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BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
FOR THE CITY OF SEATTLE

In the Matter of the Appeal of:

Livable Phinney, a Washington non-profit
corporation

From a Department of Construction and
Inspections decision.

No. MUP 17-009 (DR, W)

SDCI Reference: 3020114

APPLICANT’S POST-HEARING BRIEF

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Livable Phinney (“Appellant”) appealed the Director of the Department of Construction and Inspection’s (“SDCI”) approval of a 57-unit residential building at 6726 Greenwood Avenue North in the Phinney Ridge neighborhood in Seattle (“Project”). The Project required design review and State Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”) review, and was subject to a Request for Interpretation, Interpretation No. 17-002, which the Appellant also appeals.

The Project was reviewed during four separate Design Review Board (“Board”) meetings. As a result of design review, several changes to the Project were made, ultimately resulting in a better-designed building. In addition, the Applicant thoughtfully considered the surroundings of the Project site in its design and, in accordance with citywide and neighborhood

1 design guidelines, balanced the transition to neighboring properties with the need for a strong
2 corner street presence. In sum, the Project is one of the most well-designed and thoroughly
3 considered residential projects in the Phinney Ridge neighborhood. The City of Seattle (“City”)
4 Department of Construction and Inspections (“SDCI”) properly issued design review approval.

5
6 SDCI also thoroughly reviewed the Project under SEPA. As part of the SEPA review for
7 the Project, the Applicant Johnson & Carr, Inc. (“Applicant”) completed several SEPA studies,
8 including a traffic analysis, parking analyses, geotechnical report and Phase I and II
9 environmental reports, which SDCI reviewed. Ultimately, SDCI issued a Master Use Permit
10 (“MUP”) decision consisting of approval of the design recommended for approval by the Board
11 and a Determination of Nonsignificance (“DNS”).

12
13 Appellant requested a Land Use Code Interpretation regarding several items: setback
14 requirements in SMC 23.47A.014.B.3; issues related to the definition and location of the
15 clerestory; the shadow study conducted pursuant to SMC 23.47A.012.C.7; the view study
16 conducted pursuant to SMC 23.47A.012.A.1; the height of certain rooftop features; and the
17 definition of frequent transit. After thorough consideration of the issues, the City determined
18 that the Appellant’s arguments were without merit and it upheld its zoning decisions.

19
20 The Appellant has not met its burden to show that the MUP approving this Project was
21 erroneous. The Appellant has similarly not met its burden to show that the conclusions in the
22 Interpretation were erroneous. The appeal must be denied and the MUP and the Interpretation
23 must be affirmed.

24 25 **II. FACTS**

26 The facts in this matter were established at hearing. The relevant facts are discussed
27 below in relation to each claim.

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III. ARGUMENT

The Hearing Examiner has only that authority granted to it by statute or ordinance. *Chausee v. Snohomish Ct. Council*, 38 Wn. App. 630, 636, 689 P.2d 1084 (1984); *HJS Development, Inc. v. Pierce County*, 148 Wn.2d 451, 471, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003). Accordingly, the Examiner’s authority to review the Appellant’s claims is expressly limited by the specific standards of review outlined in the Seattle Municipal Code (“City Code” or “SMC”).

As discussed below, the Appellant has not met its burden to show that the MUP approving this Project was erroneous. The Appellant has similarly not met its burden to show that the conclusions in the Interpretation were erroneous. The appeal must be denied and the MUP and the Interpretation must be affirmed.

A. Appellant failed to meet its burden to show that SDCI’s design review decision was erroneous.

1. The Hearing Examiner must give substantial weight to SDCI’s design review decision and the burden of proof is on Appellant.

The design review process exists, in part, to “[e]ncourage better design and site planning to help ensure that new development enhances the character of the city and sensitively fits into neighborhoods.” SMC 23.41.002. The Board is the entity charged with reviewing the design of projects under the Code and the City’s adopted Design Review Guidelines. SMC 23.41.008.A. When (as here), if four or more members of the Board are in agreement in their recommendation to SDCI, there is a presumption that the Design Review Board’s recommendation is correct. *See* SMC 23.41.014.F.2. SMC 23.41.014.F.2 requires the Director to make compliance with the recommendation of the Design Review Board a condition of permit approval if four or more members of the Design Review Board are in agreement regarding the recommendation, with some exceptions not applicable here.

1 In recognition of this process, the City Code requires the Hearing Examiner to give
2 substantial weight to SDCI's design review decision. RCW 43.21C.090; SMC 23.76.002.C.7;
3 *King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Mgm't Hrgs. Bd.*, 91 Wn. App. 1, 30, 951 P.2d
4 1151 (1998). The burden is on the Appellant to overcome the deference that the Director's
5 decision.

6
7 Courts interpret the "substantial weight" requirement as mandating the clearly erroneous
8 standard of review. *Indian Trail Property Owner's Ass'n. v. City of Spokane*, 76 Wn. App. 430,
9 431, 886 P.2d 209 (1994); *Brown v. Tacoma*, 30 Wn. App. 762, 764, 637 P.2d 1005 (1981).
10 Under the clearly erroneous standard, reviewing bodies do not substitute their judgment for that
11 of the agency but may invalidate the decision only when left with the definite and firm
12 conviction that a mistake has been committed. *Whatcom County Fire District No. 21 v.*
13 *Whatcom County*, 171 Wn.2d 421, 427, 256 P.3d 295 (2011), *citing Norway Hill Pres. and Prot.*
14 *Ass'n. v. King County Council*, 87 Wn.2d 267, 274, 552 P.2d 674 (1976) (internal quotations
15 omitted).

16
17 An Appellant does not meet its burden to show a decision is clearly erroneous if the
18 evidence shows only that reasonable minds might differ with the decision. *See e.g.*, Findings and
19 Decision of the Hearing Examiner for the City of Seattle, *In the Matter of the Appeals of CUCAC*
20 *and Friends of UW Open Space, et al.*, File Nos. S-96-002 and S-96-003 (July 15, 1996), p. 13;
21 Findings and Decision of the Hearing Examiner for the City of Seattle, *In the Matter of the*
22 *Appeal of Andrew Kirsh and Meredith Getches*, File No. MUP-08-003 (May 23, 2008). Mere
23 complaints, or claims without the production of affirmative evidence showing that a decision was
24 erroneous, are insufficient to satisfy an Appellant's burden. *Boehm v. City of Vancouver, supra*,
25 at 719-720 (2002); *see also Moss v. Bellingham*, 109 Wn. App. 6, 13, 31 P.3d 703 (2001).
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1 Much of the Appellant’s presentations were given to discussing the design review
2 process, and the “impacts” of the Project regarding design. However, only lay testimony was
3 submitted to the Examiner regarding design concerns of the Project. Such evidence is neither
4 clear, nor convincing, and the Appellant failed to meet its burden to show, with clear and
5 convincing evidence, that the Design Review Board’s decision regarding height, bulk and scale,
6 respect for adjacent sites, zone transitions, and other design issues, was correct. The Examiner
7 must reject Appellant’s claims regarding these issues.
8

9 **2. The Project is consistent with the Design Review Guidelines.**

10 The Design Review process in Seattle is a collaborative process. The Design Review
11 Guidelines are a framework for designing a building, and are not considered to mandate a
12 particular project design. (Testimony of Jay Janette, Day 2, 256-260:14-1). Guidelines are
13 intended to be viewed in total, and must accordingly be balanced among one another. *Id.*
14

15 Instead of reviewing the Project against the Guidelines in their entirety, Appellant argued
16 that the Project did not comply with three guidelines: Citywide Guidelines CS2-D-5 and CS2-D-
17 3 and Greenwood/Phinney Guideline CS2-II-ii. Appellant is incorrect. The evidence at hearing
18 showed that the Project meets both the Citywide and Greenwood/Phinney Design Review
19 Guidelines, including the specific Guidelines cited by Appellants. *See* Exhibits 63, 65-67;
20 Testimony of Michael Dorcy, Day 3, 194-8:2-19.¹ Appellants failed to meet their burden to
21 demonstrate that SDCI’s conclusion on design review was erroneous.
22

23 All evidence in the record shows that the Project met both the Citywide and
24 Greenwood/Phinney Design Review Guidelines, in the following manner:
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28 ¹ Relevant portions of the hearing transcript are cited in this brief, the excerpts of which are provided in the Declaration of Katie Kendall that accompanies this brief.

1 **a. Guideline CS2-D-5: Respect for Adjacent Sites.**

2 Appellants generally complained that the Project did not meet CS2-D-5, which
3 recommends that a project respect adjacent sites to minimize disrupting the privacy of residents
4 in adjacent buildings. Elizabeth Johnson Testimony, Laura Reymore Testimony. However,
5 Appellants failed to present affirmative evidence supporting their allegations that the Project did
6 not meet Guideline CS2-D-5. Instead, the evidence in the record shows that the Project meets
7 the height, bulk and scale requirements of the Citywide and Greenwood/Phinney Guidelines,
8 including CS2-D-5.
9

10 The Project architect Jay Janette testified regarding the extensive design review process
11 conducted for the Project. The Board reviewed this Project in four meetings, an unusually large
12 number. Mr. Janette testified to the design changes requested by the Board so that the Project
13 better relates to the properties to the east and to the south. Specifically, the Project made several
14 changes to improve the aesthetic of the Project and minimize disrupting the privacy of residents
15 in adjacent buildings, including:
16

- 17 • The building maintains a 5-foot setback along the east property. (Exhs. 3 and Exh.
18 46, pp. 3, 6, 8)
- 19 • The building maintains a 10-ft upper level setback at the northeastern property
20 façade and a 25-ft upper level setback at the southeastern property façade. (Exh.
21 46, p. 3)
- 22 • Landscape screening was added along the east property line at the upper level
23 setback. (Exh. 46, p. 3, 16-18; Janette Testimony, Day 2, at 192-3:16-2; 216:16-
24 23; 262-3:11-11)
- 25 • The brick façade was extended around the northeastern corner of the building to
26 maintain a high quality and attractive look (Exh. 46, p. 3)
- 27 • The Project reduced the height of the parapet to the minimum necessary to reduce
28 the height and appearance of bulk (Exh.46, p.3; Janette Testimony at 176:10-13,
 179:6-13)
- The clerestory expression along Greenwood was set back from the southern edge
 of the building to transition to the existing building to the south. (Exh. 46, p. 3)

- 1 • The stair along the south property line was relocated further to the north, rotated,
2 and chamfered to reduce its visual impact from the south façade (Janette
3 Testimony, Day 2, 188:2-19).
- 4 • The south facing façade received a design treatment with patterning that is
5 consistent with the other facades. (Exh. 46, p. 3)
- 6 • The bays along the eastern façade were removed at the northeast corner, where
7 the building is closest to the property line, and shortened to be below the roofline
8 along the rest of the east façade. (Exh. 46, p. 3)
- 9 • The south facing façade was modified so that the CMU portion of the wall at
10 grade will be painted a lighter color to match the façade above, and provide
11 additional reflected light into the space between the buildings. (Exh. 46, p. 6;
12 Janette testimony, Day 2, 181:11-19 and 183-4:24-7).
- 13 • High windows of the east facing units and the punched windows in the NE brick
14 volume were reconfigured and reduced in size in order to minimize the visual
15 impact to and ensure the privacy of the neighboring properties to the East. (Exh.
16 46, p. 6; Janette testimony, Day 2, 184-5:8-14).
- 17 • The Project removed balconies on northeastern façade (Exh. 46, p. 3; Janette
18 Testimony, Day 2, at 179:15-16)
- 19 • The Project moved roof the deck further west to ensure privacy and reduce noise
20 for the properties east of the Project (Janette Testimony, Day 2, 186-7:17-2).
- 21 • The Project placed south-facing windows so that they are in the oblique, and do
22 not directly face the windows in the building to the south in order to maintain
23 privacy for the residents to the south (Janette Testimony, Day 2, 226-227:4:11).

24 The Board was notably focused on the transition from the Project to the neighbors to the
25 south and the east (*see* Exhs. 5; 65; 67). Indeed, at the second Early Design Guidance meeting, the
26 Board members agreed that the applicants' preferred option provided for the best arrangement of
27 uses on the site and allowed for desirable transitions: 1) to the new mixed-use structure across N. 68th
28 Street, 2) to the multi-family structure to the south, and 3) to the single-family structures to the east.
Exh. 65, p. 7. However, to provide for suitable transitions, the Board also recommended that the
architect doff the clerestory cap along the south portion of the top of the compositional bar facing
onto Greenwood Avenue N, requested that the architect provide significant design attention to the
south façade. *Id.* The Board also requested that the transition to the eastern properties receive further
attention, including setting the easternmost live-work unit further back from the property line at N.
68th Street, truncate the bays above the two live-work units below the cornice line atop the side wall,

1 remove bay roofs and doff the building “caps” altogether. *Id.* These suggestions were incorporated
2 into the approved design. Exh. 46, p. 3 and 6. Based on the extensive changes noted above, the
3 Board was satisfied with the changes in relationship to the design guidelines.

4 With regard to Guideline CS2-D-5, the Board agreed that the Project responds to the
5 concerns regarding adjacent sites and privacy of neighbors to the east, stating:

6
7 The Board expressed satisfaction with the 5-foot setback along the east property
8 line and the modifications to the fenestration on the east façade. They were also
9 satisfied with the proposed landscape plan, pointing out that establishing the
10 plantings would require an irrigation plan, especially at the second level amenity
11 area where it is critical to establish the landscape to ensure privacy to the units and
12 to their neighbors.

13 Exhibit 5, p. 5.

14 The report also reflects that:

15
16 The Board expressed satisfaction and agreed that changes to the window composition
17 within the clerestories and on the east façade had addressed their concerns expressed
18 at the earlier Recommendation Meeting.

19 *Id.*

20 With regard to Guideline CS2-D-5, the Board requested, and the Applicant agreed, to
21 keep the south wall a lighter color. The light color is shown in the final Design Review
22 Submission (Exh. 46, p. 6) and in the final MUP Plans (Exh. 3, p. A3.04).

23 The MUP Decision requires the following:

24
25 The building and landscape design shall be substantially consistent with the materials
26 represented at the Final Recommendation meeting and in the materials submitted after
27 the Final Recommendation meeting, before the MUP issuance. Any change to the
28 proposed design, including materials or colors, shall require prior approval by the Land
Use Planner (Michael Dorcy, (206) 615-1393, michael.dorcy@seattle.gov).

Exh. 5, p. 29.

To clarify that this condition also requires that the south wall be light in color, the
Hearing Examiner requested that the parties propose a condition regarding the south wall.

1 Applicant accordingly proposes that the City revise the above condition in the MUP
2 decision, stating the following:

3 The building and landscape design shall be substantially consistent with the materials
4 represented at the Final Recommendation meeting and in the materials submitted after
5 the Final Recommendation meeting, before the MUP issuance. The building's south
6 wall shall be light in color as recommended by the Board. Any change to the proposed
7 design, including materials or colors, shall require prior approval by the Land Use
8 Planner (Michael Dorcy, (206) 615-1393, michael.dorcy@seattle.gov).

9 The Appellant failed to submit any affirmative evidence overcoming the presumption that
10 Guideline CS2-D-5 has been addressed. The Examiner must reject this issue.

11 **b. Guideline CS2-D-3 and Guideline CS2-II-ii: Zone Transitions and**
12 **Zone Edges.**

13 Citywide Guideline CS2-D-3 and Greenwood/Phinney Guideline CS2-II-ii relate to the
14 transitions at zone edges between different zones. Exhibit 5, pp. 6-7. The Project abuts a split
15 zone lot which includes NC2-40 at the zone edge and single family use approximately 20 feet
16 from the eastern property line. *Id.*, p. 2. While the Project does not directly abut a zone of lesser
17 density, both the Applicant and the DRB took into account the single family uses to the east in
18 consideration of the Project, resulting in a design that provides an appropriate transition to this
19 lesser intense zone in accordance with both Citywide Guideline CS2-D-3 and
20 Greenwood/Phinney Guideline CS2-II-ii. *See generally* Exh. 46; Exh. 5, pp. 3-22.

21 Guideline CS2-D-3 recommends that a project located at the edge of a different zone
22 provide an appropriate transition or complement to adjacent zones by creating a step in perceived
23 height, bulk and scale between the anticipated development potential of the adjacent zone and
24 the proposed development. Exh. 5, p. 6. Greenwood/Phinney Guideline CS2-II-ii similarly
25 requests zone transitions, and suggests that an applicant consider four different design techniques
26 at zone edges, including (1) increasing the building setback from the zone edge at the ground
27

1 level; (2) reducing the bulk of the building's upper floors nearest to the less intensive zone; (3)
2 reducing the overall height of the structure; and (4) using extensive landscaping or decorative
3 screening. *Id.*, p. 7. The Project utilized all methods described above to reduce the actual and
4 apparent height, bulk and scale of the building along the eastern edge of the Project, including:

- 6 • The Project reduced the height of the parapet to the minimum necessary to reduce
7 the height and appearance of bulk. (Exh.46, p.3; Janette Testimony at 176:10-13,
179:6-13)
- 8 • The Project dissolved the mass and broke up the bulk and the scale with
9 modulation and bays as the building moves east to provide a transition. (Janette
10 Testimony, Day 2, 167:10-18)
- 11 • The Project removed balconies on northeastern façade (Exh. 46, p. 3)
- 12 • The bays along the eastern façade were removed at the northeast corner, where
13 the building is closest to the property line, and shortened to be below the roofline
14 along the rest of the east façade. (Exh. 46, p. 3)
- 15 • Landscape screening was added along the east property line at the upper level
16 setback. (Exh. 46, p. 3, 16-18; Janette Testimony at 192-3:16-2; 216:16-23; 262-
17 3:11-11)
- 18 • The Project increased setbacks beyond Code requirements to the extent feasible
19 while maintaining a corner and street presence along 68th Street.
 - 20 ○ The southeastern edge is set back 5 feet at ground level and 25 feet in the
21 upper level setbacks with significant landscaping. (Exh. 46, p. 3; Janette
22 Testimony 192-3:16-2 and 216:16-23).
 - 23 ○ The northeastern edge is set back 5 feet at ground level and 10 feet in the
24 upper level with landscaping along the upper level setback (Exh. 46, p. 3,
25 6; Janette Testimony, Day 2, 262-3:11-11).
- 26 • The selected scheme was determined to cast the least amount of shadow on the
27 eastern single-family backyards than any of the other schemes presented. (Janette
28 Testimony, Day 2, 168:1-6).

21 Mr. Janette also testified that the Project is 45-51 feet from the residential structures east
22 of the Project. (*Id.*, 169:10-21). Mr. Janette testified about balancing the need for a strong
23 architectural presence on 68th Street with the need to provide appropriate transitions and setbacks
24 to the neighbors to the east. (*Id.*, 256-260:14-1). Indeed, the upper level southeastern façade is
25 set back 25 feet from the property line to provide sufficient light and air to the open spaces to the
26 east. Exh. 46, p. 3. For the northeastern façade, the upper level façade is set back 10 feet for a

1 few reasons: one, the northeastern façade is closest to a garage and not entirely open space; two,
2 the building must maintain a strong street line on 68th Street. (Dorcy Testimony, Day 3, 217-
3 21:17-6; Janette Testimony, Day 2, 216-19:14-9). The setbacks, coupled with the significant
4 project changes requested by the Board, demonstrate that the Project meets Citywide Guideline
5 CS2-D-3 and Greenwood/Phinney Guideline CS2-II-ii. Exh. 5. The Appellant failed to submit
6 any affirmative evidence overcoming the presumption that these guidelines have been addressed.
7
8 The Examiner must reject this issue.

9 **3. Appellant failed to meet its burden to show that SDCI's design review**
10 **decision was erroneous.**

11 Much of the Appellant's presentations discussed Appellant's opinion of the southern and
12 eastern façades of the building. However, Appellant failed to show that the design review
13 decision was made in error.

14 Appellant offered no expert witnesses regarding building design, the design review
15 process, or the application of the Design Review Guidelines. Appellant offered the testimony of
16 several neighbors to the Project regarding their personal, lay opinion of the Project's design and
17 its impacts. However, the personal opinions of a handful of neighbors do not overcome the
18 substantial weight given to SDCI's design review decision.
19

20 In response, the Applicant presented the testimony of Jay Janette, a Seattle architect who
21 has over 20 years experience designing buildings in Seattle and presenting projects to the Design
22 Review Board. Mr. Janette testified to the significant design changes for the Project so that it
23 best relates to the residential properties to the east and south, provides appropriate transitions,
24 and seeks to ensure privacy of those residents. The Project design reflects those changes as well
25 as the goal to create a coherent architectural presence and a strong street corner presence.
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27 (Janette Testimony, Day 2, 216-19:14-9, 234-36:1-16). Mr. Janette described the push and pull
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1 of balancing the design guidelines, and strive to the best of his ability to “try to come to a
2 reasonable, rational, coherent conclusion, both architecturally, functionally, programmatically,
3 economically, environmentally in order to strike a balance.” (*Id.*, 259:12-16). For example, Mr.
4 Janette testified that he balanced the need for strong corners as described in Citywide Guideline
5 CS2-C-1 with the guidelines for residential transition and privacy at Citywide Guidelines CS2-
6 D-5 and CS2-D-3 and Greenwood/Phinney Guideline CS2-II-ii. (*Id.*, 266-67:21-17; Dorcy
7 Testimony, Day 3, 217-20:22-6).

9 Michael Dorcy concurred in the Board’s determination and balancing of the priority
10 guidelines. (Dorcy Testimony, Day 3, 232-33:18-25). Mr. Dorcy also testified that, when (as
11 here), if four or more members of the Board are in agreement in their recommendation to SDCI,
12 there is a presumption that the Design Review Board’s recommendation is correct. *See* SMC
13 23.41.014.F.2. SMC 23.41.014.F.2 requires the Director to make compliance with the
14 recommendation of the Design Review Board a condition of permit approval if four or more
15 members of the Design Review Board are in agreement regarding the recommendation, unless
16 the Director concludes the recommendation, among other things, reflects inconsistent application
17 of the design review guidelines. SMC 23.41.014.F.2. Mr. Dorcy testified that he did not find the
18 Board’s recommendation insufficient in any way and was accordingly required to make
19 compliance with the Board’s recommendation a condition of permit approval. (Dorcy
20 Testimony, Day 3, 197-98:23-18; 206-7:15-9).

21 In sum, Appellants failed to meet their burden to show the SDCI design review decision
22 was in error, taking in to account the substantial weight allocated that decision by the Hearing
23 Examiner.
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1 **B. Appellant failed to meet its burden to show that the DNS was clearly erroneous.**

2 **1. Appellant must show that the DNS was clearly erroneous.**

3 SEPA and the City Code require the Hearing Examiner to give substantial weight to the
4 Director's decision to issue a DNS. RCW 43.21C.090; SMC 23.76.022.C.7; *King County*, 91
5 Wn. App. at 30. The burden is on the Appellants to overcome the deference that the Director's
6 decision must be given. *Brown*, 30 Wn. App. at 764.

7
8 Substantial weight is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, where reviewing
9 bodies do not substitute their judgments for those of the agency and may invalidate the decision
10 only when left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. *Cougar*
11 *Mountain Associates v. King County*, 111 Wn.2d 742, 752, 765 P.2d 264 (1988); *Polygon Corp.*
12 *v. Seattle*, 90 Wn.2d 59, 69, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978); *Ass'n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County*,
13 141 Wn.2d 185, 4 P.3d 115 (2000).

14
15 It is Appellant's burden to prove, beyond a mere suggestion, that the decision to issue the
16 DNS was clearly erroneous, and that the Project will result in significant adverse impacts and
17 requires an EIS. *Boehm*, 111 Wn. App. at 719-720; *Moss*, 109 Wn. App. at 13. To prove that a
18 decision was clearly erroneous, the Appellant must produce affirmative evidence showing that
19 such impacts will occur as a result of the project. Specifically, where an Appellant claims of a
20 failure to adequately identify or mitigate adverse impacts, the Appellant must produce evidence
21 that such impacts will actually exist for a decision to be overturned. *Boehm*, 111 Wn. App. at
22 719-720. Mere complaints, or claims without the production of affirmative evidence proving that
23 the decision was clearly erroneous, are insufficient to satisfy an Appellant's burden of proof as a
24 matter of law. *Id.*

1 The Appellant has not furnished affirmative evidence supporting its allegations, and it
2 has therefore not met its burden. The Appellant’s claims must be dismissed.

3 **2. The Appellants failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the DNS was**
4 **clearly erroneous with regard to any of the alleged impacts.**

5 In its appeal documents, Appellant alleged that the Project would have significant
6 adverse impacts to the following elements of the environment: height, bulk and scale, views,
7 land use, neighborhood aesthetics and character, the potential release of hazardous substances,
8 environmental health, transit, and on-street parking. With regard to each of these alleged
9 impacts, Appellant has not furnished affirmative evidence supporting their allegations, and it has
10 therefore not met its burden. The Appellant’s claims must be rejected.

11 **a. Appellant failed to meet its burden with regard to height, bulk and**
12 **scale impacts.**

13 Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof with regard to height, bulk and scale impacts.

14 SEPA states that an agency may condition a project only if the condition is based on
15 policies identified by the agency and incorporated into regulations, plans or codes that are
16 formally designated by the agency as possible bases for the exercise of its authority under SEPA.
17 RCW 43.21C.060; WAC 197-11-660(1); *Maranatha Mining, Inc. v. Pierce County*, 59 Wn. App.
18 795, 803, 801 P.2d 985 (1990); *Cougar Mountain Associates*, 111 Wn.2d at 752; *see also* SMC
19 § 25.05.660.A.
20
21

22 The City has adopted substantive SEPA policies to form the basis of its exercise of its
23 SEPA authority. One of these policies, the SEPA Overview Policy, provides, “[m]any
24 environmental concerns have been incorporated in the City’s codes and development regulations.
25 Where City regulations have been adopted to address an environmental impact, it shall be
26

1 presumed that such regulations are adequate to achieve sufficient mitigation,” with limited
2 exceptions. SMC 25.05.665.D.

3 The City’s SEPA policy for height, bulk and scale provides that citywide and
4 neighborhood design guidelines are intended to fully mitigate height, bulk, and scale impacts.
5 Any project approved through the design review process is presumed to comply with the City’s
6 height, bulk, and scale SEPA policies. SMC 25.05.675.G.2.c. This presumption may only be
7 rebutted with clear and convincing evidence that height, bulk, and scale impacts have not been
8 adequately mitigated. *Id.* “Clear and convincing” evidence is not defined by the City Code.
9 Courts have interpreted it to mean that “a highly probable standard instead of more likely than
10 not is necessary.” *In re Det. Of Brooks*, 145 Wn.2d 725, 36 P.3d 1034 (2001). The clear and
11 convincing standard is higher than the “less stringent ‘preponderance of the evidence’ burden.”
12 *Herron v. Tribune Pub’g Co.*, 108 Wn.2d 162, 169-70, 736 P.2d 249 (1987).

15 Here, as discussed above, the Project underwent a lengthy and thorough design review
16 process. Exhs. 45-46 and 62-67. The Board carefully considered the Project’s height, bulk and
17 scale and determined that it complied with the City’s Design Guidelines. *See* Exhs. 63, 65, 66,
18 67. This determination was supported by extensive evidence in the materials presented to the
19 Board. Exhs. 45-46 and 62, 64. The Project height is consistent with other nearby development
20 along Greenwood Avenue. Exh.46, p. 21. The Project includes measures to reduce its actual
21 and apparent height, bulk and scale, provide appropriate transitions to the less-intense zones, and
22 implement project elements to ensure the privacy of adjacent neighbors. *See* Section A.2, *supra*;
23 Janette and Dorcy Testimony *generally*.

26 At hearing, Appellant failed to produce affirmative evidence demonstrating that the DNS
27 was clearly erroneous. Instead, Appellants provided only lay testimony regarding individual
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1 neighbors' opinions that the Project is too large. This evidence is not clear and convincing and
2 does not satisfy Appellant's burden.

3 The Hearing Examiner must reject Appellant's claim.

4 **b. Appellant failed to meet its burden with regard to parking impacts.**

5 Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof with regard to parking impacts.

6
7 The testimony of Edward Koltonowski, a transportation engineer with 25 years of
8 experience conducting traffic and parking studies in the City of Seattle, demonstrated that the
9 parking analyses were conducted utilizing well established City of Seattle analyses methods that
10 were reviewed and approved by John Shaw, a transportation reviewer with over 20 years of
11 experience reviewing traffic and parking studies for the City. (Testimony of Edward
12 Koltonowski, Day 2, 8:10-18). Both Mr. Shaw and Mr. Koltonowski testified that, while parking
13 in the study area is constrained with and without the Project, the parking capacity constraints
14 caused by the Project do not result in a significant adverse environmental impact. *See generally*
15 *Koltonowski Testimony; Testimony of John Shaw.*

16
17 In contrast, Appellant offers only the testimony of David Crippen, a long-time employee
18 of King County Metro who lives a block from the Project, who admitted to never conducting a
19 parking study for a development in the City of Seattle. (Testimony of David Crippen, Day 1,
20 121:10-12). Mr. Crippen did not conduct a separate study and instead only sought to question
21 the parking calculations by utilizing unsupportable assumptions. The correct process for
22 conducting a parking study, as well as each of Mr. Crippen's incorrect assumptions, is discussed
23 below.
24

25 Conduct of a parking study

26 Expert witness Ed Koltonowski and City witness John Shaw outlined the process for
27
28

1 conducting a parking study in the City of Seattle. The only guidance with regard to SEPA is the
2 City's SEPA Policies. The City's SEPA Policy for parking provides that "parking regulations to
3 mitigate most parking impacts and to accommodate most of the cumulative effects of future
4 projects on parking are implemented through the City's Land Use Code." SMC 25.05.675.M.1.a.
5 It further states that the City has no SEPA authority to mitigate the impact of development on
6 parking availability for residential uses located within portions of urban villages within 1,320 of
7 a street with frequent transit service, such as this Project. *Id.*

9 A parking study is conducted in steps. Much of the conduct of a parking study is
10 determined through experience conducting studies in the City of Seattle and/or seeking guidance
11 from the City.² If the City determines a study requires additional information, it will ask for that
12 information in a correction notice. Each step described below was completed by GTC on behalf
13 of the Applicant and reviewed and approved by the City.

15 Mr. Crippen calls into question certain aspects of the study. To support his conclusions,
16 Mr. Crippen relies upon unsupportable and incorrect assumptions regarding the conduct of traffic
17 analyses in the City of Seattle. His errors are also discussed below.

19 1. Determine study area. Here, the study area for parking was considered to be a
20 800 feet radius around the site. Mr. Crippen did not dispute the Applicant's study area
21 assumptions.

23 2. Determine the actual on-street parking capacity within the study area. Mr.
24 Koltonowski testified that GTC conducted on-street parking capacity counts by counting the

26 ² Even though Mr. Crippen admitted to not having experience conducting a parking study for development in the
27 City of Seattle, he did not discuss the process of conducting a parking study with anyone at the City of Seattle in
28 order to understand the typical means and methods for conducting a parking study. Crippen Testimony, Day 1, 121-
22:14-18.

1 legal parking spaces within the study area. To determine what is a legal parking space, parking
2 restrictions such as distance from a stop sign and fire hydrants, are taken into account.³ The
3 conduct of parking counts is guided by Tip 117, Parking Waivers for Accessory Dwelling Units.
4 While this is neither SEPA guidance nor a methodology for determining impacts, traffic
5 engineers and the City typically utilize Tip 117 for the limited purpose of conducting parking
6 counts. (Shaw Testimony, Day 4, 14-15:20-24). Mr. Shaw testified that GTC conducted the
7 parking counts correctly, a conclusion Mr. Crippen does not dispute. (*Id.*, 27-29:24-27).

9 Unsupported Assumption #1: On-Street Parking Capacity

10 In contravention to the manner in which parking analyses are typically conducted
11 in the City of Seattle, Mr. Crippen handicaps the analysis before it begins by removing 42
12 parking spaces from the on-street capacity. This places an inappropriate cap on measured
13 spaces. Mr Koltonowski explained that the utilization calculation for the City is only a
14 benchmark of utilization as actual parked cars can park closer to stop signs, other cars
15 and driveways or be smaller than the city's theoretical car size assumed in the city's
16 utilization calculation. (Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 41-42:20-17). Contrary to Mr.
17 Crippen's testimony, parking counts are conducted in reality, and therefore must utilize
18 the on-street capacity to determine whether the parking added by a Project will create a
19 significant adverse impact. (Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 51-52:24-21). Mr. Crippen
20 fails to provide one example of a parking study conducted in the City of Seattle or any
21 City where the on-street utilization is artificially reduced.⁴ Nor is this approach
22
23
24

25
26 ³ Appellant, through the testimony of Michael Richards, testifies that the Applicant should have taken into account
27 restricted parking in developing its parking capacity. This is not true. As Mr. Richards testimony made clear,
28 restricted parking ends at 6:00 p.m. Testimony of Michael Richards, Day 1, 221:7-10. The parking counts were
conducted from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., after parking restrictions have ended. Exh. 52.

⁴ Certainly, understanding the theoretical parking capacity/utilization at 85, 90, 95, and 100 percent theoretical
capacity helps inform the reader as to the percent utilization in the study area. Indeed, the Applicant's parking study

MCCULLOUGH HILL LEARY, P.S.

1 consistent with SEPA. SEPA requires evaluation of impacts on the existing environment
2 -- not some hypothetical environment that does not actually exist. *Chuckanut*
3 *Conservancy v. Dep't of Nat. Res.*, 156 Wn. App. 274, 285, 232 P.3d 1154, 1159 (2010)
4 (SEPA requires examination of two factors: “(1) the extent to which the action will cause
5 adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area, and
6 (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including
7 the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or
8 uses in the affected area.”) (citations omitted).
9

10 To support reducing the actual street utilization calculation to an 85% theoretical
11 street capacity, Mr. Crippen relies upon planning documents discussing planning goals.
12 *See, e.g.*, Exhs. 35b (discussing policy recommendations for Oregon) and 35h (discussing
13 parking planning policy recommendations for Seattle). These documents do not discuss
14 any environmental review threshold or a threshold in which a Project would significantly
15 impact parking. Indeed, Appellant fails to cite to any Code requirement regarding the
16 percentage of on-street parking capacity upon which a project is determined to have a
17 significant adverse parking impact.
18
19

20 Appellant also relies upon a Hearing Examiner decision in *In the matter of the*
21 *Appeal of Neighbors Encouraging Reasonable Development*, S-14-001 (December 1,
22 2014), to support its argument that 85% is the capacity limit in the City of Seattle.

23 Appellant misreads the holding in this matter. The Hearing Examiner does not conclude
24 that Project created a significant impact because it exceeded 85% of the street capacity;
25
26

27 _____
28 notes the number of cars required to reach each level of utilization on the street. Exh. 50. This is not, however, a
determination of significant adverse environmental impacts.

1 instead, she held that the City's analysis of parking impacts was insufficient, as it failed
2 to consider the impacts of several nearby projects. *Id.*, Conclusions ¶¶ 10-11. Here,
3 there is no actual evidence presented at hearing that demonstrates the parking analyses
4 did not fully consider the effect of nearby pipeline projects. This decision accordingly
5 has no bearing on the current matter.
6

7 John Shaw testified that the City utilizes this 85% utilization as a marker for when
8 the City needs to look closer at a Project and study area parking utilization. (Shaw
9 Testimony, Day 3, 260-61:2-6). The City does not, however, use this percentage as a
10 threshold for significant adverse environmental impacts. Nor does Mr. Shaw agree that
11 actual on-street capacity should be artificially reduced to 85% when conducting a parking
12 analysis. *Id.*
13

14 Mr. Crippen's assumption that a reduction in capacity to 85% of the City's
15 utilization calculation prior to even conducting the parking analysis is not supported by
16 any convincing evidence and does not demonstrate that the City's decision is clearly
17 erroneous.
18

19 3. Determine the Peak Hour parking demand. After determining the actual on-street
20 theoretical parking capacity of 281 parking spaces, GTC took actual parking counts of parked
21 cars on two separate days from midnight to 1:00 a.m., and took parking counts on two separate
22 days from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., as requested by the City and the community. Exh. 52. The
23 October 2016 report focuses on the peak hour from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., as this represents a
24 peak parking demand resulting from the combination of existing commercial uses and residential
25 uses. *Id.* GTC counted all cars on the street (not in driveways), whether they are legally parked
26 (closer to stop signs or within five feet of driveway) or not so to not discount the number of cars
27
28

1 parking on the street to determine demand. Koltonowski, Day 2, 114-116:22-6. Mr. Crippen did
2 not dispute GTC's parking counts or the determination that the 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. was the
3 appropriate peak hour in which to conduct an analysis.

4 Unsupported Assumption #2: Peak Demand vs. Peak Hour

5 Mr. Crippen argues, without providing any evidence, that the peak residential
6 demand of the project is also 6:00-7:00 p.m. (Crippen Testimony, Day 3, 26-8:19-23).
7 Mr. Crippen is incorrect and fundamentally misunderstands the difference between the
8 two concepts. While peak hour for the combination of existing commercial and
9 residential uses is 6:00-7:00 p.m., a fact to which all witnesses agree, peak residential
10 demand or peak commercial demand is a separate concept altogether. (Koltonowski, Day
11 2, 25:9-19 (noting that 6:00-7:00 p.m. is neither the peak commercial demand nor peak
12 residential demand for the project, but the "overlap of the two classes is highest at that
13 time.")).

14 Mr. Koltonowski and Mr. Shaw testified to the difference between peak demand
15 for parking ("peak hour") and the peak demand from the Project. The street peak hour is
16 the hour in which the most cars are trying to park. The project peak demand is the time
17 in which the combined residential parking demand from the *Project* is highest and the
18 time in which the commercial parking demand from the *Project* is highest. Mr. Shaw
19 testified to the difference between the two concepts:

20 But I think it is good to distinguish the two concepts. One is the peak
21 demand of the proposed development. In this case, that would be overnight
22 because the large majority of parking generated by the development is from
23 the residential component. There's some commercial, but the bulk is going
24 to be from the residents. So that would occur overnight irrespective of what
25 on-street demand shows. The existing parking supply can be measured at
26 any time of day, and it was identified as peaking between 6:00 and 7:00, at
27 least in the time periods that were measured. So it's not unusual for a project

1 to have one demand—one peak demand that is specifically related to the
2 project and in the context in which the study is done in the environment in
3 which the project is being placed, the peak time period for existing parking
supply might be at a different time of day. And that’s what occurred here.

4 Shaw Testimony, Day 3, 254:6-23.

5 To be conservative, the October 2016 parking study in Exhibit 52 accounted for
6 100% of the residential parking demand from the Project from 6:00-7:00 p.m., even
7 though this analysis over counts the residential parking demand from 6:00 to 7:00 p.m..
8 Exh. 52. Mr. Koltonowski testified that, in his Exhibit 56 which marks up Mr. Crippen’s
9 Exhibit 43, he accounted for the actual estimated residential parking demand, which is
10 not at its peak from 6:00-7:00 p.m. (Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 25-26:5-15).

11 Indeed, the actual residential demand is 69 percent of the full demand according to ITE,
12 the only data source available for demand per hour. (*Id.*, 13-4:13-16). Because the
13 October 2016 Traffic Study over counts the residential demand from 6:00-7:00 p.m., as
14 Mr. Crippen suggests, there is no dispute here. Exh. 52.

15
16
17 4. Determine the Peak Demand from the Project. As documented in GTC’s October
18 2016 parking study, GTC multiplied the 57 total residential units by a factor of .57 (per unit
19 demand) to determine the total residential parking demand from the Project, as the Project does
20 not provide on-site parking. Exh. 52. This .57 multiplier for residential use was determined
21 utilizing King County’s Right-Size Parking calculator. *Id.* King County provides for a factor
22 utilizing bundled parking (where parking is provided) and unbundled parking (where a default
23 parking fee of \$275 is charged). (Koltonowski, Day 2, pp. 19-20). Based on Mr. Koltnowski’s
24 experience conducting parking analyses in the city, a project’s parking demand is typically lower
25 than the ITE demand rates due to actual parking utilization and frequent transit service. (*Id.*, 22-
26 3:13-3). Utilizing the unbundled parking factor (.57) accordingly most accurately represents the

1 residential demand for this Project, as it reflects the “cost” of finding parking. (Koltonowski,
2 Day 2, 85-86:11-13). Here, the only parking is on the street, so there is an additional cost of
3 paying for or finding parking. *Id.* Searching for parking equates to paying for parking, as it is
4 not parking that is easy, accessible, and safe, such as when parking is bundled with a project as a
5 dedicated building space. *Id.* This cost, whether monetized or not, affects who owns a car in the
6 development. *Id.*

8 As there is limited data related to small efficiency dwelling units without parking, Mr.
9 Koltonowski reviewed two surveys of recent developments that are similar in concept and were
10 developed by the Applicant, Johnson & Carr. Exhs. 53-54. Mr. Koltonowski testified that while
11 the data of two projects alone does not provide sufficient data points to rely upon exclusively;
12 such data helps confirm the assumptions made for this somewhat unique residential product.
13 (Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 91-92:12-22). In the two projects discussed, Mad Flats and
14 Minnie Flats, the actual car ownership rates are .26 and .16 per unit respectively. Exhs. 53-54;
15 Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 35-6:5-6. Mr. Koltonowski testified that even though the two
16 projects are in more urban locations than the Project, both Mad and Minnie Flats and this Project
17 have similar elements in common, such as frequent transit, size of units, and price.
18 (Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 32-3:21-11). The actual rates for Mad and Minnie Flats are
19 less than half of the parking demand rate used for the Project, further confirming that using a
20 demand factor of .57 is appropriate for the Project. *Id.*

21 To determine peak commercial demand for the Project, GTC utilized a factor of 2.55 per
22 1000 s.f.⁵ of commercial development. Exh. 52. Contrary to Mr. Crippen’s misstatements at
23 hearing, the commercial use proposed by the Project—3,298 s.f. -- is smaller than the existing
24

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28 ⁵ Mr. Crippen does not dispute GTC’s use of this multiplier.

1 commercial uses at the Property—4,000 s.f.. Exh. 52; Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 15-17:19-
2 10. Typically, a project that is replacing commercial floor area with commercial floor area does
3 not add new parking demand and the demand is accordingly zero. *Id.* Here, the Project will also
4 remove approximately four parking spaces used in the back of the building, so those spaces need
5 to be accounted for in the street network. *Id.* To provide a conservative estimate, GTC assumed
6 that the commercial demand at 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. was 5 spaces, which utilizes a commercial
7 floor area of 3,298 s.f. and does not discount the demand based on the fact that the commercial
8 s.f. already exists.⁶ Exh. 52; Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 16-17:12-25. The total residential
9 and commercial demand from the October 2016 report that was reviewed and approved by the
10 City is 37 cars. Exh. 52.

11 Unsupported Assumption #3: Parking Demand from the Project

12
13 Mr. Crippen argues that the Project should have used a residential parking
14 demand factor of .8, instead of the .57 utilized by GTC. Exh. 43. This is incorrect. In
15 support of this assumption, Mr. Crippen relies primarily upon ITE factors, even though
16 ITE encourages use of local data where possible. Exh. 43; Koltonowski Testimony, Day
17 2, 22:4-24. Here, there was plenty of local data in the King County Right-Size Parking
18 calculator.

19
20 The data from King County is the correct data set to use, as it is a parking demand
21 predictor based on over 240 studies, and is much more accurate than ITE data because it
22 takes local conditions into account. Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 18:11-19. However,
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⁶ To reflect the fact that commercial demand is not at its peak at 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., the number of trips were reduced by 36% per ITE guidance. Exh. 52, p. 2.

1 as discussed above, the use of the demand factor which accounts for “unbundled” parking
2 is more appropriate to utilize for this Project.

3 Moreover, Mr. Crippen did not present evidence, *e.g.*, car ownership rates of
4 tenants in comparable development projects, to directly contradict the assumptions relied
5 upon by the Applicant. Indeed, the only evidence in the record to this effect confirms
6 that Applicant’s use of the .57 demand factor was appropriate and may in fact be
7 conservative. Exhs. 50-52, 56; Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2, 22-25:13-1.

9 Even if the Applicant had used the .8 parking demand multiplier requested by Mr.
10 Crippen—which is not required, the demand adjustment factor per unit becomes 0.55
11 when one accounts for the actual residential demand from the Project at 6-7 pm (at .69
12 percent of peak demand per ITE standards). Exh. 56; Koltonowski Testimony, Day 2,
13 25-6:25-15. This per unit demand factor of 0.55 is less than that used by the Applicant
14 (0.57). Mr. Crippen’s request to utilize a parking demand of .8 is accordingly immaterial.

16 The City did not commit a clear error by accepting the ratio for purposes of
17 calculating project parking demand for the study time periods.

19 5. Determine parking demand from pipeline projects. SEPA requires a cumulative
20 effects analysis. This analysis is conducted by adding known pipeline projects and accounting
21 for any known and planned changes to the capacity of public facilities, such as streets. See SMC
22 25.05.670. Here, the cumulative effect analysis included 7 projects, two of which were added
23 upon request by the City in a correction notice. Exh. 52, p. 1. Mr. Crippen does not note any
24 known projects that GTC did not take into account in its cumulative effects analysis.⁷

27 ⁷ Mr. Crippen, confusingly, alleges that the Applicant did not take the development at 7009 Greenwood Avenue
28 North into account as part of its pipeline projects analysis. Crippen Testimony, Day 4, 40:5-19. This statement is
directly contradicted by the record. Exh. 52, p. A-2.

1 The parking demand from the projects was calculated utilizing specific right-size parking
2 calculations for the residential demand and utilizing the factor of 2.55 per 1,000 s.f. for the
3 commercial demand. Exhs. 50-52. Mr. Crippen testified that the commercial demand was not
4 included in the analysis of pipeline projects. He is incorrect. For example, for the project at
5 6800 Greenwood Avenue N, 32 residential units are proposed with 4,000 s.f. of retail and 28
6 parking spaces. Exh. 52, p. A-2. Utilizing the right size parking demand of .64 for the project,
7 the residential demand is 20 parking spaces. *Id.* Utilizing the factor of 2.55 per 1,000 s.f. for
8 retail, the commercial demand is 10, resulting in a total demand of 30 spaces. *Id.* As 28 spaces
9 will be provided on site, the total parking demand is 2 parking spaces. *Id.*

11 Unsupported Assumption #4: Pipeline Projects

12 Mr. Crippen argues that the parking demand from pipeline projects is
13 approximately 15 spaces, not the 6 spaces that GTC calculated in its Exhibit 52. Exh. 43.
14 As noted above, Mr. Crippen ignores the fact that commercial uses were taken into
15 account in the Applicant's study of pipeline projects. He then utilizes questionable math
16 to arrive at his desired conclusion with regard to residential demand. Exh. 70. For
17 example, for 6800 Greenwood Avenue North, 28 parking spaces are being provided for
18 32 residential units. Exh. 52, A-2. Instead of multiplying his desired and unsupported
19 residential demand factor of .8 by the total number of units (32), which results in a
20 residential demand of 25 spaces that is fulfilled by the provided parking, Mr. Crippen
21 multiplies .8 by 4, the difference between the number of units and the number of
22 provided parking spaces. Exh. 70. Mr. Crippen then states that the residential demand is
23 3 parking spaces, and then adds the commercial demand to this total. *Id.* His approach
24 double counts the demand.
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1 Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, Mr. Koltonowski utilized Mr.
2 Crippen’s suggested pipeline project demand of 15 spaces in his calculation at Exhibit
3 56—the results continue to show there is no significant adverse impact. Appellant has
4 failed to demonstrate otherwise.

5 Unsupported Assumption #5: Cycle Track

6 Mr. Crippen argues that a project must consider a proposed cycle track, even
7 though it has not been programmed or designed, SEPA review has not been conducted,
8 and there is no current plan/funding to construct it in the next five years. Exh. 55,
9 Crippen Testimony. This argument fundamentally misunderstands how a cumulative
10 impact analysis is conducted.

11 Mr. Shaw testified that, in determining pipeline projects, including development
12 projects or the addition of a bike lane:

13 We use the same sort of criteria we would use for judging whether or not a
14 capital improvement for a transportation analysis should be included. If it’s
15 funded, if there’s some level of funding commitment, if there’s design
16 details showing that the project has been fairly far advanced, it is likely
17 appropriate to include it [as a pipeline project]. If it is a proposal that’s part
18 of a planning document but does not have funding or associated design
19 detail associated with it, we typically would not include it.

20 Shaw, Day 3, 259:10-19.

21 Mr. Crippen relies on the fact that the City updates its Implementation plan
22 annually as a reason to include a possible cycle track that has not undergone SEPA and
23 there is no evidence of any funding. This conclusion has no support in the law and is
24 contrary to the City’s criteria for determining pipeline projects. *See, e.g.,* SMC 25.05.670.
25 If the City followed Mr. Crippen’s methodology, it would have to guess as to the final
26 configuration and location of the bike lane because, without a certain level of design
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28

1 certainty, the City has no way to determine the physical impact of modifying the
2 infrastructure. Shaw Testimony, Day 4, 36:13-23. This is an untenable result that is not
3 mandated or contemplated under SEPA. SMC 25.05.670.

4 Unsupported Assumption #6: Cumulative Impacts of Zoned Capacity

5
6 Mr. Crippen argues that the Project should take into account as part of its
7 cumulative effects analysis the potential for almost every property in the area to be
8 constructed at the same density as the Project with no parking, even though plans have
9 not been proposed by any of the properties (other than pipeline projects accounted for in
10 the Applicant's studies). Exh. 43. This argument is contrary to SEPA and long-standing
11 City practices. SMC 25.05.670.B.2 (cumulative effects of the project are considered
12 together with prior, simultaneous or induced future development or taking into account
13 known future development under established zoning).

14
15 From a practical perspective, it is impossible to know whether a property will be
16 redeveloped and at what density. Indeed, Mr. Shaw testified that utilizing the zoning
17 capacity to determine pipeline projects is speculative. (Shaw Testimony, Day 4, 16:13-
18 21 ("We don't know what those projects are going to consist of. We don't know if
19 development capacity on any given site will be fully built out, if so by what uses, what
20 parking supply might or might not accompany that development. It's entirely
21 hypothetical as to what type of development might occur on any of these sites.")).
22

23
24 Mr. Crippen's error is further highlighted when one considers the manner in
25 which he calculated the parking demand from these phantom development sites. Mr.
26 Crippen confusingly calculated the density per unit of the Project as 141 s.f., even though
27 each unit must be at a minimum 220 s.f. (SMC 23.42.048.B) and the Project's MUP
28

1 Plans indicate that the size of the units range from 227 s.f. to 455 s.f. Exh. 3, pp. A2.11
2 and A2.12. Mr. Crippen then uses this factor to calculate the number of theoretical units
3 per property in the zone. Not only is there no evidence that these properties will ever be
4 developed, let alone in the time prior to project construction, but his mathematical errors
5 also grossly overestimate the potential for the number of units and parking demand.
6

7 6. Compare future parking demand of the project to the remaining street capacity.

8 The current demand plus the pipeline projects demand, plus the project demand is then
9 compared with the parking capacity of the study area. This resulted in a 105% parking
10 utilization. Mr. Shaw testified that even though Applicant’s traffic analyses were conservative
11 and accordingly projected that the streets within the 800-ft radius would result in a 104% parking
12 utilization, the City did not view the projected cumulative as a significant adverse impact.
13

14 Here, the City does not have a SEPA threshold for determining a significant impact, and
15 has no authority to mitigate. SMC 25.05.675.M.2.b. Even if it did, however, the City has
16 reviewed the impacts of the project and determined that the potential addition of 37 cars in a
17 constrained parking network radius of 800 feet does not create a significant adverse impact.
18 Exh. 5, p. 28. The City has determined “that the difficulty finding parking would likely drive down
19 the vehicle ownership as well as result in residents and visitors parking further from the site” beyond
20 the study area. *Id.* While the City cannot impose mitigation, it does explain that practicable
21 mitigation is the fact that limited parking will contribute to the self-selection of potential residents at
22 the Project. *Id.* In addition, it concludes that Transportation Demand Measures, such as providing
23 bike parking (which the Project provides—Exh. 3, p. A2.11) will reduce reliance on personal
24 vehicles. *Id.*
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1 There is no documentary evidence in the record that the project will result in a significant
2 adverse parking impact. Appellant provided no authority dictating a SEPA threshold for
3 determining significant adverse impacts requiring mitigation. Indeed the City’s SEPA policies
4 do not allow mitigation, and they control. As made clear by the testimony, the potential for
5 impacts are fully disclosed, and Appellant has failed to present clear and convincing evidence
6 that there will be significant adverse parking impacts.
7

8 The Hearing Examiner should reject this claim.

9 **c. Appellant failed to meet its burden with regard to geotechnical and**
10 **environmental health impacts.**

11 Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof relating to environmental health impacts.

12 Federal, state and regional regulations are the primary means of mitigating risks
13 associated with hazardous and toxic materials. SMC 25.05.675.F.1.b. If the decisionmaker
14 makes a written finding that applicable federal, state and regional laws and regulations did not
15 anticipate or do not adequately address the adverse impacts of a proposed project, the project
16 may be conditioned or denied to mitigate its adverse impacts. SMC 25.05.675.F.2.c.
17

18 Appellant provided only lay testimony regarding individual neighbors’ opinions that the
19 Phase II analyses were insufficient. Appellant did not meet its burden of proof. The Examiner
20 should reject this claim out of hand.
21

22 If the Examiner considers evidence on this issue, it supports the Applicant. The
23 Applicant prepared Phase I and Phase II environmental site assessment reports. The Phase II
24 Environmental Site Assessment (“Phase II ESA”) evaluates the presence of hazardous
25 substances on the Property. The Phase II ESA indicates that there is no potential for
26 contamination on the property; indeed, the findings indicate that any evidence of contaminants
27 fall well below the screening levels found in the Model Toxics Control Act (“MTCA”) and in
28

1 some cases were laboratory non-detections. *See* Testimony of Paul Riley, Day 2, 133:13-15.
2 The Applicant’s expert testified that the scope of the study was sufficient for conducting a Phase
3 II ESA, and no additional study around the perimeter of the site is warranted. (*Id.*, 134-35:18-
4 18). Indeed, EPA agreed with the conclusions of the study as well and recommended that no
5 further action be taken. Exh. 60. Appellant provided absolutely no evidence of a potential for a
6 significant adverse environmental health impact.
7

8 While Appellant provides no affirmative evidence of a significant adverse environmental
9 health impact, it may attempt in its closing brief to rely upon an email from the Department of
10 Ecology it presented as part of its cross examination of Mr. Dorcy. *See* Exh. 81. As the
11 testimony of Mr. Riley—the only expert that testified with regard to environmental health
12 impacts—indicates, there is no potential for a significant impact. (Riley Testimony, p. 136-
13 37:16-5). Indeed, to the extent Ecology requested additional sampling, it was not a formal
14 request for sampling and it was based upon community complaints and not a thorough review of
15 the Application’s Phase II. (Riley Testimony, Day 2, 140:3-11 (testifying that Ecology admitted
16 in its phone call with the Applicant that it had not reviewed Applicant’s Phase II ESA at the time
17 that Applicant and Ecology spoke)).
18
19

20 To respond to the concerns raised by Ecology, Mr. Riley submitted to Ecology a
21 summary memorandum outlining the findings of its study and its supportable methodologies.
22 Exh. 60, Appendix B. Applicant has not heard anything substantive from Ecology since
23 Applicant transmitted the October 2016 study. Riley testimony, Day 2, 142-43:12-5. Indeed, it
24 appears that Ecology withheld its review of the study until the EPA issued its Preliminary
25 Assessment. *Id.* There is no evidence in the record that indicates a concern raised by Ecology
26 after either its review of the documents provided by the Applicant or the issuance of the EPA
27
28

1 Preliminary Assessment.⁸ Raising questions alone does not meet Appellant’s burden of proof
2 with regard to hazardous materials matters. *Boehm, supra*.

3 The City’s SEPA policies require the City to defer to Ecology’s requirements. SMC
4 25.05.675.F.1.b. After requesting the studies on environmental health, the City concluded that
5 vapor intrusion is not considered a concern for the property based on the analysis provided, and
6 the site does not pose a risk to groundwater quality. The City concludes that mitigation of
7 contamination and remediation lies with Ecology, and “[c]ompliance with Ecology’s
8 requirements are expected to adequately mitigate any unlikely adverse environmental impacts
9 from the proposed development and no further mitigation is warranted for impacts to
10 environmental health per SMC 25.05.675.F.” Exh. 5, p. 25.

11
12
13 Mr. Riley testified that the Applicant will fully comply with MTCA and any formal
14 requests from Ecology (which have not occurred), and the Appellant has provided absolutely no
15 evidence to indicate otherwise. (Riley Testimony, Day 2, 143-44:10-4). Accordingly, the City’s
16 determination that compliance with Ecology’s requirements will mitigate any unlikely impacts,
17 in light of the overwhelming evidence that there is no known contamination on the site, was not
18 clearly erroneous.
19

20 **d. Appellant failed to meet its burden with regard to transit impacts.**

21 Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof relating to transit impacts.⁹ To the extent
22 Appellant raise a concern about the transit analysis conducted for the Project, *see* Exhibit 52, it
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24
25 ⁸ While Applicant understands the factual record is closed, it has come to Applicant’s attention that Ecology has
26 issued a memorandum determining that no further action is necessary for 6726 Greenwood Avenue North. Kendall
27 Declaration, Exh. E. This information was not available until the date of the filing of this post-hearing brief. As this
28 issue was discussed at hearing, Applicant wanted to provide the document for the Hearing Examiner’s information.
See HER 2.20 and 2.21.

⁹ Issues related to the City’s interpretation of a frequent transit area under SMC 23.84A.038 are address in Section
2.g, infra.

1 does so through the testimony of Jan Weldin, a lay witness who lives in the neighborhood, and
2 Exhibit 32, which was prepared by Ms. Weldin. Without independent analysis, Ms. Weldin
3 testifies that there is a lot of construction occurring in the Greenwood corridor and concludes,
4 without analysis or facts, that the Route 5 bus will be crowded.¹⁰ Ms. Weldin does not testify as
5 to the likelihood that residents of new developments would drive or ride the bus, or if the
6 developments have already been constructed and accordingly been accounted for in the existing
7 transit conditions.

9 The transit analysis was reviewed and approved by the City and determined not to have a
10 significant adverse impact. Exh. 52; Exh. 5. There is no documentary evidence in the record
11 that the project will result in a significant adverse transit impact. This does not amount to clear
12 and convincing evidence that there will be significant adverse transit impacts.

14 The Hearing Examiner should reject this claim.

15 **e. The Appellant waived its claims of significant impacts in the areas of**
16 **views, land use, and neighborhood aesthetics and character.**

17 The Appellant failed to present any evidence regarding significant impacts in the areas of
18 views,¹¹ land use, and neighborhood aesthetics and character,¹² which were issues raise in the
19 appeal.¹³ These issues should be considered waived. *Boehm v. City of Vancouver, supra*, 111
20

21 ¹⁰ Ms. Weldin appears to claim that the projects in the Greenwood corridor would also create parking impacts in the
22 study area, even though a number of projects she listed in Exhibit 32 are more than 60 blocks away from the Project.

23 ¹¹ While a view analysis was reviewed under SMC 23.47A.012.A.1.c, Appellant did not raise a SEPA concern with
24 regard to view studies. Indeed, Appellant did not allege that there are any public viewpoints in the area that could
25 potentially be impacted by the Project. *See* SMC 25.05.675.P.2.a.i (noting that a view analysis is conducted only
26 from designated public viewpoints).

27 ¹² To the extent that Appellant assert impacts to neighborhood aesthetic and character even though it provided no
28 evidence regarding this element of the environment at hearing, that claim is addressed in the discussion of height,
bulk and scale. Appellant provided no affirmative evidence specifically related to “neighborhood aesthetic and
character,” nor did any witness define this term in the context of the Greenwood/Phinney neighborhood. Further the
City has not adopted a SEPA policy regarding impacts to neighborhood aesthetics and character. Accordingly, the
City lacks authority to deny or condition the Project based on such impacts.

¹³ The testimony of Laura Reymore raised a traffic safety concern. Not only was traffic safety not an issue in this
appeal, but Ms. Reymore was complaining about the loading and traffic safety concerns under the existing

MCCULLOUGH HILL LEARY, P.S.

1 Wn. App. at 722; *see also King County v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd.*, 122 Wn.2d 648,
2 670, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993) (“In order for an issue to be properly raised before an administrative
3 agency, there must be more than simply a hint or a light reference to the issue in the record.”);
4 *Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon*, 133 Wn.2d 861, 868, 947 P.2d (1997). No
5 evidence was presented at the hearing regarding these issues and, therefore, they are waived.
6

7 **C. Appellants failed to meet their burden to show that SDCI’s Code Interpretation was**
8 **erroneous.**

9 **1. The Hearing Examiner must give great weight to SDCI’s Code**
10 **Interpretation and the burden of proof is on Appellant.**

11 Under SMC 23.88.020.G.5, appeals of Code Interpretations are “considered de novo, and
12 the decision of the Hearing Examiner shall be made upon the same basis as was required of the
13 Director. The interpretation of the Director shall be given substantial weight, and the burden of
14 establishing the contrary shall be upon the appellant.”

15 As discussed *supra*, courts interpret the “substantial weight” requirement as mandating
16 the clearly erroneous standard of review. *Indian Trail Property Owner’s Ass’n, supra*. Under
17 the clearly erroneous standard, reviewing bodies do not substitute their judgment for that of the
18 agency but may invalidate the decision only when left with the definite and firm conviction that a
19 mistake has been committed. *Whatcom County Fire District No. 21, supra*.

21 An Appellant does not meet its burden to show a decision is clearly erroneous if the
22 evidence shows only that reasonable minds might differ with the decision. *See e.g., Findings and*
23 *Decision of the Hearing Examiner for the City of Seattle, In the Matter of the Appeals of CUCAC*
24 *and Friends of UW Open Space, supra*.

25
26
27 conditions—and not as a result of the Project. This claim must be denied. In addition, testimony at hearing
28 indicated that the Project will have a loading zone in front of the building on Greenwood, and will not use the center
lane. (Janette Testimony, Day 2, 185-6:23-16).

1 **2. Appellant has failed to meet its burden that the City’s Interpretation was**
2 **clearly erroneous**

3 The substantial evidence submitted at hearing shows that the City’s interpretation was
4 reasonable. The Appellant failed to demonstrate that the City’s interpretation was clearly
5 erroneous. Each item subject to the City’s Interpretation is discussed below.

6 **a. The applicable SMC 23.47A.014.B.3 does not apply to the Project**

7 The Court must apply the Code according to its plain language. *Post v. City of Tacoma*,
8 167 Wn.2d 300, 310, 217 P.3d 1179 (2009). The applicable version of SMC 23.47A.014.B.3 to
9 which the Project is vested¹⁴ provides for upper level setbacks “[f]or a structure containing a
10 residential use, a setback is required along any side or rear lot line that abuts a lot in a residential
11 zone . . .” Under the plain language of SMC 23.47A.014.B.3, upper level setbacks are not
12 required for a lot in a split zone.
13

14 Appellant argues that the lot is in a residential zone because the majority of the lot is
15 zoned SF5000. Its argument cannot be squared with the plain language of SMC 23.47A.014.B.3.
16 A lot in a residential zone is distinct from a lot in a split zone. *See* Exh. 6, pp. 3-4. Had the City
17 Council intended Appellant’s suggested result under the former SMC 23.47A.014.B.3, it would
18 have used the term “lot in residential use” and not a “lot in a residential zone.” *Id.* Moreover, if
19 Appellant’s interpretation is correct, the City Council would not have felt it necessary to amend
20 the provision to account for a lot in a split zone. *Id.* at p. 4. Under Appellant’s interpretation, this
21 amendment would have been unnecessary.
22

23 Mr. Graves testified that the City has long interpreted SMC 23.47A.014.B.3 to exclude
24 split zones, as they are considered a lot in a split zone, not a lot in a residential zone. Testimony
25
26

27
28 ¹⁴ The Hearing Examiner determined in his order dated April 26, 2017, that the Project vested to the development standards in the Code in effect on September 3, 2015.

1 of David Graves, Day 3, 104:14-19. Indeed, if one so chooses, a commercial use can be included
2 in the 20-ft of the NC2-40 zone. This is especially true here where the lot abuts a street so that
3 the commercial portion of the lot would have direct street access. Exh. 46, p.8.

4 Appellant provided no evidence or testimony that demonstrates that the City's
5 interpretation is clearly erroneous. This claim must fail.

6
7 **b. The Project's clerestory meets the definition of a clerestory**

8 The approved MUP plans show that the clerestory has windows on the west, south, and
9 north sides. See sheets A3.01, A3.03, and A3.04 of Exh. 3. The City's interpretation concluded
10 that "[n]othing in the definition of "clerestory" requires windows on all sides. Thus, a plain
11 reading of the code shows that the feature qualifies as a clerestory."

12 Appellant provided no evidence or testimony on the clerestory at all. The only evidence
13 in the record is that this clerestory is typical of many clerestories; Mr. Janette designed it as a
14 clerestory and the City approved it as such. Janette Testimony, Day 2, 206:5-22. The City's
15 interpretation of a clerestory is accordingly not erroneous.

16 Appellant also argues that the clerestory does not constitute an outside wall. See Request
17 for Interpretation, p.8. This is incorrect. The clerestory is the wall above the roof that is
18 considered an outside wall. See Exh. 3, p. A3.01. Any other interpretation directly contradicts
19 the Code. The Code requires a clerestory to be set back 10 feet from the north lot line unless it
20 meets certain criteria. SMC 23.47A.012.C.7. Certainly, the drafters understood that a clerestory
21 set back 10 feet from the edge of the building would still create an outside wall. Appellant's
22 arguments accordingly fail and they have not presented any evidence demonstrating that the
23 City's interpretation is clearly erroneous.
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1 **c. The shadow study conducted pursuant to SMC 23.47A.012.C.7**
2 **demonstrates that the location of the clerestory within 10 feet of the**
3 **building does not create additional shadow on adjacent properties**

4 A clerestory is permitted as of right. The question raised in the Interpretation is whether the
5 clerestory can be located within 10 feet of the northern property line. SMC 23.47A.012.C.7 provides
6 that a clerestory “shall be located at least 10 feet from the north lot line unless a shadow diagram
7 is provided that demonstrates that locating such features within 10 feet of the north lot line would
8 not shade property to the north on January 21st at noon more than would a structure built to
9 maximum permitted height and FAR.”

10 The shadow study presented by the Applicant and reviewed by the City compares the project
11 shadows with and without a clerestory element, and the City determined that the shadow diagram
12 was properly developed. Graves Testimony, Day 3, 76:14-24. This comparison, however, is
13 conservative because it does not compare the shadow of a structure built to maximum permitted
14 height and FAR with the Project with a clerestory, as required by SMC 23.47A.012.C.7. The City, in
15 its review of the shadow study in Exhibit 3, found it to be typical of the type of shadow study
16 reviewed by the City and determined that the incremental shadow caused by the clerestory (in
17 comparison to the project without the clerestory) falls within the right of way. Accordingly, it was
18 reasonable for the City to determine that the location of the clerestory does not create additional
19 shadow on property to the north.
20

21 Appellant misreads the Code when it developed its Exhibit 31, showing what they perceive
22 as the shadows on the Isola building, now called the Hendon. The exhibit was developed with
23 Powerpoint by Mr. Brandis, who is not an architect, and there was no testimony as to its accuracy.
24 Assuming it is accurate, however, it provides no useful information to the Examiner. One, the
25 diagram measures the difference in shadows between a 40-ft building and a 48-ft building. That is
26 not the standard. *See* SMC 23.47A.012.C.7. Two, the plain language of SMC 23.47A.012.C.7
27 28

1 requires one to compare the proposed building with the “structure built to maximum permitted
2 height and FAR”. Here, mechanical, stair, or elevator penthouses are permitted as of right in this
3 zone, and may exceed the applicable height limit by 16 feet and be located anywhere on the roof
4 as of right. 23.47A.012.C.4.f. Penthouses are also counted towards maximum FAR. *See*
5 23.47A.013.D (showing penthouses, stairs, elevators, and mechanical equipment are not exempt
6 from FAR requirements). Accordingly, a penthouse is permitted at the maximum FAR and
7 height; in other words, it is the structure built to the maximum building envelope. Exhibit 68, p.
8 3, shows the comparison between the maximum building envelope and the Project with
9 clerestories. The maximum building envelope casts a larger shadow, and accordingly, the
10 clerestories are permitted to be located within 10 feet of the northern property line. *Id.* There
11 was accordingly no evidence that supports Appellant’s arguments.
12

13
14 **d. The clerestory does not create an additional story**

15 Appellant provided no evidence at hearing that the clerestory creates an additional story.
16 Indeed, the only evidence in the record is from the Interpretation and the testimony of Mr.
17 Graves.
18

19 The question at issue in this Interpretation is whether a mezzanine creates an additional
20 story. While story is defined at SMC 23.84A.036, mezzanines are not defined in the Code. The
21 primary principle of statutory interpretation is that “[w]here statutory language is plain and
22 unambiguous, a statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself.” *Wash.*
23 *State Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. No. 30*, 97 Wn.2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163
24 (1982); *HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep't. of Revenue*, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297 (2009).
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1 Because the City Code does not separately define “mezzanine,” the City’s Building Code
2 definition applies. *Sleasman v. City of Lacey*, 159 Wn.2d 639, 643, 151 P.3d 990 (2007).

3 Mezzanine is defined as:

4 A mezzanine or mezzanines in compliance with Section 505.2 [this section] shall be
5 considered a portion of the story below. Such mezzanines shall not contribute to either
6 the building area or number of stories as regulated by Section 503.1.

7 Seattle Building Code, Section 505.2.

8 The plain language of the definition of mezzanine unequivocally states that a mezzanine does
9 not contribute to building area or number of stories.

10 Appellant provided no evidence that the City’s interpretation is erroneous in light of the
11 Building Code definition of mezzanine.

12 **e. The view analysis conducted pursuant to SMC 23.47A.012.A.1.c**
13 **demonstrates that the additional 4 feet of the building permitted**
14 **under SMC 23.47A.012.A.1 will not significantly impact the view of**
15 **Green Lake, the Cascades, or Mt. Rainier from adjacent residential**
16 **properties**

17 SMC 23.47A.012.A.1.c states:

18 The Director shall reduce or deny the additional structure height allowed by this
19 subsection 23.47A.012.A.1 if the additional height would significantly block views
20 from neighboring residential structures of any of the following: Mount Rainier, the
21 Olympic and Cascade Mountains, the downtown skyline, Green Lake, Puget Sound,
22 Lake Washington, Lake Union, or the Ship Canal.

23 Applicant provided a view study that utilized an on-site survey, GIS mapping, including
24 topographical and elevation information, and the as-built drawings for the Fini Condos to
25 determine the appropriate view angle from the Fini. (Janette Testimony, Day 2, 241-43:5-5).
26 This information was inputted into AutoCAD, which is extraordinarily accurate. *Id.* The view
27 study shows that the view of the Cascades from the Fini remains completely unhindered by the
28 additional 4 feet. Exh. 3, p.G0.02B. The view study also shows that some of the views of Green
Lake from the Fini Condos would be blocked by the building with or without the additional 4

1 feet allowed under SMC 23.47A.012.A.1.c. Exh. 3, p.G0.02B; Janette Testimony, Day 2, 201-
2 02:9-22; Graves Testimony. Importantly, the view of Green Lake remains completely
3 unimpeded from the Fini if one looks to the left of the building and the view is accordingly not
4 significantly blocked. This is clearly shown in Exhibits 21 and 22, where Mr. Bodsky had the
5 luck of finding a clear day.
6

7 Appellants rely upon the testimony of Marcel Bodsky, an architect by training. Mr.
8 Brodsky did not conduct a view analysis for this appeal. Bodsky Testimony, Day 1, 178:7-11.
9 Instead, he relied upon an iPad application to determine the viewing angles. *Id.* Mr. Bodsky
10 noted that he does not know the accuracy of the iPad app. *Id.*, 172:19 (“Now, I’m not
11 representing any accuracy on here.”). Indeed, throughout his testimony, he spoke in qualifying
12 terms that he was not only unsure of the accuracy of the iPad app, but also concludes that the
13 study provided by the Applicant could be accurate. *Id.*, 177:1 (“If their data is correct, then the
14 view is blocked.”); 181:8-11 (“... if this diagram is correct and the view is indeed blocked, then
15 the applicant is allowed to raise the building an additional 4 feet and totally block the view. . .”).
16 His main concern appears to be that if the angle was not correctly measured, then the far bank of
17 the lake would be visible. He provided no evidence that the angle was not correctly measured.
18
19

20 Appellant appears to be requesting that any view study be conducted by a surveyor.
21 There is no mandate as to methodology in the Code, and Appellant provided no evidence that
22 Applicant’s analysis is incorrect. Appellant only brings questions, but no answers. *See Boehm,*
23 *supra*, at 719-720 (mere complaints without the production of affirmative evidence showing that
24 a decision was erroneous, are insufficient to satisfy an appellant’s burden). The only affirmative
25 evidence presented is the testimony of Mr. Janette and the corresponding exhibits regarding the
26 view study, and the City concurring in the conclusions of the analysis.
27
28

1 The City reviewed the view study and found that, under SMC 23.47A.012.A.1.c, the
2 additional 4 feet would not significantly block the view from the Fini. The City testified it found
3 the view study in the MUP plans to be sufficient and accurate, but wanted the view angle from
4 the Isola (now named Hendon). (Graves Testimony, Day 3, 109-110:9-18); Exh. 6. In the MUP
5 Plans in Exhibit 3, the Applicant provided a drawing of the view of Mt. Rainier from the
6 Hendon. Exh. 3, p.G0.02B. The Applicant concluded that there is no potential for the additional
7 4 feet to block the view of Mt. Rainier from the Hendon. *Id.* The Applicant has since conducted
8 a view study of the view from the Hendon, which confirmed its original finding. Exh. 79;
9 Graves Testimony, Day 3, 109-110:9-18. The City's determination of the view study is accurate
10 and Appellant failed to demonstrate the City's determination was in clear error.

11
12
13 **f. The elevator penthouse was properly measured from the otherwise
14 applicable height limit of 44 feet.**

15 Appellant questions whether the elevator penthouse is measured from 44 ft., as
16 determined by the City. Appellant provided no evidence at the hearing to support its claim.
17 Indeed, the City determined that the base height limit is 44 ft. under SMC 23.47A.012.A.1. This
18 provision provides, in part, that:

19 In zones with a 30 foot or 40 foot mapped height limit:

20 a. The height of a structure may exceed the otherwise applicable limit by up to 4
21 feet, subject to subsection 23.47A.012.A.1.c, provided the following conditions
22 are met:

23 1) Either:

24 a) A floor-to-floor height of 13 feet or more is provided for non-residential
25 uses at street level;

26 ...

27 SMC 23.47A.012.A.1.

28 The plain language of the provision provides that the *otherwise applicable limit* may be
exceeded by 4 feet. *Post*, 167 Wn.2d at 310. This implies that the base height limit can be

1 increased by 4 feet if the Project meets certain criteria. As discussed above, this Project meets
2 the criteria under SMC 23.47A.012.A.1, and the base height limit is accordingly 44 ft.

3 Elevator penthouses are permitted to extend 16 feet above the *applicable height limit*.
4 SMC 23.47A.012.C.4. Here, that limit is 44 feet. The City's interpretation is not clearly erroneous
5 and Appellant provided no evidence at hearing to indicate otherwise.
6

7 **g. The City properly determined that frequent transit service is
8 measured utilizing schedules provided by King County Metro**

9 SMC 23.84A.038 defines "Transit service, frequent" to mean:

10 transit service headways in at least one direction of 15 minutes or less for at least 12
11 hours per day, 6 days per week, and transit service headways of 30 minutes or less for
12 at least 18 hours every day.

13 The Land Use Code is silent on the precise means to be used to measure transit service
14 headways under the definition, and there is no active Director's Rule that provides guidance. The
15 Director relied on the bus schedule produced by King Country Metro to determine if the frequent
16 transit service is met. Utilizing the bus schedule for the analysis provided by the Applicant in the
17 plan set on Sheet A1.00 of Exhibit 3 is typical of analyses of frequent transit service received and
18 reviewed by the Director. Graves Testimony, Day 3, 82-85:4-10; Exh. 6; Exh. 77. The City
19 determined that frequent transit service was met when it approved the zoning and published its
20 decision, and reconfirmed that the definition of frequent transit service was met and exceed when
21 King County revised its schedule to add two new buses to the route. Exh. 6, p. 10; Exh. 76.

22 Appellant's only issue in its request for interpretation is that it believes that the definition
23 of frequent transit service demands that the City use actual data from King County Metro, which
24 varies from month to month, for each determination of a frequent transit area.¹⁵ This reading of
25

26
27
28 ¹⁵ Appellant appears to suggest in its testimony that the average headways were used to calculate frequent transit service. This is not true. Graves Testimony, Day 3, 173:13-23.

1 the Code is untenable and misreads the definition of frequent transit service. To support their
2 reading of the Code, Appellant relies upon the testimony of Dr. Altschul, a statistician who
3 conducted an analysis of the data from September 12 to November 30, 2016. Exh. 18. Dr.
4 Altschul testified that the bus exceeds 15 minute headways approximately 38.5 percent of the
5 time, meaning that it meets or exceeds 15 minute headways approximately 61.5 percent of the
6 time. Altschul Testimony. Dr. Altschul did not testify as to whether he knew if this was a
7 typical month or whether there were extenuating circumstances that resulted in buses being late.
8

9 Even if the City should require a statistical analysis of actual data, which the Code does
10 not require, Dr. Altschul provided no basis in the Code to support his subjective conclusion that a
11 bus meeting or exceeding its scheduling almost 62 percent of the time is not meeting frequent
12 transit. Indeed, Andrew Brick, of King County Metro, who utilized the same data in his analysis,
13 came to the opposite conclusion. Mr. Brick testified that the corridor in which the Route 5 bus
14 and Route 5 Express operate is considered a very frequent route, which means it has better than
15 15-minute headways during peak periods, and meet or exceed the 15 minute headways on
16 average. Testimony of Andrew Brick, Day 1, 34-5:17-15.
17
18

19 Dr. Altschul also did not run the analysis after the addition of the two buses in the
20 morning commute, as the data was not available at the time of analysis. He also did not review
21 data from months prior to establish any pattern. The variability of the bus routes on a monthly
22 basis, due to extenuating circumstances or increases in service, and the delay in obtaining recent
23 data, underscores the arbitrariness of relying upon a statistical analysis of actual arrival times of
24 the bus—whether one reviews one month of data or four. One can envision a scenario where one
25 project is deemed to be located in an area with frequent transit service, while another project
26 across the street analyzes data in a month where the buses were later than normal, and is
27
28

1 determined not be located in a frequent transit service area. Such an analysis would not only
2 place a significant burden on an applicant to determine whether it was in a frequent transit area,
3 but it also allows for inconsistent subjective determinations by the City as to what constitutes
4 frequent transit. Graves Testimony, Day 3, 172-73:2-23. Depending on the arbitrary standard
5 upon which Appellant would apply, it is possible no lot would ever qualify for frequent transit
6 service due to one bus being late. Exh. 6, p. 10.


8 The reliance upon schedules by the City is reasonable, and Appellant has not
9 demonstrated that reliance upon the King County bus schedule is clearly erroneous. This claim
10 should be denied.

11 **IV. RELIEF REQUESTED**

12 Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof with regard to any appeal issue. The
13 Hearing Examiner should reject the appeal and uphold the design review approval and DNS for
14 the Project.
15

16 DATED this 5th day of June, 2017.

17 MCCULLOUGH HILL LEARY, P.S.

18
19
20 By: 
21 Jessica M. Clawson, WSBA #36901
22 Katie Kendall, WSBA #48164
23 Attorneys for Applicant