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8 BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
9 FOR THE CITY OF SEATTLE

10 In the Matter of the Appeal of
11 FISCHER STUDIO BUILDING
12 CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION
13 from a decision issued by the Director, Seattle
14 Department of Construction and Inspections
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Hearing Examiner File:
MUP-21-004 (DR, W)

Department Reference:
3018037-LU

CITY AND APPLICANT'S JOINT
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S
CLOSING BRIEF

18 **I. INTRODUCTION**

19 Appellant Fischer Studio Building Condominium Owners Association ("Appellant") filed
20 a brief ("Appellant Brief" or "Appellant Br.") that fails to demonstrate any error, let alone clear
21 error, by Respondent City of Seattle ("City"). The mixed-use downtown development
22 ("Project") proposed by Respondent Jodi Patterson-O'Hare, acting as agent for 1516 2nd
23 Condominiums, LLC ("Applicant"), was subject to a serious and thorough review that fully
24 satisfied the requirements of the State Environmental Policy Act ("SEPA") and the Seattle
25 Municipal Code ("SMC" or "Code") as described in the City's and Applicant's Joint Post-
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28 CITY AND APPLICANT'S JOINT
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S
POST-HEARING BRIEF - Page 1 of 24

McCullough Hill Leary, PS

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6600
Seattle, Washington 98104
206.812.3388
206.812.3389 fax

1 Hearing Brief (“Respondent Brief”). Appellant has not provided any evidence establishing that
2 the Project as conditioned will create probable significant adverse environmental impacts or will
3 be inconsistent with the Seattle Downtown Design Guidelines (“Downtown Guidelines”).

4 In lieu of satisfying its burden of proof, Appellant accuses the Applicant of “literally
5 steal[ing] the sky” and laments that if the City “does not need to consider [loss of light and
6 human health] under SEPA, then there would be no limit to the amount of natural daylight
7 developers could take away.” Appellant Br. at 19, 24, 34. These statements embody the
8 fallacies at the heart of this appeal. A building is not “stealing” when it develops to the height
9 and density – on its own property – expressly allowed by City zoning. The Fischer Studio
10 Building residents will continue to access natural light, even if less of it passes through the west-
11 facing windows for a subset of 10 of its condos. Similarly, Appellant’s plea for a “limit” on
12 development improperly seeks to use SEPA to “dictate a particular substantive result,” which
13 conflicts with the direction of the statute. *Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA*, 188
14 Wn.2d 80, 95, 392 P.3d 1025, 1032 (2017) (quotations omitted). Neither SEPA nor the City’s
15 design review process prohibits all impacts to the Fischer Studio Building or supports the notion
16 of a “limit” on development that conflicts with the zoning adopted by the City Council.
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20 II. ARGUMENT

21 A. Appellant cannot reassert abandoned or dismissed claims.

22 As explained at pages 39-40 of Respondents’ Brief, Appellant abandoned its claims
23 regarding historic resources, wind, conservation, renewable resources, and loss of housing by
24 failing to present evidence in support of these claims. The Examiner should disregard the
25 statements in Appellant’s Brief that attempt to revive these issues, such as the allusions to
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1 historic resources and loss of housing at pages 2-3 and 54.¹ Similarly, Appellant devotes
2 substantial space to arguing that its efforts to persuade the Downtown Design Review Board
3 (“Board”) to reach a different result regarding the Project were “ignored.” Appellant Br. at 7-12.
4 Appellant’s claim that “the Design Review process did not allow for meaningful public
5 participation and ignored significant issues,” however, has been dismissed. Order on Motion to
6 Dismiss, p. 4. Indeed, Appellant did not dispute that dismissal was required. *Id.* The Examiner
7 should disregard these statements as well.
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9 **B. The City Demonstrated Prima Facie Compliance With SEPA.**

10 Appellant fails to demonstrate any failure by the City to demonstrate *prima facie*
11 compliance with the procedural requirements of SEPA. Appellant’s generalized and speculative
12 concerns regarding loss of light and human health did not obligate the City to do anything more
13 than it did: accept and consider Appellant’s comments and conclude that they did not require
14 further analysis. There was no error.
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16 **1. Prima Facie Compliance.**

17 Appellant attempts to stretch the concept of *prima facie* compliance with SEPA beyond
18 what is supported by legal authority. Caselaw establishes that an agency may fail to demonstrate
19 *prima facie* compliance with SEPA when it has failed to engage seriously in the SEPA process or
20 has entirely ignored a relevant impact. *See, e.g., Lassila v. Wenatchee*, 89 Wn.2d 804, 817, 576
21 P.2d 54, 61 (1978) (failure of *prima facie* compliance when court “cannot tell whether the
22 environmental significance of the Plan was even considered by the commissioners”); *Boehm v.*
23 *City of Vancouver*, 111 Wn. App. 711, 721, 47 P.3d 137, 143 (2002) (City demonstrated *prima*
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27 ¹ Even if these claims were considered, they would fail because Appellant contradicts its own theory that the Fischer
28 Studio Building will “fail to attract” future residents, asserting that the “owners of one west-facing unit” have
“already sold their unit.” Appellant Br. at 3 (emphasis added).

1 *facie* compliance because it “thoroughly considered appropriate environmental factors”). In
2 *Seattle Mobility Coalition*, HE File No. W-18-013, Amended Findings and Decision at 10 (Oct.
3 24, 2019), the Examiner found that an agency had failed to demonstrate *prima facie* compliance
4 with SEPA because it had not responded to an entire section of the SEPA checklist – despite
5 indicating that the checklist was the only basis for its threshold determination.
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7 Appellant’s framing of *prima facie* procedural requirements is inconsistent with this
8 authority. Appellant suggests that the City failed to demonstrate *prima facie* compliance with
9 the procedural requirements of SEPA when it “did not perform any further investigation after
10 receiving Mr. Clark’s comments raising concerns about human health impacts.” Appellant Br.,
11 pp. 17-18. But Appellant fails to support its assertion that an agency is required to “perform” an
12 “investigation” any time a comment raises “concerns,” which would create an unworkable
13 standard for environmental review. Instead, an agency is permitted to rely on its own discretion
14 and expertise in determining whether the substance of a comment justifies further study. *See*
15 *Boehm*, 111 Wn. App. at 720 (no failure of *prima facie* compliance when complained-of impacts
16 “are merely ‘speculative’ and therefore, need not be considered”); *Seattle Mobility Coalition*,
17 *supra*, at 6-7.
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20 Similarly, Appellant suggests that an agency fails to demonstrate *prima facie* compliance
21 if it does not “articulate a standard or threshold for determining [whether] impacts are
22 significant.” Appellant Br. at 22. This unsupported assertion conflicts with SEPA’s regulations.
23 Nothing in the procedures governing the content of environmental review or threshold
24 determination process requires an agency to determine a “standard” in the manner Appellant
25 suggests. *See* WAC 197-11-060, 197-11-330. Appellant’s interpretation also conflicts with the
26 definition of “significance,” which “involves context and intensity and does not lend itself to a
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1 formula or quantifiable test.” WAC 197-11-794(2). The City’s consideration of the Project was
2 not deficient because Seattle Department of Construction and Inspections (“SDCI”) staff
3 declined to take on a legislative role.

4 **2. Loss of Light and Human Health**

5 Appellant fails to establish a lack of *prima facie* SEPA compliance by the City regarding
6 the issue of loss of light and human health.

7 First, Appellant cannot establish that any such consideration was required. *See*
8 Respondent Br. at 16-17. Appellant asserts at page 18 of its Brief that the absence of specific
9 questions on the environmental checklist was the “core basis” for Respondents’ request for
10 dismissal of the “loss of light and human health” SEPA claim, but this is incorrect. The
11 checklist’s *inclusion* of “light” and “environmental health” questions and corresponding *lack* of
12 “light and human health” questions represents just one (of many) textual indications that this
13 consideration is not mandatory. *See* Respondents’ Joint Motion for Partial Dismissal and/or
14 Partial Summary Judgment at 8-16; Respondents’ Joint Reply in Support of Motion at 2-13. The
15 Department of Ecology email cited at page 19 of Appellant’s Brief does not indicate otherwise
16 by suggesting a means by which the “loss of light” issue “could” be addressed. Contrary to
17 Appellant’s suggestion, the email says nothing about health impacts and establishes no
18 requirement of any kind. Nor has Appellant provided any support for the assertion that any
19 allegation of a health impact requires consideration as a “public health” issue. *See* Appellant Br.
20 at 19.

21 Even if “loss of light and human health” *could* appropriately be considered under SEPA
22 in some cases, that does not establish that such consideration was *required* here. Appellant
23 provides no support for the suggestion that any time a public comment references an issue, the
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1 City is obligated to perform a “further investigation” of that issue in order to achieve procedural
2 compliance with SEPA. *See* Appellant Br., p. 17. To the contrary, “SEPA review is not required
3 for speculative worst-case scenarios.” *Seattle Mobility Coalition*, HE File No. W-18-013,
4 Amended Findings and Decision at 7 (Oct. 24, 2019); *accord*, *Boehm*, 111 Wn. App. at 720.

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6 Here, Appellant fails to establish that Senior Land Use Planner Crystal Torres improperly
7 responded to the comments submitted prior to the threshold determination. Appellant Br. at 17-
8 18. As explained at pages 17-23 of Respondents’ Brief, Ms. Torres made no error. Contrary to
9 Appellant’s suggestion, Ms. Torres did not ignore this issue; instead, she determined the alleged
10 impacts “would not be significant” in the Project’s downtown context and that Appellant’s
11 comments did not rise “to the level” of requiring further analysis. *Torres Testimony*, Day 4
12 Audio, Part 52. In *PT Air Watchers v. Dep’t of Ecology*, 179 Wn.2d 919, 929, 319 P.3d 23, 28
13 (2014), the Court noted that there could be a failure of *prima facie* SEPA compliance if an
14 agency had “entirely ignored” an impact. However, because the record demonstrated that the
15 agency had given the appellants the “opportunity to present, project-specific scientific
16 information” by accepting and considering comments (“a step not even required by statute”),
17 there was no failure. *Id.* The same opportunity for comment and consideration of submitted
18 comments was provided in this case and SCDI satisfied its *prima facie* SEPA obligation.

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21 In addition, Ms. Torres’s determination was an appropriate response to the one comment
22 submitted by Mr. Clark (“Clark Comment”), which made no specific assertions of probable
23 significant human health impacts. *See* Respondent Br. at 19-23. Indeed, Appellant implicitly
24 concedes this through its assertion that Mr. Clark “indicat[ed] that the loss of light would be
25 severe and likely result in human health impacts,” Appellant Br. at 17, with no statement that
26 those impacts to human health will be significant. Nor was Ms. Torres required to conduct an
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1 investigation regarding the speculative and attenuated suggestion that a reduction in natural light
2 entering the Fischer Studio Building's west-facing windows would leave a subset of its residents
3 in total darkness. *See* Respondent Br. at 22-23; *Seattle Mobility Coalition, supra*, at 7.

4 The *Escala Owners Association* appeal is cited in Appellant's Brief but does not support
5 its arguments. *See* Appellant Br. at 19-20. In that case, the Examiner noted that the applicant's
6 expert witness had acknowledged the potential for "negative health impacts." *Escala*, HE File
7 No. MUP-17-035, Amended Findings and Decision at 19 (June 12, 2018). In this appeal, by
8 contrast, there was no such acknowledgment; instead, as discussed below, Dr. Stephen Lockley
9 testified that there is no likelihood of significant adverse human health impacts due to a
10 reduction in natural light and that Appellant's assertions did not establish otherwise.

13 3. Loss of Light.

14 Appellant asserts that the City's alleged failure of *prima facie* SEPA compliance
15 extended to the issue of "loss of light" apart from health impacts. Appellant's Notice of Appeal
16 did not include this claim, and the Examiner should not permit Appellant to assert it at this late
17 date. *See* Respondent Br. at 33.

18 Even if Appellant had raised this claim, it would fail. As Appellant itself states, the
19 checklist prepared for the Project "addressed loss of light impacts." Appellant Br. at 19; *see* Ex.
20 68 at 27.² The City also considered the "loss of light" issue through the shadow studies
21 incorporated by the design review process, *e.g.* Ex. 6 at 43-45; Ex. 20 at 5, and through its

22 ² In response to Question 13.d, under the element of "Historic and cultural preservation," which requests "proposed
23 measures to avoid, minimize, or compensate for loss, changes to, and disturbance to resources," the Checklist states:
24 "Tower siting to minimize reduction in solar exposure, with a composition of minimized residential tower floor
25 plates in the lower stories of the development, creating a large break in the massing mid-block, allowing light and air
26 to the east and territorial outlook from the west. Increased plan/massing setbacks along alley at mid-block also
27 provided." Ex. 68 at 27. A notation added by Ms. Torres states: "No SEPA mitigation is warranted per Overview
28 Policies," providing further confirmation of the City's consideration of this issue. *Id*

1 determination that City-adopted zoning standards and substantive SEPA policies provide
2 sufficient mitigation for this issue. Ex. 21 at 25; *see* SMC 25.05.675.Q.1.d. This demonstrates
3 that the issue was not “ignored” by the City and thus that there was no failure of *prima facie*
4 compliance. Appellant fails to support its suggestion that the City was required to ignore its
5 policies and analyze the “loss of light” to the satisfaction of Fischer Studio Building residents.
6 The City’s choice of an alternative approach was not a failure of *prima facie* compliance.
7

8 **4. Light and Glare**

9 Appellant next argues that the City failed to demonstrate *prima facie* compliance with
10 SEPA regarding light and glare impacts. Appellant Br. at 20-23. Appellant does not contest that
11 the City’s Decision includes a condition requiring the Applicant, prior to issuance of a
12 construction permit, to “[p]rovide additional information in order to ensure lighting at both the
13 double-height lobby and the exterior void would not create glare or spill toward the alley.” *See*
14 Ex. 21 at 26. This condition evinces serious consideration of potential glare impacts and
15 demonstrates *prima facie* compliance by the City.
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17 Nonetheless, Appellant suggests that SEPA required the City to set a specific standard
18 regarding how much glare would be acceptable. Appellant Br. at 21-22. Appellant cites no
19 authority for this invented requirement; indeed, as Appellant acknowledges, the only regulation
20 cited for this argument affirms the authority of an agency to note a potential impact during SEPA
21 review and reserve more specific review until later. *See id.* (citing WAC 197-11-158). Even if
22 SMC 25.05.675.K.2.b required the City to “assess” light and glare impacts “and the need for
23 mitigation,” as Appellant claims, *see* Appellant Br. at 22 n.40, that is exactly what the City did.
24 Appellant notably fails to allege that Applicant will be unable to fulfill the condition or that the
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1 language in the condition and in SMC 25.05.675.K.2.d provide insufficient guidance for further
2 review.³

3 Second, Appellant argues that because the condition as recommended by the Board
4 would require “additional information at MUP review,” *see* Ex. 20 at 23, the Decision “violated
5 the City’s design review regulations” by requiring information “prior to issuance of a
6 construction permit” instead of during “MUP review.” Appellant Br. at 22-23.⁴ This argument
7 is based on the assertion that SMC 23.41.008.F.3 compelled SDCI to adopt the “MUP review”
8 language from the Board’s recommendation as a literal requirement. *See id.* In other words,
9 Appellant “questions compliance” with design review procedure. *See Escala, supra*, at 20. Its
10 argument, therefore, must fail, because “procedural requirements under Chapter [23.41] are not
11 within the Hearing Examiner’s jurisdiction.” *Escala, supra*, at 20. Even if this were not the
12 case, Appellant’s claim would not succeed. The condition imposed in the Decision ensures that
13 the Board’s request for lighting design that minimizes glare impacts will be fulfilled before the
14 Project is completed. It was not clear error for the City to document the requirement in this
15 manner.
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19 **C. Appellant Did Not Demonstrate Probable, Significant Adverse Impacts.**

20 Appellant cannot demonstrate probable, significant adverse environmental impacts any
21 more than it can demonstrate a failure of *prima facie* SEPA compliance. Appellant’s arguments
22 improperly seek to flip the burden of proof, raising a host of generalized assertions and insisting
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25 ³ *See* Ex. 21 at 26 (“ensure lighting at both the double-height lobby and the exterior void would not create glare or
26 spill toward the alley”); SMC 25.05.675.K.2.d (“Mitigating measures may include, but are not limited to: (1)
27 Limiting the reflective qualities of surface materials that can be used in the development; (2) Limiting the area
28 and intensity of illumination; (3) Limiting the location or angle of illumination; (4) Limiting the hours of
illumination; and (5) Providing landscaping.”).

⁴ Appellant includes this argument in the section of its Brief that concerns *prima facie* SEPA compliance. *See*
Appellant Br. at 22. These assertions are not linked to Appellant’s SEPA claims and provide no support for them.

1 that the City prove a negative. This fails to demonstrate clear error. The burden of proof in a
2 SEPA appeal “is not met when an appellant only argues that they have a concern about a
3 potential impact, and an opinion that more study is necessary,” or when an appellant has “failed
4 to identify what the significance” of claimed impacts would be. *Save Madison Valley*, HE File
5 No. MUP-20-023, Amended Findings and Decision at 11-12 (June 18, 2021). No evidence
6 presented during the hearing or cited in Appellant’s Brief meets this standard, and Appellant fails
7 to demonstrate clear error in the City’s determination.
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9 **1. Loss of Light and Human Health**

10 Nothing in Appellant’s presentation at hearing established that the Project will result in
11 probable, significant adverse impacts on human health due to loss of natural light. The
12 discussion of this issue in Appellant’s Brief conflates two largely undisputed propositions:
13 improper circadian alignment – particularly in the shift work context – has been linked to
14 adverse health impacts, and exposure to natural light can have beneficial effects. Even assuming
15 both of these propositions are true, Appellant did not establish that circadian misalignment is a
16 *probable* outcome here, let alone that secondary human health effects are either probable or
17 significant. Nor has Appellant established that a diminution in a subset of Fischer Studio
18 Building residents’ ability to obtain the *benefits* of natural light from their western windows
19 (even if such a diminution were to occur) would result in *probable, significant, adverse* health
20 impacts.
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23 First, Appellant fails to establish that Fischer Studio Building residents would experience
24 a “probable” or “significant” effect on their ability to maintain circadian alignment. It is
25 undisputed that human beings rely on light exposure in order to “entrain,” *i.e.* to align their
26 internal circadian rhythms of sleep and wakefulness with the world’s 24-hour cycle, and health
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1 consequences can result from improper alignment. Ex. 36 at 5; Ex. 58 at 9-10. Relying on Dr.
2 de la Iglesia's testimony, Appellant asserts that Fischer Studio Building residents will lose access
3 to the natural light/dark cycle and experience a condition of circadian misalignment that is
4 "associated with" and "has been linked to" various health issues. Appellant Br. at 27.
5 Appellant's claim fails on the basis of its vagueness alone. See Respondent Br. at 29-30.
6 Generalized assertions by Dr. de la Iglesia, such as the statement that the Project "will likely lead
7 to adverse physical and mental health outcomes" that "could include" a range of outcomes, does
8 not satisfy Appellant's burden of proof. See Ex. 36 at 9-10; see *Seattle Mobility Coalition*,
9 *supra*, at 7 (expert's "conclusory statement" that was "not accompanied by analysis that
10 quantified or measured impacts" fails to meet appellant's burden of proof).
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13 In addition to their lack of specificity, Appellant's contentions are simply unconvincing.
14 Dr. de la Iglesia agreed with Dr. Lockley that entrainment can be achieved through the use of
15 electric light alone, though he suggested that electric light is not as "reliable" as natural daylight
16 and is "not necessarily sufficient" to ensure "good" alignment. Ex. 36 at 5; *Iglesia Testimony*,
17 Day 2 Zoom Recording, 2:05:30. These statements do not support Appellant's apparent
18 assumption that Fischer Studio Building residents depend entirely on their west-facing windows
19 for all light. See Appellant Br. at 27. Appellant attempts to create the impression that a
20 reduction in natural light from the west will leave the Fischer Studio Building in total darkness,
21 but the evidence confirms that residents have other windows, use electric light, and go outside.
22 See Respondent Br. at 25-26. Dr. de la Iglesia stated that light entering a unit's kitchen window
23 was "irrelevant" unless the resident was planning to "spend all day in the kitchen," but this only
24 confirms the incorrectness of Appellant's assumption that residents *currently* spend all day in
25 front of their western windows. See *Iglesia Testimony*, Day 2 Zoom Recording, 1:48:30.
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1 Likewise, Dr. de la Iglesia's assertion that Fischer Studio Building residents will be unable to
2 avoid nighttime exposure to artificial light from the Project is contradicted by the assertion in the
3 very same paragraph that residents will "keep their window shades down" during the day. Ex.
4 36 at 8.

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6 One need not question Dr. de la Iglesia's understanding of human biology to recognize
7 that the factual scenario he posits is unrealistic. Even if a hypothetical person whose only access
8 to light was through a western window in the Fischer Studio Building might experience some
9 circadian misalignment as a result, Appellant provided no evidence whatsoever indicating that
10 this is the scenario faced by current residents. Instead, as Dr. Lockley explained, Appellant's
11 claim depends on a "very large leap in logic" that conflates a new building's shadow with the
12 "health problems associated with working night shifts over many decades." Ex. 58 at 22-23.

13
14 Mr. Clark's testimony regarding human health impacts was equally unpersuasive – both
15 because of his lack of qualifications, *see* Respondent Br. at 26, and because he assumed the same
16 unrealistic facts as Dr. de la Iglesia. Mr. Clark's "Circadian Stimulus" ("CS") analysis predicted
17 a decrease in the number of hours during which the level of natural light reaching a person
18 standing static in one place four feet from a west-facing Fischer Studio Building window from
19 sunrise to 1 p.m. would exceed a CS-designated threshold. *Clark Testimony*, Day 2 Audio, Part
20 1, 00:55. Appellant cannot establish (and does not even argue) that this CS-threshold constitutes
21 evidence of health impacts of any kind, let alone "probable" or "significant" impacts. Mr. Clark
22 did not dispute Dr. Lockley's testimony that entrainment may be achieved at low light levels and
23 from a variety of light sources, and he failed to explain how his model – which assumes a total
24 lack of exposure to light from artificial sources, other windows, or the outdoors – could be seen
25 as predictive of real-world impacts on human health in any way. It cannot. Mr. Clark's

1 assumptions, like Dr. de la Iglesia's, were directly contradicted by the testimony of Fischer
2 Studio Building residents. Respondent Br. at 25-26.

3 Next, rather than disputing Dr. Lockley's arguments on the merits, Appellant attempts to
4 attack his credibility by citing an op-ed he authored describing the health benefits of daylight
5 exposure. Appellant Br. at 29-33. This neither undermines Dr. Lockley's credibility nor
6 supports Appellant's claim.⁵ It is undisputed that daylight can have health benefits, and Dr.
7 Lockley never suggested otherwise. But the advice to see increased access to daylight as a
8 "simple step to better health," *see* Appellant Br. at 33, does not mean that the converse is true –
9 either as a general matter or, especially, under the specific circumstances of this case. The article
10 does not constitute affirmative evidence linking Appellant's broad assertions to probable,
11 significant impacts *from* this Project *to* the Fischer Studio Building.
12

13
14 Appellant also misconstrues many of Dr. Lockley's statements. First, Dr. Lockley did
15 not "paint a straw man" regarding Dr. de la Iglesia's position on entrainment. *See* Appellant Br.
16 at 34. Instead, Dr. Lockley explained that the Project will not prevent a subset of Fischer Studio
17 Building residents from achieving entrainment sufficient to avoid significant health impacts. Ex.
18 58 at 19-26. Dr. de la Iglesia expressed a generalized concern that artificial light may not be as
19 reliable a method to achieve entrainment, but (as with all of his statements) failed to explain why
20 this would supposedly lead to a probable, significant adverse impact in this case. Ex. 36 at 5;
21 *Iglesia Testimony*, Day 2 Zoom Recording, 2:05:30.
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24 Second, Dr. Lockley explained that the CS metric is not reliable because "no scientific
25 conclusions can be reached about the health impacts of light using this model." Ex. 58 at 16.
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27 ⁵ Appellant's suggestion that Dr. Lockley is simply lying is unpersuasive on its face. Dr. Lockley's undisputed
28 credentials and his lengthy and detailed testimony belie any such insinuation.

Appellant's response – that its claims did not depend on that model because impacts will be “dramatic” – only highlights the vague nature of its claims. Appellant Br. at 35.

Third, Dr. Lockley noted that the use of artificial light in the evening is “a larger concern” for health than delayed access to bright light during the day. Appellant responds that it is “impossible” for its residents to use less artificial light in the evening. Appellant Br. at 35. Even if this were true, it would not support Appellant's apparent assertion that the Project's impacts must be considered significant in compensation for computer and cell phone use by these residents.

Finally, Appellant argues that Dr. Lockley is not credible because he did not predict specific health outcomes for two Fischer Studio Building residents. This once again represents an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof from Appellant to Respondents, who are not required to prove “definitively” that “there will be *no* adverse health consequences” in order to defeat Appellant's claim. *See* Appellant Br. at 36. In addition, Dr. Lockley's refusal to comment on the health of individuals he had not examined in no way invalidates his conclusions. Dr. Lockley, again, did not contest that a severe reduction in light exposure can have health consequences, but his report explains that there is “no scientific basis for a reduction in *natural* light,” rather than artificial light, “causing adverse effects on human health,” as well as no basis for the assertion that construction of the Project will result in the type of severe light loss for which health consequences have been studied. Ex. 58 at 26 (emphasis added). Appellant did not rebut these statement during the hearing and has not done so in its Brief. Nor has Appellant pointed to any other specific, affirmative evidence of probable, significant health impacts resulting from loss of light. Appellant has failed to meet its burden of proof, and its claim fails.

2. Loss of Light

Appellant attempts to employ an incorrect legal standard to establish that loss of light impacts unrelated to health will be significant. First, Appellant incorrectly suggests that because an online dictionary defines “moderate” as “average,” an “EIS is required whenever impacts may be more than average.” Appellant Br. at 15. Appellant then twists this language further, asserting that an EIS is required for *any* impact that is not “typical, frequent, or common.” Appellant Br. at 25-26. These statements are incorrect. Appellant’s line-drawing attempt conflicts with SEPA’s definition of “significance” as a concept that “does not lend itself to a formula or quantifiable test.” WAC 197-11-794(2). In addition, Appellant’s assertion that *any* “uncommon” or “infrequent” impact is, by definition, “more than a moderate adverse impact on environmental quality” is self-evidently unworkable. *See id.*

Appellant has not provided evidence that a reduction of natural light will cause significant impacts of any kind. Mr. Clark asserted that Fischer Studio Building residents would experience a decrease in the number of hours during which their units would achieve the “50 lux” and “200 lux” metrics from natural daylight alone. *See* Ex. 26 at 9-10. As a result, he suggested, residents would need electric light to read unless sitting by the window and that their ability to “experience the warmth of the sun” would be reduced. *See* Appellant Br. at 25.⁶ This

⁶ Mr. Clark did *not*, as Appellant suggests, state that “50 lux is the amount of light a person would need to move around their house without bumping into things.” Appellant Br., p. 24, *see also id.*, pp. 9, 25. Instead, when asked by counsel to describe 50 lux “in human terms,” Mr. Clark said: “It would be when you walk into a movie theater before the movie starts. It’s not super dim, but it’s a little bit dimmer than it was in the lobby. It’s what you would experience, it’s what’s recommended in fine dining. It’s bright enough for mobility, it’s bright enough to maybe read a menu, but it’s not something that’s going to be useful for visual acuity. It’s just kind of a general recommended lighting for a home environment, essentially.” *Clark Testimony*, Day 1 Zoom Recording, 5:34:45. Nothing in this testimony or the other exhibits cited by Appellant indicates that walking through an apartment is a task requiring “visual acuity” or otherwise supports the assertion that Fischer Studio Building residents will “need electric lights simply to move about their homes.” Appellant Br., p. 25; *see* Ex. 26, pp. 6-7, 25-33; Ex. 32, pp. 18-26.

1 does not establish a significant adverse impact. Again, the recitation of possible impacts is
2 insufficient to meet Appellant’s burden of proof. *See Save Madison Valley, supra*, at 12; *Seattle*
3 *Mobility Coalition, supra*, at 7. Moreover, as Professor Lockley noted, however, a “photon is a
4 photon” for purposes of stimulating the visual systems: the body does not distinguish between
5 electric and natural light sources. Mr. Clark’s study omitted any evaluation of the baseline
6 electric light sources used in the Fischer Studio Building despite the testimony of Fischer Studio
7 Building residents that they do use electric light sources in their units. *Ringen Testimony*; *see*
8 Respondent Br. at 25-26. Mr. Clark’s study proves nothing about the reduction of light where it
9 omits such evaluation. Appellant’s claim around the “loss of light” untethered from the alleged
10 human health impacts does not come close to meeting its burden under SEPA and should be
11 rejected.
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14 3. Geotechnical Considerations

15 Appellant’s claims regarding the alleged “risk of physical damage to the Fischer Studio
16 Building” fail for the same reasons discussed above. Nowhere in the eight pages of the
17 Appellant’s Brief discussing this issue does Appellant actually state that the Project will have
18 probable, significant adverse impacts to earth or to any other element of the environment. *See*
19 Appellant Br. at 47-54. Instead, Appellant repeatedly expresses the “serious *concern*” that there
20 is a “significant *risk* of physical damage” and insists that the City’s threshold determination
21 “should be reversed and remanded for further *evaluation* of these issues.” *Id.* (emphasis added).
22 As with Appellant’s other claims, Appellant’s “concern about a potential impact, and an opinion
23 that more study is necessary” is insufficient to meet its burden of proof. *Save Madison Valley,*
24 *supra*, at 11.
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1 Appellant provided no evidence going beyond this assertion. Appellant's expert witness,
2 Darren Johnston, asserted only that there will be a risk, rather than a likelihood, of damage from
3 the Project.⁷ Although Appellant's Brief includes the statement that there is "likely to be
4 significant damage" to the Fischer Studio Building, *see* Appellant Br. at 54, this is not actually
5 an assertion that such damage is a probable impact of the Project. Instead, when read in context,
6 along with Appellant's statement that "there is a *significant risk* of ground movement," this can
7 only be interpreted as an assertion that significant damage to the Fischer Studio Building is likely
8 *if that ground movement were to occur. See id.* (emphasis added). Nothing in Appellant's
9 presentation or Brief suggested that damage is *probable*, only that it is possible. Again, this
10 alone is a sufficient reason to deny this claim.
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13 In fact, the evidence in the record demonstrates that the earth movement under the
14 Fischer Studio Building alleged by Mr. Johnston – who is not a geotechnical engineer and
15 performed no independent analysis of earth movement – will not occur. Matt Smith, a
16 geotechnical engineer with more than 25 years of experience, explained that the City requires
17 development projects using temporary excavation support systems to limit deflection (*i.e.* lateral
18 deformation of soil) to 1 inch or less, but that the Project will exceed this standard by limiting
19 deformation to 0.5 inches. *Smith Testimony*. A robust monitoring system will ensure that
20 deflection is limited as planned and that construction activity will stop if there is a threat of
21 exceedance. *Smith Testimony*.
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26 ⁷ Appellant inaccurately reports that Mr. Johnston stated the Fischer Studio Building's floors are "double-
27 cantilevered" and depend on unconnected beams. Appellant Br. at 51-52. While Mr. Johnston stated that this was
28 possible, he did not claim that the beams *are* unconnected and admitted that whether and how they are connected is
"unknown." *Johnston Testimony*, Hearing on Rebuttal, 3:30.

1 Mr. Johnston's asserted that lateral movement adjacent to the shoring wall, which will be
2 16 feet away from the Fischer Studio Building, could be between 0.85 and 1.71 inches.
3 Appellant Br. at 50. As both Mr. Smith and Mr. McIntosh explained, however, the amount of
4 lateral movement will decrease with distance from the shoring wall. *Smith Testimony*, Day 4,
5 Part 29, 00:30; *McIntosh Testimony*, Day 4, Part 42, 02:30. As a result, even if deflection at the
6 level Appellant suggests could occur next to the shoring wall, any resulting movement at the
7 Fischer Studio Building would be much less – indeed, Mr. McIntosh stated that he expected no
8 soil movement under the Fischer Studio Building. *Id.* Appellant's suggestion that movement at
9 the shoring wall "necessarily" means a similar amount of movement at the Fischer Studio
10 Building is based on a faulty premise and contradicted by the record.
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13 Appellant again attempts to compensate for its failure to meet its burden by improperly
14 shifting that burden to Respondents. Appellant criticizes Respondents' witnesses for their
15 supposed failure to prove that any and all risk would disappear. Appellant Br. at 53-54. But the
16 burden is not on Respondents to make that showing; instead, Appellant is obligated to provide
17 evidence that significant adverse impacts are probable, which it has failed to do. For example,
18 Appellant makes much of statements indicating that settlement by up to half an inch is "possible"
19 and "within the upper bounds" of a potential range, but these statements only confirm that
20 Appellant's claimed impacts are "possible" rather than "likely." *See* Appellant Br. at 53-54.
21 Further, Appellant's claims are based on ignoring key testimony by the *only* geotechnical
22 engineers to provide evidence – Mr. Smith and Mr. McIntosh – that earth movement would be
23 limited to .5 inch at the shoring wall and would reduce with distance so that *no* earth movement
24 would occur under the Fisher Studio Building. *Smith Testimony*, Day 4, Part 29, 00:30;
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1 *McIntosh Testimony*, Day 4, Part 42, 02:30. Appellant has the burden of proof and did not meet
2 it.

3 Finally, the Examiner should disregard the Appellant’s unsupported assertion that
4 construction issues implicate the “physical integrity of the Fischer Studio Building . . . as an
5 important historic landmark.” Appellant Br., p. 54. Having failed to substantiate its historic
6 resources claims with expert testimony during the hearing, Appellant cannot now assert them in
7 its Brief.
8

9 **D. Appellant fails to show error in the City’s design review decision.**

10 **1. Privacy and Light**

11 Appellant fails to establish that consideration of “privacy,” as well as consideration of
12 “light” in the sense raised by its claims, are required by the design review process. For the
13 reasons stated in Respondents’ Joint Motion for Partial Dismissal, “privacy” is not a
14 consideration required by the Downtown Guidelines. Appellant’s unsupported assertions that
15 privacy “would fit” under broad language in Chapter 23.41 (such as “promotion of public health
16 and welfare” and “desirable urban feature”) do not establish otherwise. *See* Appellant Br. at 42-
17 43; *see also Nagele Testimony*, Day 3, Part 2, 1:13:00 (Board has not previously required a
18 privacy study to her knowledge). The design review guidelines are not prescriptive even with
19 regard to the issues that are specifically named, let alone those are not. Ex. 23 at 7 (“Design
20 guidelines offer a flexible tool – an alternative to prescriptive zoning requirements . . .”).
21 Nonetheless, even if this consideration were required, the record establishes the well-considered
22 and correct nature of the Board’s approval of the Project. Respondent Br. at 45-48. The contrary
23 opinion of Appellant’s expert witness does not establish error by the City. *See id.*
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1 Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Respondents have not disputed that consideration of
2 light can be “relevant” to the design review process. *See* Appellant Br. at 42-43. But as noted at
3 page 44 of Respondents’ Brief, the reference to “direct sunlight” in Downtown Guideline A1
4 concerns the amount of light reaching the project under consideration. Appellant cites no
5 language from the guidelines requiring what it apparently seeks: the equivalent of a SEPA
6 impacts analysis regarding light and adjacent residences. There is no such requirement. *See*
7 *Torres Testimony*, Day 4, Part 48.

9 **2. The City consistently applied the guidelines.**

10 Section D.1 of Appellant’s Brief asserts that the City’s design review decision should be
11 reversed because of the Board’s alleged failure to examine light and privacy impacts with the
12 same degree of “scrutiny” it applied to the 2015 Proposal. Appellant Br. at 38. This claim fails
13 because it was entirely appropriate for the Board to consider two entirely different projects in a
14 different manner. *See* Respondent Br. at 54-57. The Board’s review of the 2015 Proposal
15 examined an office building with entirely different massing and design, not a high-rise
16 residential tower. Nor did the Board’s request for additional alternative options mandate any
17 specific consideration or design element. *See* Ex. 11 at 4. Indeed, the Board does not have the
18 authority to do this – it can only apply the Guidelines, which expressly encourage flexibility. Ex.
19 23 at 7. Appellant’s claim is essentially that once the Board has asked a development applicant
20 to examine a particular issue, *any future proposal* for that site, regardless of use, must utilize the
21 massing approach suggested by the Board’s request. This is self-evidently absurd. The Board
22 did not need to require the Project to utilize the same design as the 2015 Proposal in order to
23 apply the Guidelines consistently.
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1 Nothing in Appellant’s Brief counters these points or otherwise establishes that the City
2 inconsistently applied the Downtown Guidelines. Section D.1 does not state that any guideline
3 was inconsistently applied – indeed, it does not even reference any guideline. Appellant Br. at
4 38. Instead, Appellant argues that the Board did not require the same type of “analysis” for the
5 Project as for the 2015 proposal; there was “no effort to ensure consistency”; and this alleged
6 error was magnified because a Board member participated in both decisions. Appellant Br. at
7 39. Each of these assertions challenges the procedures employed by the Board in reaching its
8 conclusions about the Project’s consistency with the applicable guidelines. The Examiner lacks
9 jurisdiction over the procedural requirements of SMC Chapter 23.41 and cannot consider these
10 claims. *Escala, supra*, Amended Findings and Decision at 20.

13 Neither of the Code provisions that Appellant cites at page 38 of its Brief provides a basis
14 for its claim. First, SMC 23.41.008.A.5 states that the Board “shall perform the following, as
15 applicable: . . . Ensure fair and consistent application of Citywide or neighborhood-specific
16 design guidelines.” This provision applies to the review process utilized by the Board and does
17 not directly concern a proposal’s consistency with the design guidelines. Appellant’s suggestion
18 that the requirements of SMC 23.41.008.A.5 have been violated is inherently a procedural
19 challenge that the Examiner may not consider.

21 Second, SMC 23.41.008.F.3.a states that SDCI “shall make compliance with the
22 recommendation of the Design Review Board a condition of permit approval, unless the Director
23 concludes that the recommendation . . . [r]eflects inconsistent application of the design review
24 guidelines.” Notably, this language does not support Appellant’s claim that “SDCI’s design
25 review decision should be reversed,” *see* Appellant Br. at 42, because SMC 23.41.008.F does not
26 make consistent application of the guidelines a condition of approving a permit; instead, the
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1 consideration applies only to whether the Director makes compliance with the Board's
2 recommendation a condition of approval. *Compare* SMC 23.41.008.F.2 with SMC
3 23.41.008.F.3. Appellant's claim therefore makes no sense: if it were to prove that the City
4 improperly applied SMC 23.41.008.F.3.a, the only result would be that compliance with the
5 Board's recommendation would *not* be a condition of approval.
6

7 Appellant's comparison of the Applicant's privacy study with the Dr. Adhya's
8 conclusions, *see* Appellant Br. at 39-42, suffers from the same flaws as its other "consistency"
9 arguments. Appellant's central assertion is that the Board improperly failed to recognize the
10 supposed flaws in Applicant's analysis and require additional alternatives. *Id.* This, again, is a
11 procedural argument that may not be asserted in this appeal. Appellant also contends that the
12 Project should have been subject to a 2015 requirement for analysis that, in Appellant's own
13 words, was "clearly aimed at understanding whether *office workers* would be able to peer into
14 residences across the alley." Appellant Br. at 39 (emphasis added). Appellant cites no authority
15 supporting its theory that the City clearly erred by failing to require the same analysis for a
16 residential project. The City did not err.
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19 **3. The Project is consistent with the guidelines.**

20 Appellant fails to establish that the Project as approved and conditioned will violate any
21 of the Downtown Guidelines. It argues first that SDCI's design review decision should be
22 reversed due to the alleged lack of "analysis" quantifying the amount of sunlight that will reach
23 the Fischer Studio Building through the "gap" in the Project. Appellant Br. at 45. Despite
24 asserting that the Project will "violate the specific terms of the city's Downtown Design
25 Guidelines," Appellant once again fails to cite any such terms, to name any of the guidelines, or
26 to explain how its challenge to the Board's "analysis" is anything other than an improper
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1 procedural claim. Appellant also does not actually contest that the gap will increase the amount
2 of sunlight reaching the middle of the block, arguing only that the amount is not “reasonable” or
3 “meaningful.” *Id.* This does not establish inconsistency with any applicable guideline.

4 Appellant’s second argument, regarding privacy, fails for the same reason.

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6 Appellant next asserts that the decision to place the larger “Mama Tower” on the north
7 side of the Project Site was erroneous. This argument, again, largely depends on misrepresenting
8 the record and the standard of proof. In particular, Appellant’s assertion that the Board made the
9 decision by ignoring all buildings other than towers, *see* Appellant Br. at 36, is contradicted by
10 the Board’s decision, which expressly describes the considerations related to the Fischer Studio
11 Building and other “shorter buildings across the alley” that the Board employed. Ex 7 at 5.
12 Likewise, Mr. Steinbrueck’s disagreement with the Board’s interpretations do not establish error
13 by the City. *Alexandria Homeowners*, HE File No. MUP-15-001, Findings and Decision at 7
14 (June 17, 2015).

15
16 Appellant does cite one guideline to support its argument: Downtown Guideline B-2
17 (“Buildings on zone edges should be developed in a manner that creates a step in perceived
18 height, bulk, and scale between the development potential of the adjacent zones.”). According to
19 Appellant, the Board violated this guideline by stating that the northern tower alignment would
20 provide “a more sympathetic response to the shorter buildings across the alley by placing the
21 ‘baby tower’ closer to the shorter building which created a better transition in height and scale,”
22 but failing to recognize that the shortest building may be redeveloped. Appellant Br. at 47; *see*
23 Ex. 7 at 5. Even if this assertion could establish a project’s inconsistency with Guideline B-2
24 (which it could not), it would not do so here, because the Applicant’s design and Board’s
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consideration of the Project's massing specifically considered the "development potential" of the area across the alley. *See* Respondent Br. at 49-50.

Appellant's distaste for the Project does not establish inconsistency with the Downtown Guidelines. All of Appellant's design review claims fail.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons, Respondents Applicant and City jointly request that the Hearing Examiner deny Appellant's appeal and uphold the City's Decision in all respects.

DATED this 16th day of July 2021.

s/Courtney A. Kaylor, WSBA #27519

s/Ian Morrison, WSBA #45384

s/David P. Carpman, WSBA #54753

McCULLOUGH HILL LEARY, PS

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6600

Seattle, WA 98104

Tel: 206-812-3388

Fax: 206-812-3398

Email: courtney@mhseattle.com

Email: imorrison@mhseattle.com

Email: dcarpman@mhseattle.com

Attorneys for Applicant 1516 2nd Condominiums, LLC

s/Daniel B. Mitchell, WSBA #38341

Assistant City Attorney

SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050

Seattle, WA 98104-7097

Ph: (206) 684-8202

Fax: (206) 684-8284

Email: daniel.mitchell@seattle.gov

Attorney for Respondent

Seattle Department of Construction & Inspections