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BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER  
FOR THE CITY OF SEATTLE

In Re: Appeal by  
Seniors United for Neighborhoods (SUN)  
of the City of Seattle Citywide  
Implementation of Mandatory Housing  
Affordability (MHA) Final Environmental  
Impact Statement

Hearing Examiner File No. W-17-011  
  
SUN'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

**I. The FEIS Fails to Adequately Address Environmental  
Impacts**

**The City Has Shown It Is Able to Produce a Thorough MHA (Mandatory  
Housing Affordability) Environmental Impact Analysis, But Did Not In The  
Citywide FEIS**

The City of Seattle has shown that it can create a thorough, detailed, readable MHA analysis on a neighborhood level that effectively meeting Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) and SEPA (State Environmental Policy Act) requirements with its Uptown EIS (which in a single neighborhood was a similar length to the 27 urban village citywide EIS) and its University District EIS. A similar level of

1 To provide sufficient impact analysis for the FEIS, this information could have presented or  
2 assisted environmental analysis on a variety of issues in a variety of ways.

3 For instance, because they have current building and lot square footage and MHA building  
4 maximum heights and units, these files could be used to show what development from MHA would  
5 look like compared to today—not just the current zoning, but the current buildings, which are often  
6 much lower than the zoning, making it visible to the public how the new MHA developments will  
7 look in the neighborhood. In addition to making impacts from land use and aesthetics more visible,  
8

9 This redevelopment information includes the number of units on the lot and the number of  
10 potential and capacity units under MHA, meaning it could inform decisionmakers on a parcel by  
11 parcel level or anything beyond that.

12 The information is categorized by urban village or outside an urban village, and gives a PIN number  
13 and usually also a street address, so organizing by neighborhood, and seeing the impact on that  
14 neighborhood would be available if the parcels were organized in neighborhoods, either on a map  
15 or listed.

### 17 *Historic Resources*

18 Another example is historic resources. There was extensive historic resources information  
19 which the City had in their databases (<http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/programs-and->  
20 [services/historic-preservation/historic-resources-survey](http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/programs-and-services/historic-preservation/historic-resources-survey)) in addition to easily available state and  
21 federal historic information that would have shown a significant environmental impact to historic  
22 resources in many areas of the City had the information been included, but it did not appear in the  
23 EIS for decisionmakers or the public to examine. Additionally, Spencer Howard was able not only to  
24 find the information, but to produce it in a readable map format with extensive information showing  
25 historic resources distribution.  
26

1 obtaining the information counted nothing toward the EIS because the information was already  
2 available, yet the information did not appear, or did not appear fully, in the EIS—leaving  
3 decisionmakers with less of the critical information needed to decide on policies with on  
4 environmental impacts.

5  
6 “For some proposals, it may be impossible to forecast the environmental impacts with  
7 precision, often because some variables cannot be predicted or values cannot be quantified.” SMC  
8 25.05.330.4. In the cases in this section, had the full information been provided, many values were  
9 quantified and many variables were more than predicted, providing a more through analysis of  
10 impacts and better informing Seattle City Council and the public.

11 In summary, the EIS either ignored or otherwise failed to us extensive, definitive, and  
12 concrete information that would show significant impacts, instead relying on forecast data that was  
13 less clear or reliable or simply not providing any data to those who would be making the decisions.  
14

## 15 16 **II. The DEIS Fails to Meet Its Stated Objectives**

17 The DEIS fails to meet any of its four stated objectives. Below are the Objectives as stated in the  
18 DEIS followed by how the DEIS doesn’t meet those objectives.

### 19 **Objectives (p. 1.3)**

- 20  
21 • Address the pressing need for housing affordable and available to a broad range of  
22 households.
- 23 • Increase overall production of housing to help meet current and projected high demand.
- 24 • Leverage development to create at least 6,200 net new rent- and income restricted housing  
25 units serving households at 60 percent of the area median income (AMI) in the study area  
26 over a 20-year period.

1 attain those units (see below under Displacement), nor does it establish solutions like one-for-one  
2 replacement of those demolished units, which would lay the groundwork necessary to achieve those  
3 numbers.

4           Additionally, the DEIS could create far more than 6,200 net new affordable units if it chose a  
5 higher required affordable unit threshold among many other policies. The City has refused to do this,  
6 both during the HALA negotiations and during the scoping for the DEIS itself (see notably Solutions  
7 to Seattle’s Housing Emergency, which was developed by housing activists, religious leaders and  
8 City Council aides, which provided more than 50 solutions to create more affordable housing than  
9 offered in the DEIS).

10           [New housing is “greatly skewed” towards demolition of lower-priced housing stock and  
11 replaced with more expensive homes. This increase the number of units, but decreases the supply of  
12 affordable housing. Levitus day7, part 3 4:53. Also, “new development can contribute to economic  
13 displacement at the neighborhood scale” due to amenities and higher cost units driving up rents and  
14 house prices EIS 3.48]

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16  
17 **Distribute Benefits & Burdens Equitably**

18 The DEIS absolutely does not “distribute the benefits and burdens of growth equitably.” In actuality,  
19 it does just the opposite: it increases the burden on low income people and people of color, while  
20 benefitting wealthier white people. (See “Displacement” below for further explanation.)

21 [Testimony from Reid day 2, part 9:00, Levitus day 7, part 3 and Mefford day 10, part 3 the largest  
22 economic displacement impacts are by the Black population also addresses this point.]

23 Exhibit 255 except between brackets  
24  
25  
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1 that they use as the definitive number for this estimate is woefully inadequate, even as the DEIS  
2 mentions, but then ignores. Since displacement is a core component of the DEIS, failing to  
3 adequately address displacement is a fatal flaw in the DEIS. (See pages 3.30-32 and 3.56-58, among  
4 others)

5  
6 Below are the elements that the DEIS and others mention as limiting factors to the accuracy of 17  
7 displacements per 100 as the full extent of displacements:

8 \* Language barriers or mental health

9 \* The rate TRAO-eligible households complete the application is not available

10 \* TRAO data does not include all instances of eviction.

11 \* TRAO records don't cover every instance of physical displacement caused by demolition

12 \* Does not track households with incomes greater than 50% AMI

13  
14 \* Until recently, there were no mechanisms to deter developers from evicting tenants to avoid  
15 paying relocation benefits.

16 \* Do not reflect displacement of households with incomes above 50 percent of AMI or households  
17 who should have received TRAO but did not for various reasons.

18 \* All low-income tenants on a lease are treated as members of one household and granted only one  
19 quota of relocation assistance, even if they are roommates who do not intend to seek housing  
20 together again.

21  
22 \* Not mentioned but relevant is that both many landlords and many tenants are unaware of the  
23 TRAO law. Exhibit 257

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- The DEIS does no analysis of the broad displacement of low-income people and People of Color that will occur around light rail stations due to the further increased property and land values *from the HALA upzones which allow for more and larger buildings and Urban Villages expansions*, the increased taxes stemming from the larger valuations, and the displacement from the inability to pay the higher taxes caused by the new valuations.
- When taller, wider buildings and more units on properties are built, both will be more expensive than the current small houses throughout the south end and create further high taxes that will be difficult to afford for low income people who have been living in those neighborhoods. These buildings will also change the nature of the neighborhood (both physical nature and the race and class of homeowner/tenant), are too expensive for most current residents to afford and therefore will further displacement.
- Citywide, the MHA upzones will create significant growth which will require large investments in parks (434 acres of new parks at \$2.8 billion), transit (\$54 billion light rail and Sound Transit, \$11.3 billion Metro), police, fire, schools, wastewater and water infrastructure, etc. requiring an additional large increase in taxes, which will be a hardship on low income people and people of color and create further displacement.
- Increase in land and property valuations and taxes will also impact the ability of ethnic businesses to survive and losing large numbers of their neighborhood clientele will further undermine these businesses, disrupt their communities, and also encourage further residential displacement.
- "... new growth also has the potential to attract new amenities that could increase housing demand and potentially increase economic displacement in some neighborhoods. p. 1.17

1 other area is below average and the few other areas that are above average aren't much above  
2 the average.

- 3
- 4 • These higher rents for new development are shown as one example on page 3.29 where it  
5 says: Buildings built 2010 or later rent for \$2,077 per month, on average. This is \$490 more  
6 per month than buildings constructed in the 1980s and 1990s and \$760 more than buildings  
7 constructed from 1965—1979. This rapid influx of new buildings, in aggregate, can distort  
8 the apartment market by pushing up the average of all rents.
  - 9 • Following that statement in the FEIS is another example of what was mentioned above about  
10 the FEIS stating that market rate housing lowers rents when it says: “The new supply reduces  
11 upward pressure on rents in the remaining housing stock,” but that is not what’s is happening  
12 in Seattle.
  - 13 • And while rates have gone up sharply with new development, they’ve flattened only a little  
14 while creating a greater vacancy rate, particularly in the high rent areas. For example,  
15 downtown Seattle has a 25% vacancy rate.  
16

17

18 **The EIS Significantly Downplays the Impacts of Upzones on Existing Housing Stock**

19 The information used throughout the FEIS is dated, with most of it from data that is more  
20 than four years old—while the last four years has seen Seattle’s greatest levels of demolition,  
21 displacement and gentrification, so newer data is needed.  
22

23 The FEIS also does not separate out very low earners, those earning at or below 30% of AMI  
24 from those earning 50% of median income. Exhibit 52.  
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1 Significantly less impact on historic  
2 Would create more affordable housing without upzones.  
3 Land values would be less.  
4 Little mitigation needed  
5 More targeted would allow more thorough EIS, determine impacts with greater accuracy  
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