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7 BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER  
8 FOR THE CITY OF SEATTLE

9 In the Matter of the Appeals of

10 **FOSS MARITIME COMPANY AND**  
11 **PORT OF SEATTLE**

12 from an interpretation  
13 issued by the Director,  
14 Department of Planning  
15 and Development

Hearing Examiner File Nos.

S-15-001; S-15-002

(Director's Interpretation: 15-001)

FOSS MARITIME'S OPPOSITION TO  
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER  
CONCERNING THE DEPOSITION OF  
ANDREW MCKIM

16  
17 **I.**  
**INTRODUCTION**

18 Foss Maritime Company ("Foss") respectfully requests that the Hearing Examiner deny  
19 the Motion for Protective Order Concerning the Deposition of Andrew McKim ("Motion")  
20 filed by the Department of Planning and Development ("Respondent" or "DPD"). DPD does  
21 not even attempt to meet its legal burden to show that it satisfies the requirements for issuance  
22 of a protective order under CR 26, and instead simply relies on a straw man argument in  
23 contending certain potential areas of questioning for Mr. McKim are not "relevant." In so  
24 doing, DPD effectively would turn CR 26 on its head by placing the burden on Foss to justify  
25 the discovery it seeks – when, to the contrary, it is the responsibility of the party seeking to  
26 resist discovery to demonstrate why the discovery should not be had. Foss also hereby joins in

1 the opposition to the Motion filed separately by the Port of Seattle ("Port").

2 **II.**  
3 **AUTHORITY & ARGUMENT**

4 **A. DPD Has Not Met Its "Heavy Burden" To Demonstrate That It Is Entitled To A Protective Order.**

5 As an initial matter, DPD fails entirely to make the legal showing that is required to  
6 obtain a protective order. A party's objection that the discovery sought is irrelevant does not  
7 entitle that party to withhold discovery or to the issuance of a protective order. Instead, under  
8 Washington law, a party seeking a protective order to prevent or restrict discovery bears the  
9 "heavy burden" of demonstrating "good cause" justifying issuance of the order. *Cedell v.*  
10 *Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 176 Wn.2d 686, 696, 295 P.3d 239 (2013) (citing *Blankenship v.*  
11 *Hearst Corp.*, 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). To establish good cause, the party "must  
12 show that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted." *McCallum v.*  
13 *Allstate Property and Cas. Ins. Co.*, 149 Wn. App. 412, 423 (2009) (citing cases) (emphasis  
14 added). "Unsubstantiated allegations of harm" or conclusory statements that some generalized  
15 harm will occur are insufficient as a matter of law. *Id.* Instead, a party must provide specific  
16 factual allegations and "concrete examples" of the potential harm that will be suffered in  
17 absence of an order. *Id.* In deciding a motion for a protective order, courts must weigh the  
18 potential harm against the non-moving party's interest in obtaining full discovery. *Id.*

19 Here, DPD does not even attempt to meet its burden to show good cause. The Motion  
20 merely cites the text of CR 26, but does not describe or even suggest any harm that would  
21 result from proceeding with the deposition as noted. Nor could DPD make such a showing.  
22 DPD's counsel will have every opportunity during Mr. McKim's routine deposition to state any  
23 objections for the record as may be warranted. *See* CR 30(c). DPD also will have the  
24 opportunity to challenge the admissibility of deposition testimony or any other evidence offered  
25 by Foss (or any other party) at the hearing. *See* HER 2.17. DPD thus has failed to meet its  
26 "heavy burden" – or any burden at all – of showing good cause, and the Motion must be denied

1 as a matter of law on this basis alone.

2 **B. DPD Fails To Show That The Discovery Sought Is Not Relevant.**

3 Even if DPD had shown some manner of potential harm that conceivably could justify a  
4 protective order – which it has not – the Hearing Examiner still should deny the Motion  
5 because DPD has not shown that the discovery sought is not “relevant to the subject matter  
6 involved in the pending action.” CR 26(b)(1).

7 Public policy in Washington weighs heavily in favor of full and open discovery. *See*,  
8 *e.g.*, *Fellows v. Moynihan*, 175 Wn.2d 641, 649, 285 P.3d 864 (2012) (privileges restricting  
9 discovery are in derogation of policy favoring discovery and must be strictly construed); *N.K.*  
10 *v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints*, 175 Wn. App.  
11 517, 538, 307 P.3d 730 (2013) (reversing trial court’s denial of motion to compel on relevance  
12 grounds and noting that parties in Washington “have a broad right of discovery”).<sup>1</sup>  
13 Accordingly, it is well-settled that the rules of discovery should be read liberally to ensure that  
14 parties are able to fully investigate their claims and defenses before trial. *See, e.g.*, *Herbert v.*  
15 *Lando*, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) ([T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad  
16 and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil  
17 trials.”); *Senear v. Daily Journal American*, 27 Wn. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (1980) (CR 26 is  
18 to be given “broad and liberal construction”). Indeed, one prominent Washington commentator  
19 has noted that in the context of discovery, the requirement of relevance is “nominal,” and that  
20 the provisions of CR 26 were “deliberately drafted broadly, to allow discovery beyond what  
21 would be considered relevant at trial.” Tegland, 14 WASH. PRAC. § 13:2; *see also Bennett v.*  
22 *Smith Bundy Berman Britton, PS*, 176 Wn.2d 303, 312, 291 P.3d 886 (2013) (“[Washington

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24 <sup>1</sup> This perhaps is nowhere more evident than where the information sought is held by public agencies or officials.  
25 *See Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of Spokane*, 172 Wn.2d 702, 715, 261 P.3d 119 (2011)  
26 (noting policy, reflected in the Public Records Act, that “free and open examination of public records is in the  
public interest, even if examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment.”). Indeed, “full access to  
information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary  
precondition to the sound governance of a free society.” *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).

1 has] very liberal rules of discovery. In reality, parties are required to produce many more  
2 records than are ultimately relevant to the specific issues before the court.”). And as DPD  
3 concedes, parties may seek discovery of inadmissible information so long as it is reasonably  
4 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. CR 26(b)(1).

5 DPD’s argument that the areas of Mr. McKim’s testimony they seek to quash are not  
6 relevant is based upon a straw man of DPD’s own creation, and should be rejected. Mr.  
7 McKim authored the Interpretation at issue in this appeal. DPD conclusorily alleges that Mr.  
8 McKim’s testimony regarding whether the Interpretation was arbitrary or politically motivated,  
9 or regarding the historical uses of Terminal 5 and similar properties, is not relevant because it  
10 would support only “estoppel” arguments that the Hearing Examiner may not consider. DPD is  
11 mistaken. Although such testimony might indeed support an estoppel theory, Foss has not  
12 advanced such a position. Rather, as will be explained in greater detail in Foss’s forthcoming  
13 opposition to DPD’s motion to dismiss, Foss contends that these facts establish, among other  
14 things:

- 15 • That DPD’s Interpretation is not entitled to the deference normally afforded  
16 under SMC 23.88.020.G.5 because it is arbitrary and politically motivated rather  
17 than being based upon a sound interpretation of the law, *see Sleasman v. Lacey*,  
18 159 Wn.2d 639, 647, 151 P.3d 990 (2007);
- 19 • That DPD’s Interpretation is not entitled to the deference normally afforded  
20 under SMC 23.88.020.G.5 because it represents a shift from its past  
21 interpretation and enforcement, *Sleasman*, 159 Wn.2d at 647; and
- 22 • That previous uses conducted at Terminal 5 and/or similar properties, approved  
23 by DPD, are evidence of legislative intent, which is a key consideration in  
24 statutory interpretation.

25 The Motion fails to address any of these issues, and its attempt to dismiss the import of  
26 Mr. McKim’s testimony on these issues as merely an “estoppel” argument is not well-taken.

1 DPD's reliance on *Morgan v. Peacehealth, Inc.*, 101 Wn. App. 750, 14 P.3d 773 (2000)  
2 similarly is misplaced, as *Morgan* addressed an entirely different legal standard and does not  
3 even mention CR 26. In *Morgan*, the defendant hospital moved for summary judgment against  
4 the plaintiff physician. 101 Wn. App. at 753. The physician moved to continue the motion,  
5 arguing (among other things) that, under CR 56(f), he should be given additional time to  
6 conduct discovery prior to responding to the summary judgment motion. *Id.* at 786. The  
7 *Morgan* court ruled that the trial court's refusal to grant the physician this additional discovery  
8 was not an abuse of discretion. *Id.* at 787. Under CR 56(f), the party seeking the additional  
9 discovery bears the burden of showing what evidence he or she expects to obtain that will raise  
10 a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, and the physician had failed to  
11 do so. *Id.* at 787. Thus, in addition to applying an inapposite legal standard, *Morgan* presents  
12 the polar opposite of the parties' posture here, where the burden is on the party resisting  
13 discovery and not on the one seeking it. Accordingly, *Morgan* does not support DPD's  
14 position and provides no guidance here.

15 **C. There Is No Good Cause To Delay The Deposition.**


16 DPD's request that Mr. McKim's deposition be rescheduled for July 6 should be  
17 denied. The hearing in this matter is only some four weeks away, and the parties simply cannot  
18 delay their preparations or waste the available time in any way. Perhaps most importantly, for  
19 the reasons stated above, there is no justification for delaying the deposition, and accordingly it  
20 should proceed as noted.

21 **III.**  
22 **CONCLUSION**

23 DPD has not even attempted to meet its heavy burden to establish proper grounds for  
24 the issuance of a protective order that would deny Foss the discovery it needs to proceed to a  
25 full and fair hearing of its appeal. Such grounds do not in fact exist, as the discovery Foss  
26 seeks is relevant and not privileged. The Motion should be denied.


1 DATED this 24<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

2 GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Dominique Barrientes, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on June 24, 2015, I caused to be served the foregoing document, FOSS MARITIME'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER CONCERNING THE DEPOSITION OF ANDREW MCKIM, on the person(s) identified below in the manner shown:

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21 Dated at Seattle, Washington, this 24<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

22   
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25 GSB:7137379.1  
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