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BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
FOR THE CITY OF SEATTLE

In Re: Appeal by

ESCALA OWNERS ASSOCIATION

of Decisions Re Land Use Application
for 1933 5th Avenue, Project 3019699

MUP-20-012

ESCALA OWNERS ASSOCIATION’S
CLOSING ARGUMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

The city’s SEPA responsible official determined that construction of a 48-story building at 1933 5th Avenue, cheek-to-jowl with the Escala, would have significant adverse environmental impacts. SEPA Determination of Significance ((July 3, 2017).¹ The responsible official then determined that an environmental impact statement (EIS) drafted in 2003 and finalized in 2005 could be used in lieu of drafting a new EIS. *Id.* In a prior proceeding, the Hearing Examiner determined that staff had not adequately assessed the project’s health impacts resulting from a loss of light in the homes of nearly 200 Escala residents. *In the Matter of the Appeal of the Escala Owners Association*, (MUP-17-035), Amended Findings and Decision (June 12, 2018) at 21 (DS remanded “for the purpose of evaluating the proposal’s impacts as they relate to loss of light within the Escala residential units”).

¹ The DS was exhibit 89 in the prior hearing and part of appellant’s exhibit 2 in this hearing.

1 On remand, SDCI stuck to its guns. This appeal has proved it wrong. The evidence of a
2 dramatic loss of light is undisputed. Scientists on both sides concur that the loss of light is associated
3 with severe health risks, including cancer and diabetes. But the respondents argue that because the
4 magnitude of that risk cannot be quantified, a determination of non-significance should be upheld.
5 There are two flaws with that approach.

7 One, the definition of “significance” takes into account not just the likelihood of an occurrence
8 but its severity. If there were uncertainty about the likelihood of an impact of less consequence, a
9 determination of non-significance might be justified. But here, the impacts are severe (*e.g.*, cancer,
10 diabetes and other extremely serious health issues). Nearly 200 people are exposed to this risk. That
11 the risk cannot currently be quantified should not detract from the significance of the risk. An EIS
12 should be prepared.

14 The second flaw is that the responsible official totally ignored the SEPA rule that addresses
15 circumstances where information important to a decision is unavailable. In that situation, the rule
16 requires a weighing of a decision to proceed with the severity of the possible adverse effects. If the
17 agency decides to proceed in the face of that uncertainty, it must prepare a worst case analysis:

18 If information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision
19 and the means to obtain it are speculative or not known;

20 Then the agency shall weigh the need for the action with the severity
21 of possible adverse impacts which would occur if the agency were to
22 decide to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it
23 shall generally indicate in the appropriate environmental documents its
worst case analysis and the likelihood of occurrence, to the extent this
information can reasonably be developed.

24 WAC 197-11-080(3)(b).

25 But there is no evidence that the city “weigh[ed] the need for the action with the severity of
26 possible adverse impacts which would occur if the agency were to decide to proceed in the face of

1 uncertainty.” Nor, once it decided to proceed in the face of that uncertainty, did it prepare the required
2 worst case analysis. These twin failings requires a remand so that staff can comply with the rule,
3 prepare an EIS, “weigh the need for the action with the severity of the possible adverse impacts” and,
4 if it still thinks proceeding is a good idea, prepare the mandatory worst case analysis.
5

6 II. ARGUMENT

7 A. Standard of Review

8 The adequacy of an EIS is a question of law subject to de novo review. *Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce*
9 *Cty.*, 124 Wn.2d 26, 37–38, 873 P.2d 498, 504 (1994). EIS adequacy involves the legal sufficiency of
10 the data in the EIS. *Id.* Adequacy is assessed under the “rule of reason,” which requires a reasonably
11 thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences of the
12 agency's decision. *Id.* The court will give the agency determination substantial weight. *Id. citing* RCW
13 43.21C.090.
14

15 Here, the city determined an EIS drafted in 2003 and finalized in 2005 “adequately address[ed]
16 the environmental considerations set forth is RCW 43.21C.030 [*e.g.*, alternatives, impacts,
17 unavoidable impacts].” RCW 43.21C.034. Whether the 2005 EIS adequately addressed those
18 considerations should be considered using the *de novo* standard of review typically used for reviewing
19 the adequacy of an EIS. Whether an EIS is being used for the proposal for which it was originally
20 prepared or a later one, the issue remains the same: Does it adequately address the environmental
21 considerations required by RCW 43.21C.030? That is an issue of law, reviewed *de novo*. *Id.*
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1 **B. When a Determination of Significance is Made and a Prior EIS is Adopted to**
2 **Address SEPA’s Requirements for Detailed Environmental Review, a New EIS**
3 **or Supplemental EIS Must be Prepared to Address Any Issues Not Adequately**
4 **Addressed by the Prior EIS**

5 The overriding and central premise of the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), ch. 43.21C
6 RCW, is that, for any major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment, the lead
7 agency must prepare a detailed statement on, among other things: (1) the environmental impacts of
8 the proposed action, (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
9 proposal be implemented, and (3) alternatives to the proposed action. RCW 43.21C.030.

10 The first step in the SEPA process is the “threshold determination.” RCW 43.21C.033; WAC
11 197-11-310; SMC 25.05.310. This is a determination of whether a proposal is a major action
12 significantly affecting the environment pursuant to RCW 43.21C.030. WAC 197-11-330 specifies the
13 process, including criteria and procedures, for determining whether a proposal is likely to have a
14 significant adverse environmental impact. *See* WAC 197-11-794. The threshold determination is the
15 formal determination about whether an EIS must be prepared. WAC 197-11-330. When the
16 responsible official makes a threshold determination, it is final and binding on all agencies, subject to
17 the provisions of this section and WAC 197-11-340, 197-11-360, and Part Six of the SEPA rules.
18 WAC 197-11-390.

19 If the responsible official determines that a proposal “may” have a probable significant adverse
20 environmental impact, the responsible official shall prepare and issue a DS. WAC 197-11-360. When
21 a DS is issued for a proposal, that means that the proposal is a “major action significantly affecting the
22 quality of the environment” and the requirements of RCW 43.21C.030 are triggered. RCW
23 43.21C.030; *see also Moss v. City of Bellingham*, 109 Wn. App. at 14. The agency must prepare an
24 EIS to evaluate the proposal’s environmental impacts, any adverse environmental effects which cannot
25 EIS to evaluate the proposal’s environmental impacts, any adverse environmental effects which cannot
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1 be avoided should the proposal be implemented, and alternatives to the proposed action. RCW
2 43.21C.030.

3 An EIS is particularly important because it documents the extent to which SDCI “has complied
4 with other procedural and substantive provisions of SEPA; it reflects the administrative record; and it
5 is the basis upon which the responsible agency and officials can make the balancing judgment
6 mandated by SEPA between the benefits to be gained by the proposed ‘major action’ and its impact
7 upon the environment.” *Juanita Bay Valley Cmty. Ass’n v. City of Kirkland, supra*, 9 Wn. App. at 68.
8 The mandatory elements include an analysis of impacts and measures to mitigate those impacts, a
9 description of unavoidable impacts, and the alternatives analysis — the heart of the EIS requirement.
10
11 *Id.*

12 When an agency decides to use an existing EIS in lieu of drafting a new one, the foregoing
13 requirements still apply. The statute that authorizes re-use of an existing EIS expressly states that an
14 existing EIS may be used only if it “adequately address[es] the environmental considerations set forth
15 is RCW 43.21C.030.” RCW 43.21C.034.

17 SEPA authorizes phased review, where more generalized analysis on a planning level
18 document is followed by more detail on a project-level document, but phased review is not a gambit
19 for first reviewing broad issues at a general level and then failing to prepare a follow-up EIS on the
20 site-specific issues. The second phase of phased review is supposed to be an EIS that focuses on the
21 narrow issues that were not analyzed or not analyzed in detail in the earlier programmatic EIS:
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23 (2) A nonproject proposal may be approved based on an EIS assessing
24 its broad impacts. When a project is then proposed that is consistent
25 with the approved nonproject action, the EIS on such a project shall
26 focus on the impacts and alternatives including mitigation measures
specific to the subsequent project and not analyzed in the nonproject
EIS. The scope shall be limited accordingly. Procedures for use of
existing documents shall be used as appropriate, see Part Six.

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2 (3) When preparing a project EIS under the preceding subsection, the
3 lead agency shall review the nonproject EIS to ensure that the analysis
4 is valid when applied to the current proposal, knowledge, and
technology. If it is not valid, the analysis shall be reanalyzed in the
project EIS.

5 WAC 197-11-443.

6 Thus, reliance on an earlier, nonproject EIS is not authorization for skipping an EIS for a
7 subsequent site-specific project — especially when, as here, the agency has determined the project has
8 probable significant adverse impacts and issued a DS accordingly. The project-specific EIS need not
9 re-analyze issues that were analyzed in the programmatic EIS (if that analysis remains “valid”), but
10 the project-specific EIS must analyze in detail (“shall focus on”) the “impacts and alternatives . . .
11 specific to the subsequent project and not analyzed in the nonproject EIS”.

13 **C. An Addendum Can Not Be Relied on as a Substitute for an EIS or SEIS**

14 An addendum cannot be used as a substitute for an EIS. *Klickitat Cty. Citizens Against*
15 *Imported Waste v. Klickitat Cty.*, 122 Wn.2d 619, 631, 860 P.2d 390, 398 (1993), *as amended on*
16 *denial of reconsideration* (Jan. 28, 1994), *amended*, 866 P.2d 1256 (1994). Procedurally, the steps in
17 creating an addendum are different (and less demanding) than those involved in preparing an EIS.
18 Whereas an EIS must first be scoped, no scoping is required for an addendum. *Compare* WAC 197-
19 11-408 *with* WAC 197-11-625. Whereas an EIS is first published as a draft and circulated to other
20 agencies with expertise and the public for comment, no such scrutiny is required for an addendum.
21 *Compare* WAC 197-11-455 *with* WAC 197-11-625. Whereas a final EIS must be prepared and must
22 include a response to the comments on the draft EIS, no such final analysis and no such transparency
23 is required for an addendum. *Compare* WAC 197-11-460 and 560 *with* WAC 197-11-625.
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1 Substantively, the two documents are distinct, too. An EIS must include all of the information
2 summarized in WAC 197-11-440 (a detailed discussion of alternatives, summary of existing
3 environment, analysis of impacts, and more). In contrast, an addendum is reserved for supplemental
4 material that does not materially modify the prior analysis. WAC 197-11-660(4)(c); Ex. 76.

5
6 The 2005 FEIS does not address the adverse health effects of a loss of light on the Escala
7 residents. The issue in this case is whether those impacts are significant. If so, an EIS (or supplemental
8 EIS) must be prepared. The most recent addendum provides the City's rationale for concluding that
9 those impacts are not significant. As shown at the hearing and summarized here, the Examiner should
10 conclude that the impacts are significant and require an EIS.

11 **D. The Timing Issue: The Design Review Process for the 5th and Virginia Proposal**
12 **Violated SEPA Regulatory and Case Law Requirements that Disclosure and**
13 **Analysis of Environmental Impacts Must Occur Before a Decision Maker**
14 **Commits to a Particular Course of Action.**

15 SEPA is the legislative pronouncement of our State's policy to assure that the environmental
16 impacts of government decisions are considered **before**, not after, government decisions are made.
17 *Lands Council v. Washington St. Parks & Recreation Comm'n*, 176 Wn. App. 787, 807–808, 309 P.3d
18 734 (2013). *See also Stempel v. Dept. of Water Resources, supra*, 82 Wn.2d at 118; *ASARCO, Inc. v.*
19 *Air Quality Coalition*, 92 Wn.2d 685, 707, 601 P.2d 501 (1979) (SEPA requirements constitute a
20 directive to shape the future environment “by deliberation, not default”).

21 Ms. Bolser's testimony to the contrary, environmental documents are not paperweights,
22 hidden from view of an agency's review bodies. They are to be used by agency staff, advisory boards
23 and decision makers as a project moves through the administrative process, so that better
24 recommendations and decisions are made. SEPA regulations and decades of case law instruct that
25 SEPA's requirements are to be met early in the process before momentum builds in favor of one
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1 alternative or another. WAC 197-11-055(2); *Lands Council v. Washington State Parks Recreation*
2 *Comm’n*, 176 Wn. App. 787, 803-04, 309 P.3d 734, 742-43 (2013); *King County v. Boundary Review*
3 *Bd.*, 122 Wn.2d 648, 663 (1993). The disclosure and analysis of environmental impacts must occur
4 before commitments to a particular course of action are made. WAC 197-11-055(2)(c); WAC 197-
5 11-448(1); *City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound Regional Council*, 108 Wn. App. 836, 849 (1999).
6 SEPA regulations require that the “lead agency shall prepare its threshold determination and
7 environmental impact statement, if required, *at the earliest possible point in the planning and decision-*
8 *making process*, when the principle features of a proposal and its environmental impacts can be
9 reasonably identified.” WAC 197-11-055(2) (emphasis supplied). Both the threshold determination
10 and Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) must be developed early. “The [EIS] shall be prepared
11 early enough so it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decision-making process
12 and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.” WAC 197-11-406.
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15 Ms. Bolser frankly testified that, in essence, the Design Review process for the 5th and Virginia
16 Proposal violated SEPA regulatory and case law requirements. In direct violation of the law, the
17 Design Review Board’s decisions were not informed by SEPA. Depriving the Design Review Board
18 of environmental analysis in its process is a blatant violation of SEPA’s requirements.
19

20 According to the Seattle Code, the applicable design guidelines are intended to mitigate the
21 adverse height, bulk, and scale impacts addressed in the SEPA policies. SMC 25.05.675.G. A project
22 that is approved pursuant to the design review process is presumed to comply with these height, bulk,
23 and scale policies. *Id.* The code states that the Design Board can condition the 5th and Virginia Proposal
24 via the City’s SEPA authority by, among other things, modifying the bulk of the development,
25 repositioning the development on the site, or requiring increased setbacks or other techniques to offset
26 the appearance of incompatible height, bulk, and scale. *Id.*

1 The Design Review Board has the opportunity and duty to push the design in various directions
2 to obtain greater conformity with applicable design guidelines. In doing so, the board should be
3 cognizant that the environmental impacts of different designs may be different. A design that does a
4 little bit better addressing one design guideline may, unfortunately, create worse environmental
5 impacts. The Board should be informed when it is pushing one design or another whether there are
6 environmental consequences associated with those choices. SDCI's process leaves the Board blind to
7 the environmental consequences of its efforts and recommendations. SDCI's process violates SEPA.²

9 That the DRB process results in a recommendation, not a final decision, is no excuse for
10 depriving the DRB of the information in SEPA documents. As discussed above, SEPA rules and case
11 law emphasize, repeatedly, that environmental review must be completed as early as possible in the
12 "process," not just before a final decision is made. The city's process places great weight on the Design
13 Review Board's recommendations. SDCI must adopt the Board's recommendations absent
14 extenuating circumstances. SMC 23.41.014. To preclude the Board from considering the
15 environmental impacts of its own recommendations is a dreadful failing of the city's permitting
16 process. The Board issued decisions that were not informed by any of the information that would be
17 included in an EIS assessing the building's height and bulk impacts on light and health. The Board did
18 not have the opportunity to review height and bulk design alternatives that would have been analyzed
19 in detail in an EIS.

22 The Board's actions, uninformed by an adequate EIS, unlawfully built momentum in favor of
23 a specific alternative without the benefit of environmental review and improperly limited the choice

25 ² We do not assert that the Design Review Board has any role in preparing SEPA documents nor in
26 assessing their adequacy. The Board is not involved in the process of creating the SEPA documents. But that does not
justify the city from blocking the Board's access to the information in the SEPA documents.

1 of alternatives before SEPA review was conducted. To the extent the Seattle Municipal Code requires
2 this to occur (as Ms. Bolser testified without citation), state law obviously controls.³

3 Of particular relevance, Downtown Design Guideline A1 addresses the very issue discussed
4 in detail by Escala residents and their experts — the loss of access to daylight:

5 Each building site lies within a larger physical context having various
6 and distinct features and characteristics to which the building design
7 should respond. Develop an architectural concept and arrange the
8 building mass in response to one or more of the following, if present:

9 d. Access to direct sunlight – seasonally or at particular times of
10 the day.

11 Design Review Guidelines for Downtown Development at 10.⁴

12 The Design Review Board members did not have the benefit of an EIS addressing height and
13 bulk impacts on “direct sunlight” and the consequent health impacts. Not surprisingly, then, the DRB’s
14 recommendations failed to address the project’s significant height, bulk and scale adverse impacts on
15 Escala and failed to make recommendations for the changes necessary to mitigate those impacts. The
16 MUP decision which embodies the Design Review Board’s recommendation, prepared without the
17 benefit of an adequate EIS, should be reversed.

18 **III. SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE**

19 Two days of hearing testimony revealed far more areas of concurrence among the parties’
20 experts than disagreement. Several critical foundations for Escala’s claims were not disputed and were
21 even acknowledged by the respondents’ experts:
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25 ³ A local ordinance cannot modify state law. This is a bedrock principle of state constitutional law.
26 “Under article XI, section 11 of the Washington State Constitution, a city has the authority to “make and enforce within its
limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations *as are not in conflict with general laws.*” *Chan v. City of Seattle*,
164 Wn. App. 549, 559 (2011) (emphasis supplied) (finding local gun control ordinance invalid).

⁴ Available at: <http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/SDCI/About/DowntownDesignGuidelines.pdf>

- 1 1. The Douglaston tower would reduce light in the Escala units dramatically. No one
2 contested the overall accuracy of Mr. Clark’s analysis showing a loss of virtually all
3 natural light in some of the units and significant losses of light in most east-facing units
4 at all times of the year.⁵
- 5 2. Because of their east-facing direction, the decrease in natural daylight in the Escala
6 will be particularly severe during the morning and winter months.
- 7 3. The reduction in natural daylight would lead to a substantial decrease in the number of
8 days per year in which natural daylight would be sufficient to efficiently stimulate the
9 circadian system.
- 10 4. Loss of access to natural daylight is associated with significant adverse health
11 conditions, including cancer, metabolic disorders, mental health issues (especially
12 depression), and diabetes.⁶
- 13 5. While electric light, if precisely engineered (as in the space shuttle and specially
14 equipped hospitals) can trigger the circadian system, the proponent is not proposing to
15 mitigate its impacts on Escala by installing any such systems in the Escala.⁷

16 IV. CRITIQUE OF THE ADDENDUM

17 The foregoing unchallenged findings should have led SDCI to conclude that the project would
18 have a significant adverse effect. Instead, SDCI published a second addendum that in its “Discussion”
19 section (Addendum at 9-10) advanced various excuses and one relevant rationale for not requiring an
20 EIS. The testimony demonstrated that the numerous excuses and the one relevant rationale lacked
21 merit.

22 **EXCUSE #1:** The addendum states there is “no scientific consensus regarding a single, one-
23 dimensional metric” for calculating the physiological effects of light. Addendum at 9.

24 ⁵ Mr. Mott quibbled with some of Mr. Clark’s assumptions regarding the room layouts for a couple of
25 units, but Mr. Clark explained on rebuttal that the differences were minor and, in any event, impacted the sight lines that
26 were exhibiting the least impact in the first place. The quibbles did not impact the forecast lost light percentages for sight
27 lines with the greatest impact. In fact, it might have caused those to increase. *See* Clark Rebuttal Testimony. And Mr.
28 Mott’s big reveal that Mr. Clark’s supposed mis-analysis understanding of the floor 19 layout turned out to be a non-event
29 resulting from the omission of floor 13 in the building’s numbering system.

30 ⁶ As one notable example, Dr. Brainard’s agreed with a Covid science panel’s recommendation that
31 house-bound Covid avoiders go outdoors more to protect their own health.

32 ⁷ Indeed, the Covid science panel Dr. Brainard referenced recommended house-bound Covid avoiders go
33 outside more—not retrofit their homes with exotic, high-tech lights.

1 *Response:* Simply because there are multiple methods for measuring light does not mean that
2 it cannot be measured with sufficient certainty to estimate the amount of lost light for circadian
3 entrainment (synchronization) purposes. Mr. Clark discussed two different metrics, CS (Circadian
4 Stimulus) and EML (equivalent melanopic lux). The CS computations were done by Mr. Clark. The
5 EML computations were done by Stantec at the applicant's request. They showed basically the same
6 thing: a huge lose in light. Another consultant retained by the applicant (Brainard), prefers a third
7 metric (melanopic EDI), but he agreed that the EML metric Mr. Clark discussed was very good and
8 provides results very similar to the melanopic EDI metric he (Brainard) now favors.

10 *Conclusion:* The applicant's whole discussion about the different metrics for measuring light
11 was a smokescreen, trying to confuse a rather simple issue: No matter how measured, the project
12 would dramatically cut light to the Escala. Both metrics discussed by Clark showed roughly the same
13 dramatic decline. And Brainard agreed that one of those metrics, EML, was basically equivalent to
14 the metric recently approved by an international body (the CIE). But the authors of the addendum
15 seemed not to have picked up on that key point, *i.e.*, the smokescreen was effective. Even after
16 listening to Dr. Brainerd acknowledge that the EML metric was plenty good and showed a huge
17 reduction in light, SDCI's witness stuck to her line that uncertainty about the metric required a finding
18 that the impacts were not significant. The Examiner should exercise her *de novo* review authority⁸ and
19 find that department's rationale was based on a misunderstanding of the entire metrics discussion.

22 **EXCUSE #2:** The addendum states: "Any analysis relative to the potential impacts on human
23 health of any unique individual would require consideration of the individual's unique exposure to
24

25 ⁸ SMC 25.05.680.B.5. While review is *de novo*, the Examiner must also give "substantial weight" to the
26 staff decision. But "substantial weight" does not mean decisions not based on the facts should be upheld. This is not an
issue of giving weight to competing testimony. Brainard agreed with Clark that the EML metric was adequate and no one
contested the bulk of Clark's forecast of light reductions.

1 light and darkness as well as the other variables that have been shown to elicit changes in circadian
2 timing, such as exercise, diet and temperature, among others.” Addendum at 9.

3 *Response:* Dr. Horacio de la Iglesia explained that individualized health risk assessments like
4 that are not realistic or standard procedure. He testified that assessments of risks associated to
5 environmental exposures use population scale metrics, not individualized assessments. He used the
6 current Covid risk assessments as examples of population level risk assessments, which are commonly
7 employed, even though every individual’s response is unique. None of the respondents’ witnesses
8 contended otherwise.
9

10 *Conclusion:* This is another smoke screen. Public health officials routinely rely on population
11 level assessments, without attempting to do the impossible or impractical: calculate risk for each
12 individual. The Examiner should find that this excuse is not based on standard risk assessment
13 protocols and that staff erred in using this as an excuse for not preparing an EIS.
14

15 **EXCUSE #3:** The addendum states: “These Escala residents will continue to have
16 opportunities to access daylight based on their personal circumstances, lifestyles and preferences,
17 including access to light in the approximately two-thirds of daylight that the average Seattleite spends
18 outside their home.” Addendum at 9.

19 *Response:* As Dr. de la Iglesia testified, Escala residents should have the opportunity to stay
20 healthy right in their own homes. Many are elderly and/or retired. To properly synchronize circadian
21 clocks, it is important that light exposure occur in the early morning. Escala residents should not be
22 forced to leave their own homes in the early morning to get access to healthy amounts of daylight.
23 Mandating that the injured take action to compensate for the adverse impacts caused by the project
24 does not demonstrate that the project’s impacts are insignificant. To the contrary, the need to take such
25 action is testament to the project’s significant impacts.
26

1 *Conclusion:* This is another smoke screen. Attempting to shift the focus from the impact
2 suffered by Escala residents to measures they could take to mitigate that harm is irrelevant to the issue
3 of whether the impacts are significant in the first place.

4 It also is distressing that when it comes to mitigation, instead of the applicant considering
5 means within its own control to limit harm (*i.e.*, using the 2017 code amendments that allow the tower
6 to be skinnier and taller⁹), the applicant seeks to blame the victims for not taking steps to reduce the
7 harm caused by the applicant.

8 **Rationale #1:** The addendum provides a single explanation for not preparing an EIS that is
9 germane to the issue before the Examiner (though it, too, is intertwined with an irrelevant excuse).
10 The addendum states: “While any reduction of access to daylight is likely to be perceived as significant
11 by the residents of some east-facing Escala units, a reduction in access to daylight within one façade
12 of one residential building is a less than moderate impact to the environment when viewed in context
13 of the downtown urban environment as a whole.”

14 *Response:* This statement in the addendum consists of two intertwined explanations. One
15 focuses on the number of people exposed to the harm, that is, the (unstated) number of people residing
16 “in east-facing Escala units.” The other adds the element of the larger context, that the building is in
17 the “downtown urban environment.” We address each in turn.

18 We agree that the number of people exposed to an adverse impact is a part of the “significance”
19 equation. Here, the undisputed testimony is that close to 200 people reside in those units. Testimony
20 of Sosnowy. That number is just part of the equation, though. The nature of the harm must also be
21 considered. Exposing a couple hundred people to serious, long-term health risks is more significant
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26 ⁹ See CB119038/Ord. 125374 (amending SMC 23.49.008 (height); 23.49.011 (FAR); and 23.76.004 (review)).

1 than exposing a couple hundred people to a matter of mere inconvenience, a slight traffic delay, or a
2 minor aesthetic impact. Exposing a couple hundred people to serious adverse health impacts should
3 be viewed as a significant impact.

4 The context issue (that the building is in the downtown urban environment) is another smoke
5 screen. Certainly, as a general rule, context matters. Noise levels that are significant in a quiet rural
6 environment might not be viewed as significant in downtown. But health risks are significant whether
7 they occur downtown, in Ravenna, South Park or a remote rural area. Nothing about the city's
8 planning process for the downtown area suggests that adverse health impacts are less significant when
9 they arise there than anywhere else. The city's "context" argument is wrong and, frankly, frightening
10 in its suggestion that the health of downtown residents is less significant than the health of other city
11 residents.
12

13 **V. THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN ASSESSING SIGNIFICANCE**

14 In the end, SDCI seemed most absorbed with the uncertainty about the magnitude of the harm
15 that will be suffered due to the loss of light. We acknowledge that scientific studies documenting a
16 specific dose response relationship do not exist. But, as Dr. de la Iglesia analogized, we do not have
17 a specific dose response relationship for the Covid virus, but we know it is dangerous and act
18 accordingly.
19

20 Uncertainty is an inherent part of environmental analysis:

21 "NEPA requires that an EIS engage in reasonable forecasting. Because
22 speculation is ... implicit in NEPA, [] we must reject any attempt by
23 agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling any and
24 all discussion of future environmental effects as crystal ball inquiry."
25 *N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 668 F.3d 1067,
26 1079 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1 *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.*, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1063
2 (N.D. Cal. 2015).¹⁰

3 Uncertainty inherent in environmental assessments is not an excuse to abort the assessment.
4 SDCI reasoned that the uncertainty necessitated *not* analyzing the issue more completely in an EIS.
5 That was the fundamentally wrong decision. The uncertainty provided more support for digging
6 deeper, not turning away.
7

8 SEPA rules also address the uncertainty issue. To repeat:

9 If information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision
10 and the means to obtain it are speculative or not known;

11 Then the agency shall weigh the need for the action with the severity
12 of possible adverse impacts which would occur if the agency were to
13 decide to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it
14 shall generally indicate in the appropriate environmental documents its
 worst case analysis and the likelihood of occurrence, to the extent this
 information can reasonably be developed.

15 WAC 197-11-080(3)(b). This rule is not a license to shy away from hard questions; just the opposite.

16 The rule sets out an “if/then” protocol. If the conditions in the first paragraph are satisfied,
17 then the steps in the second paragraph shall be taken.

18 Applying that rule here, there should be no debate that the conditions in the first paragraph are
19 satisfied. Information about the health impacts of lost access to light is “information relevant to
20 adverse impacts,” it was “important” and, according to SDCI, the “means to obtain it are speculative
21 or not known.” Thus, the three conditions in the preamble are all met. We do not believe the
22 respondents have, will or can claim otherwise.
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26 ¹⁰ “The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f is substantially
similar to SEPA, Washington Courts may look to federal case law for SEPA interpretation.” *Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark
 Cty. v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd.*, 137 Wn. App. 150, 158, 151 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2007).

1 Two responses to that situation are described in the second paragraph. The first response is
2 mandatory: "[T]he agency shall weigh the need for the action with the severity of possible adverse
3 impacts which would occur if the agency were to decide to proceed in the face of uncertainty." One
4 looks in vain in the addendum or MUP for any indication that SDCI "weigh[ed]" the need for the
5 action with the severity of the possible adverse impacts. No weighing was done at all. Rather, SDCI
6 concluded that because important information about the severity of the impacts was unobtainable, it
7 would stop worrying about the issue and issue the permit. This is a blatant failure that occurred only
8 because SDCI failed to prepare the required EIS and proceeded to make its decision in ignorance.

10 The second response in the second paragraph is not mandatory. It is triggered only if the
11 agency decides to proceed. But here, SDCI decided to proceed, so the response was triggered: "If the
12 agency proceeds, it shall generally indicate in the appropriate environmental documents its worst case
13 analysis and the likelihood of occurrence, to the extent this information can reasonably be developed."
14 SDCI did not comply with this mandate either. If it had prepared an EIS, it could and should have
15 included in the EIS the "worst case analysis" triggered by this rule. Even if the impacts were judged
16 insignificant because of the uncertainty (which would have been wrong), the worst case analysis
17 should have been included in the addendum. But SDCI did not prepare a worst case analysis anywhere.

19 VI. CONCLUSION

20 The health hazards of living in a dark cave all morning have been illuminated by numerous
21 studies in the last 20 years. This is, by some standards, a relatively new environmental issue. But
22 simply because it is new and not capable of analysis with mathematical precision (contrast it with an
23 LOS calculation or compliance with a height limit) does not mean it is not significant. SDCI has the
24 opportunity here to perform an important service in the advancement of our understanding of the
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1 health impacts associated with a loss of light. But more than that, SDCI had the legal duty to do so.
2 The department should be ordered to prepare an EIS

3 Dated this 29th day of September, 2020.

4 Respectfully submitted,

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7 By: 

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