

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
CITY OF SEATTLE

In the matter of the Appeal of
THE BALLARD COALITION
of the adequacy of the FEIS issued by the
Director, Seattle Department of
Transportation for the Burke-Gilman Trail
Missing Link Project.

Hearing Examiner File No.:
W-17-004
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
BALLARD COALITION'S
DISPOSITIVE MOTION

I. INTRODUCTION

According to King County Superior Court Judge Jim Rogers, in his ruling on a
prior appeal related to the Missing Link – the same ruling Appellant relies on in its
Dispositive Motion:

**SEPA does not dictate the specific degree of project
completion for SEPA review. It may be 10%. It may be
60%. It may be a different number entirely. All may be
adequate depending on the project.¹**

The degree of project development necessary to reasonably identify its
environmental impacts is a question of fact, contrary to the Appellant's assertion
otherwise. Considering the unique facts in the prior appeal, Judge Rogers held that a ten
percent level of design was not sufficient to "be able to consider whether there would be

¹ Second Order of Remand, King County Superior Court No. 09-2-26586-1 SEA ("Second Remand Order"),
Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings ("Transcript") at 4 (emphasis added), attached as Exhibit A to the
Declaration of Erin E. Ferguson ("Ferguson Decl."). The Second Remand Order incorporated the Superior
Court's oral ruling and attached the Transcript to the order.

1 impacts in certain limited situations.”² In an attempt to apply this narrow holding to the
2 present case, the Appellant completely mischaracterizes Judge Rogers’ ruling. First, that
3 decision involved the adequacy of a Determination of Non-significance (“DNS”), which is
4 significantly different than the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) under review
5 here. Second, Judge Rogers’ ruling pertained to only the Shilshole Segment, a small part
6 of the larger Missing Link Project. The Hearing Examiner must determine whether the
7 level of design relied upon for the purpose of the Missing Link Project EIS is appropriate
8 based on the unique facts presented in this case.

9 Moreover, collateral estoppel applies, and the parties are bound by Judge Rogers’
10 broader holding that “SEPA does not dictate the specific degree of project completion for
11 SEPA review.” The level of design SDOT relied upon in preparing the EIS for the
12 Missing Link Project is both appropriate and consistent with the Court’s earlier ruling, and
13 the Motion should be denied.

14 II. FACTS RELEVANT TO OPPOSITION

15 The Appellant’s Dispositive Motion relies on Judge Rogers’ holding that that ten
16 percent level of design of the Shilshole Segment was not adequate for purposes of
17 reviewing the Seattle Department of Transportation’s (“SDOT”) issuance of a DNS for
18 the Missing Link Project.³ Pursuant to that holding, the Court remanded the matter to
19 SDOT “for the limited purpose of more fully designing the **Shilshole Segment** so that the
20 impacts of the proposal on the adjoining land uses, and any proposed mitigation of those
21 impacts, may be identified.”⁴ As described in the FEIS and in the earlier proceedings, the

22
23 ² *Id.*

24 ³ Although the City does not agree with the Appellant’s characterization of all of the facts, a more robust
description of the procedural history of this case is set forth in Appellant’s Motion and is not repeated here
for brevity.

25 ⁴ Second Remand Order at 2 (Ferguson Decl., Exh. A) (emphasis added).

1 Shilshole Segment is only a portion of the full, approximately 1.4 mile long, Missing Link
2 Project. The Shilshole Segment is a 0.3 mile stretch along Shilshole Avenue between 17th
3 Avenue NW and NW Vernon Place.⁵

4 Pursuant to Judge Rogers' decision, SDOT prepared plans for the Shilshole
5 Segment at a 20 to 30 percent level of design.⁶ The remainder of the design remained
6 unchanged, at approximately 10% level of design. SDOT then published a Reissued
7 Revised DNS, which Appellant's predecessor in interest appealed. The Hearing Examiner
8 found that the Shilshole Segment's 20 to 30 percent level of design was sufficient to
9 assess impacts; found no error with SDOT's decision as to the rest of the trail, portions of
10 which were designed to ten percent; and ordered preparation of an EIS on the Shilshole
11 Segment portion only.⁷ SDOT subsequently prepared an EIS assessing not only the
12 Shilshole Segment, but the entire Missing Link.

13 III. ARGUMENT

14 A. The level of design SDOT relied upon in preparing Missing Link EIS was 15 sufficient to reasonably identify the potential environmental impacts of the 16 Project.

16 1. SEPA does not establish a specific percentage threshold of design.

17 Contrary to the Appellant's argument, SEPA does not establish a specific
18 percentage threshold of design that is required prior to completion of environmental
19 review. Instead, SEPA is much less precise and requires only that a project be sufficiently
20 defined such that "the principal features of a proposal and its environmental impacts can
21

22
23 _____
24 ⁵ Hearing Examiner Decision, File W-11-002 (Ferguson Decl., Exh. B), at 2; FEIS at 1-1 and 1-2 (Ferguson
25 Decl., Exh. C).

⁶ Dispositive Motion at 4-5; Hearing Examiner Decision, File W-12-002 (Ferguson Decl., Exh. D) at 2.

⁷ Hearing Examiner Decision, File W-12-002 (Ferguson Decl., Exh. D) at 8-9.

1 be reasonably identified.”⁸ (Emphasis added.). That general directive is balanced against
2 the simultaneous requirement that an EIS should be prepared “**at the earliest possible**
3 **point** in the planning and decision-making process.”⁹ (Emphasis added.). Consistent with
4 the WAC and SMC, Judge Rogers stated,

6 Let me be very clear. **SEPA does not dictate the specific**
7 **degree of project completion for SEPA review. It may be**
8 **10%. It may be 60%. It may be a different number**
9 **entirely. All may be adequate depending on the project.**
 The question is not the level of planning. The question is
 whether or not there is enough to know whether it can be
 reviewed under SEPA for its impact.¹⁰

10 As noted by Judge Rogers, the question of whether an agency has reasonably
11 identified a project’s principal features is a question of fact that cannot be decided as a
12 matter of law based on the percentage of design that is complete.

13 Appellant misconstrues Judge Rogers’ prior holding to support its erroneous
14 argument that SEPA establishes a specific threshold of design. First, Appellant ignores the
15 Court’s express disavowal of a specific percentage design threshold. Second, Appellant
16 ignores the legal context in which the Court previously ruled that the City’s prior design
17 was deficient. The Court’s previous ruling regarding use of a ten percent level of design
18 arose in the context of a DNS for only the small Shilshole Segment of the Missing Link
19 Project. The distinction between a DNS and an EIS is a critical legal distinction that, per
20 the Superior Court’s holding, impacts the appropriate level of design completion. A DNS
21 is a “relatively superficial threshold environmental analysis” that “represents an agency
22 decision not to undertake sophisticated environmental analysis before acting on a

23 ⁸ WAC 197-11-055(2); Seattle Municipal Code (“SMC”) 25.05.055(b).

24 ⁹ WAC 197-11-055(2); Seattle Municipal Code (“SMC”) 25.05.055(b). *See also* WAC 197-11-406; SMC
25.05.406.

25 ¹⁰ Second Remand Order, Transcript of Proceeding (Ferguson Decl., Exh. A), at 4-5 (emphasis added).

1 proposal”;¹¹ signifies the agency’s conclusion that the proposal will not have any probable
2 significant adverse environmental impacts;¹² and is a “quite absolute agency choice which
3 has major potential for subverting SEPA.”¹³ As the Superior Court stated, “[I]f in fact there
4 is impact, and I don’t even know that there would be, if that decision was made later on it
5 could make the decision potentially unreviewable.”¹⁴

6 Here, however, the Hearing Examiner is reviewing an EIS for the entire project.
7 Unlike a DNS, an EIS: analyzes the proposal under “intense environmental scrutiny and
8 elaborate process requirements”; “is designed to systematically analyze and inform
9 decisionmakers of all relevant and material environmental considerations” including
10 significant environmental impacts; and allows for supplemental analysis even after the
11 finalization of an EIS.¹⁵ Unlike a DNS, where the agency has concluded that there are no
12 impacts, the City’s EIS includes rigorous analysis of potential impacts. Thus, the question
13 of whether a project is sufficiently designed to support a conclusion of no impacts without
14 further analysis (as in the case of a DNS) is fundamentally different, as a matter of law, than
15 the question of whether a project is sufficiently defined to support the rigorous
16 environmental review of an EIS. Judge Rogers’ conclusions about the adequacy of the
17 design related to a DNS are therefore irrelevant to the adequacy of the EIS. The fact that a
18 DNS represents a more superficial, more absolute, and less detailed agency decision than
19 an EIS supports requiring a higher level of design completion for a DNS than an EIS.

20 Third, Appellant ignores the limited factual context in which the Court previously
21 ruled that the City’s prior design was deficient. In the Second Remand Order, Judge

22 ¹¹ R. Settle, *The Washington State Environmental Policy Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis*, §§ 14.01,
23 14.01[1][b] (2016).

¹² WAC 197-11-340.

24 ¹³ R. Settle, *supra*, § 14.01[1][b].

¹⁴ Second Remand Order (Ferguson Decl. Exh. A) at 5.

25 ¹⁵ R. Settle, *supra*, §§ 14.01, 14.01[12].

1 Rogers' ruling regarding the insufficiency of design applied only to the small Shilshole
2 Segment, even though the rest of the Project was also designed to a ten percent level of
3 design.¹⁶ Further, in File W-12-002, the Hearing Examiner found that the Shilshole
4 Segment's 20 to 30 percent level of design was sufficient to assess impacts and also found
5 no error with SDOT's decision as to the rest of the trail, rejecting Appellant's challenges to
6 the level of design.¹⁷ Thus Judge Rogers and the Examiner previously declined to
7 extrapolate the Court's conclusions related to that limited segment to the entirety of the
8 Project. Appellant's claim that SDOT has "un-design[ed] its proposal and revert[ed] to the
9 prior level of design"¹⁸ distorts the facts and ignores the progression of design and additional
10 analysis of the potential impacts along the Shilshole Segment,¹⁹ in addition to the remainder
11 of the Project, that has occurred since the Second Remand Order.

12 Therefore, the Examiner should reject Appellant's arguments that suggest SEPA or
13 the Court's prior order establishes a specific threshold of design prior to completion of an
14 EIS.

15 **2. Determining the appropriate level of design requires a fact-dependent
16 analysis of the nature of the project.**

17 Appellant's argument rests on a gross over-simplification of project design. There
18 can be no specific threshold of design that is required for SEPA purposes precisely because
19 there is no universal definition of a "ten percent level of design." As explained in the
20 attached Declaration of Darby Watson, Director of SDOT's Project Development Division,

21 There is no universal definition for 10% design. Different
22 agencies have different guidelines and different engineers
23 within those agencies may have their own standard for what

24 ¹⁶ Second Remand Order (Ferguson Decl., Exh. A) at 2.

25 ¹⁷ Hearing Examiner Decision, File W-12-002 at 2 (Ferguson Decl., Exh. D), 8-9.

¹⁸ Dispositive Motion at 11.

¹⁹ See, e.g. FEIS at 1-1 and 1-17 (Ferguson Decl., Exh. C), describing one example of additional analysis that was performed between the DEIS and FEIS, in addition to design modifications and analysis done between the time the DNS was reversed and issuance of the DEIS.

1 each level of design entails, exercising their professional
2 judgment. The level of detail provided at each design
3 milestone varies by project depending on many factors,
4 including the type of project, the goals of the design, and the
5 availability of information, such as existing utility
information, survey topography, etc. Even within a single
design, the level of design may vary between different
segments of a project alignment. Therefore, defining a level
of design for plans is subjective.

6 A subjective, fact-dependent standard, such as the “ten-percent rule” championed by the
7 Appellant, cannot be applied as a matter of law, particularly where the inquiry involves a
8 completely different set of facts. At most, the Examiner is tasked with identifying whether
9 the City reasonably identified the principal features of a proposal and its environmental
10 impacts, which is an inherently factual determination that cannot be decided as a matter of
11 law.
12

13 **3. Appellant’s arguments would prevent the City from complying with**
14 **SEPA’s directive to prepare an EIS “at the earliest possible point” in**
the planning process.

15 As noted above, SEPA requires that an EIS should be prepared “**at the earliest**
16 **possible point** in the planning and decision-making process.”²⁰ (Emphasis added.).
17 Similarly, WAC 197-11-406 and SMC 25.05.406 both state, “The lead agency shall
18 commence preparation of the environmental impact statement **as close as possible to the**
19 **time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal.**” (Emphasis added.).

20 The Washington Supreme Court has explained that “SEPA is designed to avoid
21 crisis decision making by requiring meaningful early evaluations of environmental
22 matters.”²¹ Thus, SEPA invites (and it is typical for) applicants to advance design beyond

23 _____
24 ²⁰ WAC 197-11-055(2); Seattle Municipal Code (“SMC”) 25.05.055(b).

25 ²¹ *Loveless v. Yantis*, 82 Wn.2d 754, 766, 513 P.2d 1023, 1030 (1973). *See also* R. Settle, *supra*, § 14.01
 (“[Environmental impact] statements must be prepared early enough to inform and guide decisionmakers
 rather than rationalize or justify decisions already made.”).

1 what has been done by the time of the FEIS. If there are substantial changes to a design that
2 are likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts, or if new information indicates
3 a proposal's "probable significant adverse environmental impacts" were not previously
4 covered by the existing environmental documents, then SEPA invites supplemental
5 analysis.²²

6 Appellant's argument would necessarily delay environmental review and inhibit the
7 City's ability to issue its EIS at "the earliest possible point in the planning and decision-
8 making process." Appellant would instead require the City to make significant front-end
9 investment in developing proposals without the benefit of the very environmental review
10 that is supposed to inform that Project's development. SEPA does not require that result.

11 **B. Appellant is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the Superior Court's**
12 **determination that "SEPA does not dictate the specific degree of project**
13 **completion for SEPA review."**

14 The City does not dispute that collateral estoppel applies to the issue of whether
15 SEPA mandates a specific level of project design based on Judge Rogers' resolution of that
16 question; based on Judge Rogers' broader ruling, there is no set level of design required by
17 SEPA. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a subsequent proceeding.
18 Collateral estoppel applies when (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical
19 with the one presented in the action in question; (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a final
20 judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity
21 with a party to the prior adjudication; (4) the application of the doctrine does not work an

22
23
24 ²² WAC 197-11-600(3)(b)(ii); *see, e.g., Pres. Our Islands v. Shorelines Hearings Bd.*, 133 Wn. App. 503,
25 542-44, 137 P.3d 31 (2006) (concluding that an FEIS was adequate, and a supplemental EIS was not
required, even though the project applicant made "extensive modifications" to its proposal after the FEIS
was issued).

1 injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied.²³ Here, the only real
2 question relates to the issue decided in the prior adjudication before the Superior Court.

3 Although Judge Rogers' ruling arose in a completely different factual context, the
4 issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the issue presented by Appellant's
5 Motion—the degree of project completion required for SEPA review. Although the Court
6 did find that there was not sufficient design to determine the impacts on a portion of the
7 Missing Link Project in the context of a DNS, Judge Rogers clearly held that SEPA requires
8 no specific level of design completion and that different levels of design—including ten
9 percent—may be adequate under different circumstances. This holding is binding on the
10 parties and the Hearing Examiner should reject Appellant's invitation to apply a
11 mischaracterized ruling to the circumstances of the present case.

12 Given that the Appellant agrees that collateral estoppel applies, there is no dispute
13 that remaining three elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied. The prior proceeding
14 ended in a final judgment on the merits. Appellant is the successor in interest to the
15 appellants of the prior proceedings, and Washington courts have found privity in successors
16 in interest.²⁴ And finally, application of collateral doctrine does not work an injustice on
17 Appellant, because Appellant has already had a full opportunity to litigate this issue.
18 Appellant is collaterally estopped from claiming that SEPA requires a specific percentage
19 of design completion.

20 IV. CONCLUSION

21 For all of the reasons discussed above, Appellant's Dispositive Motion should be
22 denied.

23 ²³ *Christensen v. Grant Cty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1*, 152 Wn.2d 299, 307, 96 P.3d 957, 961 (2004).

24 ²⁴ *Bull v. Fenich*, 34 Wn. App. 435, 439, 661 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1983).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DATED this 31st day of July 2017.

PETER S. HOLMES
Seattle City Attorney and
VAN NESS FELDMAN


Erin E. Ferguson, WSBA #39535
Tadas A. Kisielius, WSBA #28734
Dale Johnson, WSBA #26629
Clara Park, WSBA #52255
701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104
Tel: (206) 948-7406
E-mail: erin.ferguson@seattle.gov;
tak@vnf.com; dnj@vnf.com;
cpark@vnf.com

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 I certify that on this date, I electronically filed a copy of the City's Response in
3 Opposition to Ballard Coalition's Motion with the Seattle Hearing Examiner using its e-
4 filing system.

5 I also certify that on this date, a copy of this document was sent via email
6 agreement to the following parties listed below:
7

8 Joshua C. Brower
9 Danielle N. Granatt
10 Leah B. Silverthorn
11 Email: josh@verislawgroup.com
12 danielle@verislawgroup.com
leah@verislawgroup.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
Megan Manion, Legal Assistant
Email: megan@verislawgroup.com

13 Patrick J. Schneider
14 Foster Pepper LLC
15 Email: pat.schneider@foster.com
Brenda Bole, Legal Assistant
brenda.bole@foster.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner

16 Matthew Cohen
17 Rachel H. Cox
18 Stoel Rives LLP
19 Email: matthew.cohen@stoel.com
20 rachel.cox@stoel.com
Judy Shore, Practice Assistant
judy.shore@stoel.com
Attorneys for Intervenor
Cascade Bicycle Club

21 Tadas Kisielius, WSBA #28734
22 Dale Johnson, WSBA #26629
23 Clara Park, WSBA #52255
24 Van Ness Feldman LLP
25 Email: tak@vnf.com; dnj@vnf.com
cpark@vnf.com
Marya Pirak, Paralegal

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
BALLARD COALITION'S MOTION - 1

Peter S. Holmes
Seattle City Attorney
701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2050
Seattle, WA 98104-7097
(206) 684-8200

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Email: map@vnf.com
Attorneys for Respondent City of Seattle

Dated this 31st day of July, 2017, at Seattle, Washington.

s/ALICIA REISE, Legal Assistant