocks surrounding the  
13 Preferred Alternative, the remaining supply on the Preferred Alternative, and the type of parking  
14 available. Mr. Bishop's calculation of parking availability ignored all of Figure 5-1 except for the  
15 narrow sliver of red showing the Preferred Alternative.<sup>185</sup>

16 Finally, setting aside the Coalition's disagreement with the characterization of the  
17 parking loss, the FEIS disclosed the loss of parking under each alternative, and thus disclosed the  
18 impact.<sup>186</sup>

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22 <sup>183</sup> *Id.* at 152:2-4.

<sup>184</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1120:13 – 1123:11 (testimony of R. LeProwse).

<sup>185</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1142:2 – 1144:12; Exhibit R-3, Appendix C, at Figure 5-1.

<sup>186</sup> *Id.* at 1121:17-25; Exhibit R-1 and Figure 5-1.



1 H. The FEIS appropriately analyzed the potential land use impacts and economic factors  
2 related to the Project.

3 At hearing, City witnesses confirmed what was stated in the EIS: that the EIS took into  
4 account the maritime and industrial land uses in the project area;<sup>187</sup> considered the “Major Truck  
5 Street” designation of a portion of the Preferred Alternative and other alternatives;<sup>188</sup> and  
6 carefully analyzed the Project’s relationship with the policies and goals that prioritize water-  
7 dependent uses in the area, as well as other relevant goals and policies.<sup>189</sup> The Coalition  
8 presented no evidence to support their challenge to SDOT’s consideration of the Project’s  
9 relationship with the City’s 2035 Comprehensive Plan.<sup>190</sup> Instead, the Coalition focused  
10 primarily on what it describes as the “actual” or economic impacts to businesses adjacent to the  
11 Project, but presented no credible evidence that SDOT’s analysis was inadequate. SDOT’s land  
12 use and economic analysis should be affirmed.

13 *1. The primary purpose of a SEPA land use analysis is to identify the Project’s*  
14 *relationship to existing land use plans, which includes balancing a variety of*  
15 *conflicting comprehensive plan policies.*

16 The Project’s relationship to the Comprehensive Plan is discussed in numerous places  
17 throughout Ch. 4 of both the Draft and Final EISs, as well as the Land Use Discipline Report  
18 (Technical Appendix A to the Draft EIS<sup>191</sup>) and the Updates and Errata to the Land Use

19 <sup>187</sup> E.g., Exhibit R-1, FEIS Section 4.1 and 4.2 and 11/30/17 Tr., at 1169:9 – 1170:18 (testimony of M. Johnson).  
20 The nature of the project area as an important maritime industrial area is incorporated into the relevant  
21 Comprehensive Plan goals and policies, which clearly prioritize those types of uses.

22 <sup>188</sup> 11/30/17 Tr., at 1171:19-21. The priority use of streets in the project area for freight are reflected in the goals and  
23 policies considered in the land use analysis and the land use analysis also relies on the transportation analysis, which  
clearly identifies the Major Truck Street at p. 7-4 and 7-11 of Exhibit R-1. The objective of the project itself makes  
clear that prioritizing freight movement was a primary consideration. See p. 1-3 of Exhibit R-1.

<sup>189</sup> The EIS actually defined a significant impact as an impact that would “likely cause the permanent loss of land  
uses that are a priority,” such as water-dependent, water-related, and industrial uses and considered those priority  
uses throughout the analysis. See, e.g., Exhibit R-1, p. 4-1 and 4-17.

<sup>190</sup> Notice of Appeal [Corrected], p. 9, Section E.

<sup>191</sup> Exhibit R-34.

1 Discipline Report (Technical Appendix A to the Final EIS<sup>192</sup>). A reader-friendly “Summary of  
2 Alternative Consistency with Comprehensive Plan Goals and Policies” was included as  
3 Appendix E to the original Land Use Discipline and as Appendix F to the Updates and Errata to  
4 the Land Use Discipline Report. The updated Appendix F incorporated modifications to the  
5 Seattle Comprehensive Plan that were adopted between the time the Draft and Final EIS were  
6 issued. Both summaries considered the no build alternative, as well as the five build alternatives,  
7 and clearly identified where each was consistent, inconsistent, or neutral, as related to relevant  
8 goals and policies. The summaries also include a brief qualitative description of the relationship  
9 of the alternatives, including the No Build Alternative, to the relevant goals and policies. These  
10 summaries alone appear to satisfy the requirements of SEPA.<sup>193</sup>

11 The summaries also illustrate that some Comprehensive Plan goals and policies appear to  
12 conflict. As described in the Comprehensive Plan, “Because Plan policies do not exist in  
13 isolation and must be viewed in the context of all potentially relevant policies, it is largely in  
14 applying these policies that the interests are reconciled and balanced by the legislative and  
15 executive branches of City government.”<sup>194</sup> The summaries, in addition to the commentary in the  
16 Land Use chapters, provides all the information decision-makers will need to balance the various  
17 goals and policies.

18 *2. Economics is not an element of the environment under SEPA.*

19 Seattle is unique in that its SEPA rules require an EIS to include an analysis of certain  
20 social, cultural, and economic issues, unless eliminated by the scoping process.<sup>195</sup> That required

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22 <sup>192</sup> Exhibit R-1.

<sup>193</sup> Exhibit R-1, Appendix A, Appendix F.

23 <sup>194</sup> R-18, excerpt of Seattle 2035 Comprehensive Plan, p. 18.

<sup>195</sup> SMC 25.05.440(E)(6).

1 economic analysis is described as an analysis of “[e]conomic factors, including but not limited to  
2 employment, public investment, and taxation where appropriate...” Like its State counterpart,  
3 Seattle’s SEPA rules do not include economics as an element of the environment.<sup>196</sup> Both the  
4 State and Seattle’s SEPA rules explicitly provide that certain types of information are not  
5 required to be discussed in an EIS, including: “Methods of financing proposals, *economic*  
6 *competition, profits and personal income and wages*, and social policy analysis such as fiscal and  
7 welfare policies and non-construction aspects of education and communications.”<sup>197</sup> Both the  
8 State and Seattle’s SEPA rules also explicitly provide that a cost-benefit analysis is not  
9 required.<sup>198</sup> Specifically, “the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives  
10 need not be displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis *and should not be when there are*  
11 *important qualitative considerations.*”<sup>199</sup>

12 The Coalition misrepresents what is required related to the analysis of economic factors  
13 related to the Project. Nearly every question asked of the author of the Economics  
14 Considerations Report, Morgan Shook, was framed in a way that assumed the purpose of the  
15 report was to disclose the potential impacts of the Project—based on impacts to profitability—  
16 related to specific, individual businesses along the Project route.<sup>200</sup> When framed that way, it is

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18 <sup>196</sup> See SMC 25.05.444, which lists the elements of the environment required to be considered.

19 <sup>197</sup> SMC 25.05.448.C and 197-11-448, emphasis added. For example, in *SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards*, the court  
20 held that a proposal’s adverse impact on surrounding property values was not an environmental impact, but was akin  
21 to “profits and personal income” expressly exempted from EIS coverage. Reduced profits for businesses adjacent to  
22 the proposed trail are likewise not required to be analyzed in an EIS. 49 Wn. App. 609, 616, 744 P.2d 1101, 1105  
(1987).

21 <sup>198</sup> SMC 25.05.450.

22 <sup>199</sup> *Id* (emphasis added).

23 <sup>200</sup> *E.g.*, 12/1/17 Tr., at 1405:7-12 (“Direct me to the portions of the final report that *inform the owner of an*  
*industrial maritime business on Shilshole of the effect of this project on that business*” emphasis added), 1406:20-23  
24 (“And now, again, I’m asking you to tell me as the hypothetical owner of an industrial business what I’m supposed  
25 to learn from your report about the potential impacts of this trail.”), 1410:15-17 (“So what does that tell me as a  
26 business along shilshole about the economic impact on my business?”), 1415:25 – 1416:3, 1422:8-10, 1426:5-6  
27 (“informs me, as a business owner, of the impact on my business.”), 1431:19-25 (“And so, this – is this the take

1 clear that the Coalition is concerned not about potential environmental impacts, but to the  
2 potential impacts to their bottom line, which is not the purpose of SEPA review.

3 Similarly, none of the testimony the Coalition elicited related to changes to the Economic  
4 Considerations Report between early drafts of the report and the final version published as part  
5 of the Draft EIS supports the Coalition's claim that the analysis was inadequate. As Mr. Shook  
6 testified, some information was removed from the original draft because they determined that  
7 they did not have enough support for the conclusions in the initial draft or because of concerns  
8 that some of the information would be misinterpreted.<sup>201</sup> The final report, not the preliminary  
9 draft, is at issue in this appeal and the iterative nature of drafting that final report does not impact  
10 the adequacy of the FEIS.

11 3. *SDOT disclosed all of the potential impacts from the Project, none of which were*  
12 *probable significant adverse environmental impacts.*

13 As described in the EIS, and by Mark Johnson at hearing, the EIS defined a significant  
14 land use impact as an impact that will "likely cause the permanent loss of land uses that are  
15 preferred (such as water-dependent, water-related, and industrial uses) under adopted City of  
16 Seattle policies."<sup>202</sup> This definition of "significance" in the context of land use impacts is  
17 consistent with SEPA and slightly more conservative than how courts have considered the  
18 question, which essentially defines a significant land use impact as physical blight.<sup>203</sup> Changes in

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19  
20 away that I as an industrial business in terms of the impacts of this trail on my business? Is this where I turn to learn  
them?").

21 <sup>201</sup> 21/1/17 Tr., at 1383:25 -- 1384:1; 1411:14-20 (testimony of M. Shook). Even the Coalition's expert witness,  
Spencer Cohen, agreed that there was not enough analysis to support conclusions in that initial draft. See 11/28/17  
Tr., at 694:8-9 (testimony of S. Cohen).

22 <sup>202</sup> Exhibit R-1, p. 4-1.

23 <sup>203</sup> SMC 25.05.440.5. See, e.g., *Barrie v. Kitsap Cty.*, 93 Wn.2d 843, 859, 613 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1980) (holding that  
County EIS of a shopping center should have covered socioeconomic effects, where evidence indicated the mall  
could result in a decline of Bremerton's Central Business District); *W. 514, Inc. v. Cty. of Spokane*, 53 Wn. App.  
838, 847, 770 P.2d 1065, 1070 (1989) (holding that downtown blighting consequences of a proposed shopping

1 land use are only relevant for purposes of SEPA if they will cause *physical* changes to the  
2 environment.<sup>204</sup> The development and use standards of the Land Use Code are generally  
3 expected to provide the necessary mitigation of potential adverse impacts,<sup>205</sup> so it is not  
4 surprising that no significant land use impacts from the Project were identified.

5         Regardless, the FEIS did consider the potential land use impacts to adjacent businesses,  
6 including the consideration and discussion of whether any businesses are likely to go out of  
7 business or relocate as a result of the project.<sup>206</sup> In addition to discussing whether there would be  
8 any probable significant adverse land use impacts, the land use analysis identified other potential  
9 impacts such as impacts to the railroad,<sup>207</sup> access to businesses,<sup>208</sup> and even identified potential  
10 trade-offs between impacts to businesses and other potential impacts like traffic hazards.<sup>209</sup>

11             4. *SDOT's Economic Considerations Report appropriately analyzed the economic*  
12             *factors related to the Project.*

13         At hearing, SDOT presented testimony by Mr. Shook, who has worked on approximately  
14 15 EISs and is generally familiar with SEPA,<sup>210</sup> that he and his colleagues used the data available

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15 center would be an environmental impact, though plaintiffs failed to establish that such impacts were sufficiently  
16 probable to require EIS coverage).

204 See *W. 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane*, 53 Wn. 838, at 847, 770 P.2d 1065.

205 See, "Overview Policy" at SMC 25.05.665.

206 Exhibit R-1, at p. 4-16 to 4-34.

207 E.g., Exhibit R-1, at p. 1-25 ("Rail relocation could occur in some of the alternatives."), p. 7-22 ("Impacts on  
18 freight rail would occur if freight rail movement in the study area was removed or relocated."), and p. 7-36 ("This  
could include removing pieces of siding, or passing rail (rail line that allows trains to pass each other) that are no  
19 longer used, or relocating track to allow additional right-of-way space for the trail. All track relocation would be  
coordinated with BTR so that impacts on rail operations would be minimized and so that rail operations could  
20 continue as before once construction is complete."), and p. 10-10 ("The removal or relocation of rails, or irreversible  
treatments that cover the rails or other physical features of the railroad such as switches or sleepers, would result in  
an impact to the railroad.")

208 E.g., Exhibit R-1, at p. 4-16 ("Elimination of loading zones could negatively impact business activities,  
21 particularly for auto-oriented commercial businesses. Additional people in the study area could also delay freight  
transport by crossing the roads and driveways used by freight vehicles. Because of the minor disruptions to access  
22 and loading for some of these uses within the BINMIC, a minor adverse impact could occur.")

209 E.g., Exhibit R-1, FEIS p. 7-43 ("The placement of the trail could also be moved to locations farther from the  
23 property lines, but this would require additional relocation of the BTR tracks.")

210 12/1/17 Tr., at 1361:25 (testimony of M. Shook).

1 and methodologies that are accepted in his industry<sup>211</sup> to analyze the potential economic impacts  
2 related to the Project. He also testified that the findings of that analysis are reflected in the  
3 Economics Considerations Report<sup>212</sup> and that any greater level of certainty or precision would  
4 require a huge expenditure of time and resources and may not even be feasible.<sup>213</sup> Any potential  
5 displacement of an industrial business along the Preferred Alternative would be speculative.<sup>214</sup>

6 Specifically related to the industrial businesses that were the primary focus of testimony  
7 at hearing, the Economic Considerations Report included the following:

8 *How Multi-use Trails Negatively Affect Property Value*

9 The operation of the BGT Missing Link may impede some  
10 industrial users located adjacent to the trail due to the congestion  
11 of industrial traffic with pedestrian and bicycle use. Industrial users  
12 may be required to adjust delivery patterns where the trail crosses  
13 loading docks or driveways. In addition, the operation of heavy  
14 machinery and trucks in an environment with more pedestrian and  
15 bicycle travelers may increase risk of accident. Increases in risk of  
16 automotive accidents could result in higher insurance costs or  
17 require additional labor expenditures to employ traffic flaggers to  
18 avoid collisions. Industrial businesses may adapt somewhat by  
19 adjusting delivery schedules to times of day with relatively few  
20 pedestrians and bicyclists using the BGT. This may result in more  
21 scheduled hours of operation and higher labor costs for these users.  
22 These additional operating challenges are likely to increase costs  
23 of production for these users, and these costs are unlikely to be passed on  
to consumers due to competition from producers elsewhere in the  
region.<sup>215</sup>

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21 <sup>211</sup> *Id.* at 1375:20 – 1376:1.

22 <sup>212</sup> *Id.* at 1394:3-6.

23 <sup>213</sup> *Id.* at 1384:25 – 1387:9.

<sup>214</sup> *Id.* at 1384:13-20. Nonetheless, the Economic Considerations Report does disclose that displacement is a possibility. *See* Exhibit R-34 at p. 5-1 (“However, while the economic impacts from operation of the BGT Missing Link are likely to be modest on average, these results do not imply that a negative effect could not occur to some properties.”)

<sup>215</sup> Exhibit A-34, at p. 4-7.

1 The Economic Considerations Report itself, supported by the testimony of Mr. Shook,  
2 appropriately discloses the potential impacts to properties and businesses in the project area<sup>216</sup>  
3 and analyzes the potential economic factors related to the Project.

4 Moreover, the Coalition failed to present any credible contrary evidence. Although the  
5 Coalition's expert, Mr. Spencer Cohen, indicated that SDOT did not do an adequate analysis of  
6 the potential economic impacts related to the Project, he testified that "I don't feel that I'm  
7 qualified to comment on the adequacy of a SEPA review."<sup>217</sup> Mr. Cohen has never worked on an  
8 EIS, has no familiarity with SEPA, and could not testify whether his proposed approach was  
9 required by SEPA.<sup>218</sup> In fact, he testified that the analysis he was proposing was a cost-benefit  
10 analysis,<sup>219</sup> which is explicitly NOT required by SEPA. In addition, Mr. Cohen improperly  
11 framed the question to be addressed in a SEPA analysis of economic factors as "what would  
12 those impacts be to those businesses?"<sup>220</sup> –in other words, he erroneously framed the question as  
13 being related to the profitability of a business, which is something SEPA explicitly does not  
14 require.

15 But most importantly, although Mr. Cohen testified at one point that he did believe the  
16 Project would cause "more than a moderate risk of an adverse economic impact to maritime and  
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18  
19 <sup>216</sup> *E.g.*, Exhibit R-34, Economic Considerations Report, at p. ES-1 ("The higher traffic congestion levels associated  
20 with this alternative may impose economic costs to businesses operating in the study area, due to higher labor and  
21 delivery delay costs, as well as to residents and commuters who may experience longer traffic delays."), ES-2 ("The  
22 extent to which these driveway delays may impact the profitability or viability of study area businesses is presently  
23 unknown but should be considered as potential economic issues.").

<sup>217</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 696:16-22 (testimony of S. Cohen).

<sup>218</sup> *Id.* at 714:2-23 ("Q: And so your opinion that Economic Considerations Report is inadequate, is that based on  
any prior experience, training, or real familiarity with SEPA? A: Not based on familiarity with SEPA" 714:8-12, and  
"...my understanding which is not as an expert on SEPA..." 714:16-17).

<sup>219</sup> *Id.* at 685:6 ("Think of it as sort of a cost-benefit analysis"), 696-697 (testifying that SDOT should be able to  
gather information to do a cost-benefit analysis and that he does not know if that is required by SEPA).

<sup>220</sup> *Id.* at 649:1.

1 industrial businesses,”<sup>221</sup> in several instances he stated that he did not have enough information  
2 to make that determination<sup>222</sup> and did not have any real basis for the threshold of what would be  
3 “more than moderate.”<sup>223</sup> Mr. Cohen could not say that the failure of a business would be  
4 “likely” as a result of the Project.<sup>224</sup> Absent definitive contrary expert testimony, the reviewing  
5 body must defer to SDOT’s expertise and affirm its analysis.<sup>225</sup> SDOT’s land use and economics  
6 analysis should be affirmed.

7 I. The Coalition presented no evidence on several of their appeal issues.

8 The Coalition presented no evidence on several of their appeal issues: adequacy of notice  
9 of the “New Segment”; cumulative impacts in conjunction with Seattle Public Utilities’  
10 Combined Sewer Outflow; and the adequacy of the FEIS’s analysis of impacts on the shoreline  
11 environment. Accordingly, these issues are waived and should be dismissed as a matter of law.<sup>226</sup>

12 III. CONCLUSION

13 SDOT asks the Hearing Examiner to weigh the evidence and testimony presented at the  
14 hearing in light of the standards of review set out above. The evidence and testimony will  
15 demonstrate that the Coalition’s challenge is without merit and should be rejected. The FEIS for  
16 the Missing Link Project is more than adequate to provide a basis for SDOT’s informed  
17 decision-making about the Project.

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19  
20 <sup>221</sup> 11/29/17 Tr., at 604:9-15 (testimony of S. Cohen).

21 <sup>222</sup> *Id.*, at 605:12-13 (in response to a question whether his opinion was that the project would have more than a  
22 moderate risk of an adverse economic impact to these maritime and industrial businesses, Mr. Cohen testified  
23 “There’s thus far been insufficient analysis in my opinion to draw that conclusion about the impacts.”)

<sup>223</sup> *Id.*, at 706.

<sup>224</sup> *Id.*, at 704:23-24 (“likely feels like a strong statement”).

<sup>225</sup> *Org. to Pres. Agr. Lands v. Adams Cty.*, 128 Wn.2d 869, 881, 913 P.2d 793, 801 (1996) (affirming adequacy of  
EIS where appellant’s expert witness “did not testify definitively that the studies are inadequate”).

<sup>226</sup> *Richter v. Trimberger*, 50 Wn. App. 780, 785, 750 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1988).



1  
2 DATED this 22<sup>nd</sup> day of December, 2017.

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BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER  
CITY OF SEATTLE

In the matter of the Appeal of

THE BALLARD COALITION

of the adequacy of the FEIS issued by the  
Director, Seattle Department of  
Transportation for the Burke-Gilman Trail  
Missing Link Project.

Hearing Examiner File No.:

W-17-004

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Amanda Kleiss, declare as follows:

That I am over the age of 18 years, not a party to this action, and competent to be a  
witness herein;

That I, as a paralegal in the office of Van Ness Feldman LLP, on December 22, 2017  
filed a copy of Seattle Department of Transportation's Post-Hearing Brief, a full copy of the  
hearing transcript (the transcript was not provided to the Coalition as it already has it), and this  
Certificate of Service with the Seattle Hearing Examiner using its e-filing system and that on  
December 22, 2017 I addressed said documents and deposited them for delivery as follows:

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- By U.S. Mail  
 By Messenger  
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I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED at Seattle, Washington on this 22<sup>nd</sup> day of December, 2017.

s/Amanda Kleiss  
Declarant