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BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER
CITY OF SEATTLE

In the Matter of the Appeal of:) Hearing Examiner File:
)
SEATTLE MOBILITY COALITION,) **W-18-013**
)
Appellants.) CITY’S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
From a Determination of Non-Significance issued)
by the Seattle City Council.)
)
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the Examiner’s September 20, 2019 Findings and Decision (“Decision”). To grant reconsideration, the Appellant must demonstrate there was an irregularity in the proceeding that prevented Appellant from having a fair hearing. Hearing Examiner Rule 3.20(a)(1). Appellant seeks reconsideration on: (1) the “Decision” portion of the Decision, and (2) the postscript (“Concerning Further Review”). Appellant’s motion should be denied. Appellant has failed to establish it is entitled to reconsideration under HER 3.20(a)(1).

Rather, Appellant seeks another bite at the apple, attempting to contort its main argument (that the DNS should be reversed and remanded) into a claim that the Examiner’s Decision remanding the DNS to City Council staff to complete Part B of the SEPA checklist is somehow a procedural

1 irregularity where Appellant was prevented from having a fair hearing. Appellant also seeks
2 reconsideration based on the decision's post-script because it fails to state appeal procedures if and
3 when the Council adopts any Comprehensive Plan amendments on Transportation Impact fees. Yet,
4 the post-script provides reference to relevant code and statute for SEPA. Even if the post-script
5 contains errors or omissions, it is not a procedural irregularity that prevented Appellant from having
6 a fair hearing. The post-script has nothing to do with the hearing or procedures under which the
7 hearing occurred. Appellant fails to carry its burden to establish any procedural irregularity which
8 prevented Appellant from having a fair hearing.

9 **II. FACTS**

10 Appellant appealed the DNS on November 15, 2018. After discovery, motions and opposing
11 counsel's travel plans, the hearing occurred on June 10, 12 and 18, 2019. The parties filed closing
12 briefs on July 19, 2019, and cross-closing briefs on July 26, 2019. On August 28, 2019, the Examiner
13 requested additional briefing on four discrete questions, which the parties filed on September 6 and
14 cross-briefs on September 11. The Hearing Examiner issued his Decision on September 20, 2019.

15 **III. ISSUE STATEMENT**

16 HER 3.20(a)(1) requires any party moving for reconsideration to establish evidence of an
17 irregularity in the proceeding where the moving party was prevented from having a fair hearing. Here,
18 the Appellant has failed to establish evidence of any irregularity in the proceeding where the Appellant
19 was preventing from having a fair hearing. Should the Appellant's motion for reconsideration be
20 denied?

21 **IV. EVIDENCE RELIED ON**

22 This response is based upon the pleadings and papers filed in this matter.
23

1 **V. AUTHORITY**

2 **A. Appellant failed to identify any irregularity in the proceeding where Appellant**
3 **was prevented from having a fair hearing**

4 Hearing Examiner Rule (HER) 3.20(a)(1) sets four circumstances where the Examiner may
5 grant a motion for reconsideration. In its motion, Appellant relies on HER 3.20(a)(1), which provides

6 3.20 (a) The Hearing Examiner may grant a party’s motion for reconsideration of a
7 Hearing Examiner decision if one or more of the following is shown:

8 (1) Irregularity in the proceedings by which the moving party was prevented from
9 having a fair hearing;

10 The HE Rules do not define or describe what it means by use of the term “irregularity.”

11 Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “irregularity” as:

12 Violation or nonobservance of established rules and practices. The want of
13 adherence to some prescribed rule or mode of proceeding; consisting either in
14 omitting to do something that is necessary for the due and orderly conducting of a
15 suit or doing it in an unseasonable time or improper manner. 1 Tidd, Pr. 512. And
16 *see McCain v. Des Moines*, 174 U. S. 168, 19 Sup. Ct. 644, 43 L. Ed. 936; *Emeric*
17 *v. Al-varado*, 64 Cal. 529, 2 Pac. 418; *Hall v. Munger*, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 113; *Corn*
18 *Exch. Bank v. Blye*, 119 N. Y. 414. 23 N. E. S05; *Salter v. Hilgen*, 40 Wis. 365;
19 *Turrill v. Walker*, 4 Mich. 1S3. “Irregularity” is the technical term for every defect
20 in practical proceedings, or the mode of conducting an action or defense, as
21 distinguishable from defects In pleadings. 3 *Chit. Gen. Pr.* 509.

22 Washington Court Rule (CR) 60(b)(1) contains similar language to HER 3.20(a)(1) and
23 provides in part that “the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for... [an] irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order.” Case law
interpreting this term in CR 60(b)(1) is instructive as to how this tribunal should interpret and
apply HER 3.20(a)(1).¹ The Court of Appeals concluded that an irregularity occurs when there is
a failure to adhere to some prescribed rule or mode of proceeding, such as when a procedural
matter that is necessary for the orderly conduct of trial is omitted or done at an unseasonable time

¹ HER 1.03(c) makes clear that the Hearing Examiner may look to the Superior Court Civil Rules for guidance.

1 or in an improper manner. *Mosbrucker v. Greenfield Implement, Inc.*, 54 Wn. App. 647, 652, 774
2 P.2d 1267, 1270 (1989). This case law interpretation of “irregularity” is consistent with the
3 definition in Black’s Law Dictionary.

4 In order for the Examiner to grant reconsideration under HER 3.20(a)(1), the Appellant
5 must identify a lack of adherence to a proscribed rule or mode of proceeding that prevented the
6 Appellant from having a fair hearing. However, rather than identify an irregularity where
7 Appellant was prevented from having a fair hearing, Appellant takes this opportunity to re-argue
8 its claim that the DNS should have been reversed and remanded, not simply remanded for further
9 work. *See* II.B of Appellant’s Motion, p. 3:11-7:27. Appellant’s disagreement with the Examiner’s
10 ultimate conclusion does not constitute an irregularity in the proceedings that prevented Appellant
11 from having a fair hearing.

12 Next, Appellant’s claim that the “Decision is ‘irregular’” in that “it directs the City to do
13 ‘any additional review it deems necessary’ without explanation as to what this may be”, which
14 Appellant claims is “outside the scope of remedies described in HER 3.18”. First, this is untrue.
15 The Decision remanded the DNS to the City “for the purposes of revising the SEPA Checklist to
16 include a determination(s) concerning the questions posed by Section B, and any additional review
17 it deems necessary to complete the threshold determination in accordance with SEPA procedural
18 requirements.” Decision. Second, the Examiner’s Rules authorize a remand of a Department’s
19 SEPA determination on appeal. HER 3.18 (c)(4) provides:

20 Hearing Examiner’s Decision, Contents: Decision.

21 The Hearing Examiner’s decision as to the outcome of the appeal (affirm, modify,
22 reverse, or remand) based upon a consideration of the whole record and, unless
23 otherwise provided by applicable law, supported by substantial evidence in the
record.

1 Emphasis added.

2 Further, HER 3.18(b) sets forth the scope of the Examiner’s Decision, providing “in
3 accordance with applicable law, the Hearing Examiner’s decision may affirm, reverse, modify, or
4 remand the Department’s decision or other action that is the subject of the appeal.” Remand is
5 authorized. And remand is a separate and distinct remedy from reversal. Each are called out in
6 HER 3.18(b) and (c). The Examiner’s Decision to remand, without reversing the City Council’s
7 DNS, is clearly authorized by the Hearing Examiner Rules. A remand is mentioned twice in HER
8 3.18. Appellant has failed to establish the Decision, which requires a remand without a reversal
9 of the DNS constitutes a procedural “irregularity” that prevented Appellant from having a fair
10 hearing.

11 And while Appellant spends almost five pages on its argument that “The City must issue a
12 new threshold determination”,² this entire section simply re-argues the issues already briefed by
13 the parties. Further, Appellant’s claim that the “potential for remand without specific direction”
14 were not addressed at hearing and so were not briefed by the parties. Not true. Appellant always
15 sought a reversal of the DNS and remand to the Director and argued for that throughout this
16 proceeding. *See* Notice of Appeal, p. 10:9-13, Appellant’s post-hearing brief (Subsection B. The
17 City’s failure to analyze environmental impacts requires remand, p. 24:5-26:19); Appellant’s

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² Appellant’s Motion p. 3:10-p. 7:27.

1 Supplemental Post-Hearing Brief at p. 6:17,³ p. 6:20-22,⁴ and p. 9:8-22.⁵ And, even if not briefed,
2 failure of the Examiner to offer a third round of closing briefs more than three months after hearing
3 in no way constitutes some procedural irregularity by which Appellant was prevented from having
4 a fair hearing.

5 Appellant next argues that its Motion should be granted because the post-script
6 “does not mention review by the Growth Board, although this is the ‘subsequent procedural step(s)
7 for appealing the Hearing Examiner’s decision.’ *See* HER 3.18 (5)”. Motion at p:2:24-3:2; *see* also
8 II.C. of Motion at pp.8:1-10:21. The post-script of the Decision provides:

9 **Concerning Further Review**

10 NOTE: It is the responsibly of the person seeking to appeal a Hearing Examiner
11 decision to consult Code sections and other appropriate sources, to determine
12 applicable rights and responsibilities.

13 The Decision of the Hearing Examiner in this case is the final SEPA decision for
14 the City of Seattle. Judicial review under SEPA shall be of the decision on the
15 underlying governmental action together with its accompanying environmental

16 ³ In discussing the Juanita Bay decision, state:

17 For both reasons, the court “remand[ed] this case to the City for its determination of whether it is necessary
18 to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before making a decision on the question of whether or not
19 to issue [the] grading permit,” noting that if the City could “affirmatively demonstrate prima facie compliance
20 with the procedural requirements of SEPA, *then* the burden will fall upon the appellant . . . to prove the City’s
21 decision was invalid.” *Id.* at 73-74 (emphasis added).

22 ⁴ After discussing *Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass’n v. King County Council*, stating:

23 Accordingly, the Court remanded the subdivision approval at issue for “consideration of environmental
values based on full information *before* a decision is made.” *Id.* at 279 (emphasis in original).

And like in *Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass’n v. King County Council*, the Seattle City Council has not made any type
of decision on the proposed Comp. Plan amendments.

⁵ Appellant argues for reversal but cites to *Settle* and cases that require remand only.

Recent decisions have continued to recognize that “lack of a credible threshold process precludes judicial
review of the threshold determination until the lead agency has proceeded properly on remand.” *Settle*, §
13.01[4].

In *Conserv. Nw. v. Okanogan Cty.*, No. 33194-6-III, 2016 Wn. App. LEXIS 1410, at *90 (Ct. App. June 16,
2016), the Court determined that a county’s decision to open its roads to all-terrain vehicles was accompanied
by a checklist that was “almost devoid of specific information,” containing only “repetitive, superficial,
conclusory statements regarding the potential environmental impacts” of the action.² Echoing the *Bellevue*
decision, the court declined to require an EIS – in other words, to hold specifically that there had been a
showing of significant adverse impacts – and instead remanded for preparation of a “checklist that includes
a complete disclosure and review of information relevant to the environmental impact to the areas
surrounding roads opened by the ordinance.” *Id.* at 97.

1 determination. Consult applicable local and state law, including SMC Chapter
2 25.05 and RCW 43.21C.076, for further information about the appeal process.

3 As the first quoted paragraph makes clear, it is ultimately any appealing party's responsibility
4 to research the appropriate process and timing for an appeal, and the Examiner's guidance on this is
5 not binding. Moreover, as in many other types of cases, the second quoted paragraph provides
6 appropriate guidance for judicial appeals of Examiner decisions. Appellant has failed to establish that
7 this lack of information explicitly noting an appeal to the Growth Board constitutes an irregularity in
8 the proceeding by which the moving party was prevented from having a fair hearing. In fact, Appellant
9 admits that it "does not believe it is the Examiner's responsibility to give legal advice to parties".
10 Appellant's Motion, p. 10:16-18.

11 Moreover, while the post-script does not identify an appeal to the Washington Growth
12 Management Hearings Board as being a "subsequent procedural step for appealing the Hearing
13 Examiner's Decision", the post-script provides the subsequent procedural steps:

14 The Decision of the Hearing Examiner in this case is the final SEPA decision for
15 the City of Seattle. Judicial review under SEPA shall be of the decision on the
16 underlying governmental action together with its accompanying environmental
17 determination. Consult applicable local and state law, including SMC Chapter
18 25.05 and RCW 43.21C.076,⁶ for further information about the appeal process.

19 Failure to identify a subsequent appeal the Growth Board after Council action on the proposed
20 legislation, if that occurs, does not constitute a "procedural irregularity by which Appellant was
21 prevented from having a fair hearing" as required for reconsideration.

22 However, during the August 28, 2019 post-hearing conference, the Examiner independently
23 raised concern about the post-script. Respondent City Council has no objection to the Examiner

⁶ RCW 43.21C.076 does not exist. Rather, the citation should be to RCW 43.21C.075 entitled "Appeals". The City does not object to the Examiner modifying the post-script to make clear the statutory reference should be to RCW 43.21C.075, not RCW 43.21C.076.

1 modifying the post-script to, at a minimum, correct the reference from RCW 43.21C.076, to RCW
2 43.21C.075 and, since agreed to by both parties, add a reference to the post-script referring to RCW
3 36.70A.280 or, a notation that “prior to filing a judicial appeal of the DNS, a party must first file an
4 appeal to the Washington Growth Management Hearings Board consistent with RCW 36.70A.280.”

5 The Respondent City Council and Appellant understand that, pursuant to RCW 43.21C.075,
6 an appeal of the DNS must be combined with the underlying action, which, here, would be Council
7 adoption of the proposed Comprehensive Plan legislation. *See* Decision (“Concerning Further
8 Review” and Appellant’s Motion at p. 8:2-5. And the parties also agree that because the Growth
9 Board has jurisdiction over Comprehensive Plan amendments and associated SEPA determinations,
10 any appeal of an adopted Comprehensive Plan amendment and associated SEPA determination, must
11 first go to the Growth Board before filing a judicial appeal. RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a), cited by
12 Appellant in its Motion at p. 9:3-5.

13 Finally, the Respondent City Council agrees with Appellant’s statement that the *Save Madison*
14 *Valley* order is irrelevant. Motion at p. 8:11-12. It is irrelevant because Save Madison Valley involved
15 a project-level action, not a non-project action and the statutory mechanisms for appeal are different.
16 Further, Appellant makes a variety of other arguments which are wholly irrelevant to the question
17 before the Examiner. While Respondent City Council disagrees with these arguments, it will not
18 respond to them here.⁷

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⁷ Including Appellant’s claims: (1) made in footnote 2 of its Motion at p. 8-9, and (2) that the Examiner mentioned the
Save Madison Valley court was concerned about the potential for duplicative appeals and Appellant’s claim to address
such issue at p. 10:5-15.

1 **B. CONCLUSION**

2 For all of these reasons, the Hearing Examiner should deny Appellant’s Motion for
3 Reconsideration where Appellant fails to provide evidence of any procedural irregularity that
4 prevented Appellant from having a fair hearing.

5 DATED this 7th day of October 2019.

6 PETER S. HOLMES
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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I certify that on this date, I electronically filed a copy of Respondent City’s Response to
3 Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration with the Seattle Hearing Examiner using its e-filing
4 system.

5 I also certify that on this date, a copy of the same document was sent to the following
6 party listed below in the manner indicated:

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17 *Seattle Mobility*

18 DATED this 7th day of October 2019.

19 *s/Alicia Reise*
20 Alicia Reise, Legal Assistant