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BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
FOR THE CITY OF SEATTLE

In the Matter of the Appeal of:

Livable Phinney, a Washington non-profit corporation

From a Department of Construction and Inspections decision.

No. MUP 17-009 (DR, W)

SDCI Reference: 3020114

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO REOPEN
RECORD

I. INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to further delay the resolution of this matter, Appellant now seeks to reopen the record to include information that will not assist the Hearing Examiner in his decision. The applicant Johnson & Carr, Inc. (“Applicant”) requests that the Hearing Examiner deny this late motion to reopen the record made by appellant Livable Phinney (“Appellant”). Appellant fails to establish the prerequisite showing of a “good cause” necessary to reopen the record, and instead misconstrues the City’s position in its Interpretation to support its request to include new and immaterial information. *See* Hearing Examiner Rules (“HER”) 2.20(c).

Moreover, Appellant did not request the new information on the bus arrival times until after the close of the hearing, failed to inform the Hearing Examiner of his intention to seek to

1 reopen the record at the conclusion of the hearing, and failed to note that Appellant sought this
2 additional information from King County in its closing brief, filed after Appellant filed a request
3 for the information with King County. This request is contrary to the Hearing Examiner's stated
4 goal to conduct an expeditious hearing where all parties are required to "make every effort to
5 avoid delay." HER 2.06.
6

7 The appeal was filed over four months ago. It would greatly prejudice the Applicant to
8 further delay the resolution of this matter by reopening the record to include information for
9 which Appellant failed to show good cause to include at this late date and that is not relevant to
10 the Hearing Examiner's determination. The Hearing Examiner should deny Appellant's motion.
11

12 II. FACTS

13 Appellant filed its appeal on February 6, 2017. The Hearing Examiner held an open
14 record hearing from May 2-5, 2017. Sometime after the hearing, Dr. Roberto Altschul requested
15 data from King County Metro for the bus arrival and departure times from March 13, 2017 to
16 April 28, 2017.¹ Only now, two days prior to the scheduled due date of the Hearing Examiner's
17 decision under SMC 23.76.023.C.10,² does Appellant seek to reopen the record.
18

19 III. ISSUE

20 Should the Hearing Examiner deny Appellant's motion to reopen the record where the
21 Appellant has failed to establish any "good cause," further delay would prejudice the Applicant,
22 the motion does not comply with HER 2.06 and 2.20(c), and the evidence Appellant seeks to
23 admit is not relevant to the Hearing Examiner's determination?
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26 ¹ Appellant's motion states that Mr. Altschul waited more than 2 months for the information from King County
27 Metro. According to Mr. Altschul's statements, this is untrue. Mr. Altschul requested the information after the
28 hearing, which ended on May 5, 2017. Mr. Altschul received the data on June 15, 2017. This is not a span of more
than two months.

² The Hearing Examiner has asked for oral argument on the motion, scheduled for June 27, 2017.

1 **IV. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON**

2 This Response relies on the pleadings and papers on file in this matter.

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4 **V. ARGUMENT**

5 The Hearing Examiner may reopen the record and/or hearing for good cause shown under
6 HER 2.20(a). Here, good cause does not exist, and any additional delay of the resolution of this
7 matter would greatly prejudice the Applicant. The Hearing Examiner Rules require that hearings
8 are conducted “expeditiously” and that parties “make every effort to avoid delay.” HER 2.06.
9 Contrary to this mandate, Appellant seeks to reopen the record to include information regarding
10 the bus arrival and departure times in March 2017. This attempt to supplement the record at this
11 late date must fail.
12

13 Appellant’s explanations of “good cause” are insufficient. First, to support its argument
14 of good cause, Appellant attempts to reargue the merits and points to testimony of David Graves.
15 However, it is unclear from the cited passages what testimony Appellant is relying upon, as the
16 first passage cited discusses exhibits and the second passage discusses a view analysis. There is
17 accordingly nothing to which Applicant can reasonably respond to. Even if there were, however,
18 data from arrival times of buses in March 2017 is a red herring. The question in the
19 interpretation was whether the City should require a statistical analysis of actual headway data,
20 in addition to or in lieu of relying upon King County Metro bus schedules. See Interpretation
21 Request, p. 13. The City’s Interpretation clearly concludes that only schedules should be used in
22 determining frequent transit, even if there are occasions where a bus does not meet its schedule
23 stop. See Exh. 6 at 10. If the City Council had wanted to require an analysis of actual headway
24 data, it would have adopted legislation requiring it.
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1 Second, Appellant argues that “SDCI’s code interpretation was based on mere conjecture
2 that adding two more morning buses would bring actual headways up to the minimum 15
3 minutes.” Motion, at p. 2. This is not true. See Exh. 6, p. 10. Indeed, the Code interpretation
4 simply concludes that schedules, and not actual data, should be used to determine whether a
5 project site meets the definition of Frequent Transit Service. *Id.* The Code interpretation also
6 states that the March 2017 schedule shows that the project site meets this definition of frequent
7 transit. *Id.* Nowhere does the City state that the addition of two buses on Route 5 was a key
8 determinant for the City in concluding that the project site meets the definition of frequent
9 transit, nor does it conclude that it should rely upon, or plans to rely upon, actual data. Exh. 6;
10 see generally Testimony of David Graves. Indeed, the Interpretation very clearly states that
11 actual data should not be used. Exh. 6. The inclusion of this new information is accordingly
12 irrelevant.
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15 Third, Appellant misconstrues the Hearing Examiner’s decision in *Fremont Neighbors* to
16 argue that evidence as to actual headways would be admissible. *Fremont Neighbors* did not hold
17 that the results of actual service should be used to determine frequent transit. Indeed, the
18 Hearing Examiner declined to entertain this argument because the appellants in that case did not
19 request an interpretation under SMC 23.88.020. *In Re Fremont Neighborhood Council, MUP-14-*
20 *022, Conclusion ¶10.*
21

22 Because the City’s Interpretation focused on the question asked—whether published bus
23 schedules or actual data from several months prior to the analysis should be used—Appellant
24 seeks to reopen the record to introduce information that is immaterial to the issue that the
25 Hearing Examiner is deciding under the Appellant’s request for interpretation. As the
26 overwhelming evidence at the hearing showed, the City’s determination in its Interpretation that
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1 it should rely upon the bus schedules is reasonable and not in clear error.

2 Finally, any additional delay to the resolution of this appeal greatly prejudices the
3 Applicant. Under the Hearing Examiner's Rules of Practice and Procedure, hearings must be
4 conducted expeditiously, and all parties must seek to avoid delay. *See* HE Rules 2.06, 2.20(a).
5 Appellant failed at the hearing to either request that the hearing should be continued until it
6 receives the data from King County Metro or at least notify the parties and the Hearing Examiner
7 that it intended to request said data from the county. Appellant did not even request the data
8 until sometime after the conclusion of the hearing. Importantly, in its closing brief, Appellant
9 did not notify the Hearing Examiner and the parties that it had requested additional data from
10 King County. SMC 23.76.023.C.10 requires the Hearing Examiner to issue his decision with 15
11 days after the close of the hearing, which was calculated to be June 21, 2017. The Applicant
12 would be greatly prejudiced by the inclusion of this information, as it does not have an ability to
13 cross examine the witness and opening the hearing to allow for such cross examination would
14 further delay a matter that has been under appeal for over four months. Further delay is
15 unacceptable.
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19 There is no good cause shown that supports reopening the record to include the new
20 testimony and information. Applicant accordingly requests that Appellant's motion be denied.

21 VI. CONCLUSION


22 Applicant requests that the Hearing Examiner deny Appellant's motion to reopen the
23 record.
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1 DATED this 26th day of June, 2017.

2 MCCULLOUGH HILL LEARY, P.S.

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4 By: 
5 _____
6 Jessica M. Clawson, WSBA #36901
7 Katie Kendall, WSBA #48164
8 Attorneys for Applicant
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