CITY'S RESPONSE TO EXAMINER'S INQUIRY AT PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE

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the statutory zone of interests because "the purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions."²

As noted in Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, "The generally liberal orientation to standing in NEPA cases" is not the same as the states' approaches to standing under SEPA-noting that "among the more liberal is Connecticut, whereas Washington assumes a restrictive posture." Rathkopf goes on to state:4

In some states standing imposes a considerable obstacle, as some courts have even rejected tests which are used for cases brought under less citizen-oriented legislation. Washington is among these.⁵

Both appellants have failed to meet Washington's two prong test to establish SEPA standing here. Seattle For Growth has failed to establish how Mr. Valdez, the only identified member of the Seattle For Growth, will sustain a specific, identifiable harm based on proposed Comprehensive Plan amendments. Mr. Valdez admitted at the pre-hearing conference that it is the "uncertainty" associated with impending creation of an impact fee program combined with the Mandatory Housing affordability legislation that are causing his "harm". Such claims are insufficient to establish SEPA standing here.

Likewise, Seattle Mobility Coalition relies on claims by Koppelman and Evans that they will be harmed based on loss of onsite parking. However, as noted by the Examiner, Koppelman and Evans (representatives for the developers SLMI and Onni, respectively) cannot assume

² Nevada Land Action Ass'n. v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (Toiyabe LRMP).

³ § 9:34.Standing and threshold issues, 1 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 9:34 (4th ed.) ⁴ *Id.*

⁵ See, e.g., Concerned Olympia Residents for Environment v. City of Olympia, 33 Wash. App. 677, 657 P.2d 790 (Div. 2 1983) (rejecting claims of economic injury in case involving sale of property where plaintiff owned acreage near competing hospital). In general see Rodgers, The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 33, 47 (1984), questioning the philosophy of restrictive application in light of SEPA's aims. And see Trepanier v. City of Everett, 64 Wash. App. 380, 824 P.2d 524 (Div. 1 1992) (when person alleges threatened injury, as opposed to existing injury, he or she must show an immediate, concrete, and specific injury to him or herself).

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standing on behalf of a third party including for renters or tenants. Further, while Ms. Kaylor argued that the coalition does contain some renters or tenants, Seattle Mobility Coalition did not demonstrate this through its Notice of Appeal or its Response to the City's motion to dismiss. For this reason, Seattle Mobility Coalition has failed to establish any of its members have met the two prong standing test under SEPA including that appellants interests fall within SEPA's zone of interest and that an appellant member has concrete and particularized injury, not speculative injury.

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